This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

Le thème de la « non dualité » (advaïta vedanta) ouvre sur des questions liées à un vécu au-delà de nos identifications, dont celles à notre corps et à un « moi » séparé. Nous nous appuyons sur la rencontre avec des personnes témoignant d’un vécu « non duel », dans une approche phénoménologique. Cette recherche aspire à donner un nouvel ancrage à la psychologie, dans le terreau de la philosophie. D’autres questions sont abordées, telles que celles de l’identité, de nos représentations, de la réalité, de la pensée et de sa distinction d’avec la conscience, notre rapport à la souffrance, au temps, et l’intensité du vécu lorsqu’il se situe dans le présent, l’appréhension de ce qu’est la réalité pour nos témoins dans ce présent et sans la saisie par la pensée, et la disparition de la distinction sujet/objet au niveau de l’Être. Nous tentons aussi d’aborder la quête d’un absolu, en rendant compte de l’accueil de la vie telle que celle-ci nous apparaît, dans sa singularité et dans son immanence.Nous pointons aussi la difficulté de nos témoins de dire avec des mots la teneur de leur vécu, ce qui aboutit souvent à des paradoxes, mais nous tentons aussi de montrer que la rencontre est vivante et que ce n’est pas tant ce qui se dit, que ce qui sous-tend ce qui est dit, qui a valeur de vérité et d’authenticité. Le vécu « non duel » nous permet ainsi d'envisager une écoute libre de la pensée limitante, ancrée dans une résonance corporelle et émotionnelle. Enfin, il donne à la Conscience une dimension essentielle, à la fois de respect de ce qui se donne à voir et à entendre, et de réponse possible à la quête de l’Être qui sommeille en tout être humain. / The theme of "non duality" (advaïta vedanta) raises questions regarding living beyond our identifications, such as identifications with our body and with a separate “me". We build on meetings with people testifying of a non-dual living, and we do so with a phenomenological approach. This research aspires to give psychology a new anchorage in philosophy’s fertile ground.Other questions are approached, such as those of identity, of our representations, of reality, of thought and its distinction from consciousness, also raised are questions on our relation with suffering, with time, with the intensity of living when this living is situated in the present, with the apprehension of what reality is for our witnesses in this present without the grasp of thought, and with the end of the distinction subject/object at the level of the Being. We also try to tackle the topic of the quest for the absolute, while reflecting on the way we can welcome life as it appears to us, in its uniqueness and its immanence.We also point out the difficulty for our witnesses to put into words the content of their living, a situation which often leads to paradoxes. On the other hand, we also try to show that the meeting is full of life, and that it is not so much what is said than what underlies what is said - including the silence and the presence –that bears truth.Non-duality thus allows us to consider a listening free from limiting thought, anchored in a physical and emotional resonance. Lastly, it gives Consciousness an essential dimension, that of respect for what is given to be seen and to be heard, and that of a possible answer for the quest of Being which lies dormant in every human being. / El tema de la « no dualidad » (advaita vedanta) nos lleva a entender que las vivencias van másallá de nuestras identificaciones, incluso aquellas relacionadas con nuestro cuerpo y con un« yo » diferenciado.Nos apoyamos en el encuentro con personas que comparten su testimonio sobre vivencias« no duales » desde una perspectiva fenomenológica. Intentamos así apropiarnos lo másíntimamente posible de la capacidad de interpelación de estas vivencias evitando cualquierinterpretación. Esta investigación aspira a ofrecer un nuevo arraigo en la psicología dentro delámbito de la filosofía y a su capacidad de iniciar el proceso de descubrimiento del ser y delsujeto « conocedor ».También profundizo en otras cuestiones como aquellas relacionadas con la identidad, nuestrasrepresentaciones, de la realidad, del pensamiento y su diferenciación con la conciencia. Asímismo, nuestra relación con el sufrimiento, con el tiempo y la intensidad de lo vivido cuandoéste se hace presente. Abordamos igualmente la aprehensión de lo que es la realidad para laspersonas que compartieron su testimonio de este presente sin ser captado por el pensamientoy finalmente, la desaparición de la diferenciación entre sujeto y objeto a nivel del Ser.Intentamos igualmente plantearnos el deseo de búsqueda de un absoluto, relatando la acogidade la vida tal cómo se nos presenta en su singularidad e inmanencia.Consideramos importante señalar la dificultad para nuestros entrevistados de nombrar elcontenido de sus vivencias, lo que nos lleva a menudo a paradojas y, como una vez esaspalabras son dichas, pueden atraparnos en la cárcel de las certezas del saber. Sin embargointentamos también demostrar que el encuentro tiene vida y que no es tanto lo dicho como losobreentendido que tiene valor de verdad y autenticidad, incluso el silencio y el peso de unapresencia.La vivencia « adual » nos permite contemplar una escucha libre del pensamiento limitadorenraizado en una resonancia corporal y emocional. En conclusión, es la vivencia « adual » laque da a la Consciencia una dimensión esencial a la vez de respeto de lo que se ofrece a ver ya entender y de respuesta posible a la búsqueda del Ser latente en todo ser humano. / Il tema della « non dualità », advaïta vedanta, apre su delle domande legate ad un vissuto al dilà delle nostre identificazioni di cui queste al nostro corpo ed a un « io » diviso.Ci appogiamo sull’incontro con le personne che manifestano di un vissuto « non duello », in unapproccio fénomenologico. Tentiamo di afferare questo vissuto al più vicino a ciò che puòvenire ad interrogarci, evitando le interpretazione. Questa ricerca aspira a dare un nuovoancorraggio alla psicologia, nel concime della filosofia, ed in ciò che questa ultima porta in essodi messa in moto un movimento d’un processo di scoperta dell’essere e del « soggettoconoscente ».Altre temi sono abbordate, come queste dell’identità, delle nostre rappresentazioni, della realtà,del pensièro e della sua distinzione della coscienza, il nostro rapporto alla sofferenza, al tempo,e l’intensita del vissuto quando si trova nel presente, l’apprensione di ciò che è la realta per inostri testimoni in questo presente e senza inserimento del pensiero, e la scomparsa delladistinzione soggetto/oggeto al livello dell’essere. Tentiamo anche di abbordare la ricerca di unassoluto en che rende conto dell’accoglienza della vita come questa c’appare, nella suasingolarità e nella sua immanenza.Puntiamo anche la difficoltà dei nostri testimoni di dire con le parole il contenuto della loroesperienza, ciò che spesso porta ai paradossi e anche come una volta affermati le parolepossono richiudersi come una trappola, quello del sapere. Ma tentiamo anche di monstrare chel’incontro è vivente e che ha valore di verità, non tanto ciò che se dice che ciò che sottende ciòche è detto, e di autenticità, compreso il silenzio ed il contenuto di una presenza.Il vissuto « non duello » ci permette cosi di considerare un ascolto libero del pensiero limitativo,radicato in una risonanza corporea ed emotiva. Finalmente dà alla coscienza una dimenzioneessenziale, al tempo stesso di rispetto di ciò che si da a vedere ed a sentire, e di rispostapossibile alla missione dell’essere che sta dormendo in ogni essere umano. / U tema di a « non dualità », advaïta vedanta, cunduci à quistioni ligati à un campà aldilà d'inostri idintificazioni, trà i quali quilli à u nostru corpu è à un mè stessu staccatu.Ci appughjemu à nant'à u scontru cù parsoni testimuniendu d'un campà "non-duali" in un’avvicinera fenumenulogica. Pruvemu à pighjà stu campà u più strettu di ciò ch'ellu pò venaintarrugà trà mezu à no, evitendu l'intarpretazioni. Sta ricerca brama di dà un zocculu novu à apsiculugia, in u tarricciu di a filusuffia, chì porta in pettu a missa in baddu d'un prucessu discuparta di l'Essaru è di u sughjettu cunniscenti.D'altri quistioni sò avvicinati, com’è quilli di l'idintità, d'i nostri raprisintazioni, di a rialità, di upinsà è di a so distinzioni da incù a cuscenza, u nostru rapportu cù u patimentu, u tempu,l'intinsità di u campà quand'ellu si poni ind'u prisenti, circà di piddà ciò chì hè a rialità pà i nostritestimoni ind’è stu prisenti è senza essa chjappu da u pinsà, è a disparizioni di a distinzionisughjettu/ughjettu à u livellu di l'Essaru. Pruvemu dinò à evucà a cerca di un assulutu,rendendu contu di l'accogliu di a vita tali ch’ella ci si figura, in a so singularità è in a soimmanenza.Puntemu dinò a difficultà d'i nostri testimoni di dì incù parolli u cuntinutu di u so campà, ciò chìsbocca cunduci à spessu à paradossi è dinò comu una volta cacciati ditti i parolli si ponirichjoda com’è una trappula, quilla di u sapè, ma pruvemu dinò à mustrà chì u scontru hè vivu èchì ùn hè tantu ciò chì si dici, chì susteni ciò chì hè dittu, chì t'hà un valori di verità è disputichezza, includendu u silenziu è l’esistenza u tenidori d'una prisenza.U campà "non duali" ci parmetti cusì di pruspettà un ascoltu libaru di u pinsà limitanti, ancuratuin un ribombu curpurali è emuziunali. Insomma, dà à a Cuscenza una diminsioni essenziali,attempu di rispettu di ciò chì si dà à veda è à senta, è di risposta pussibuli à a cerca di l'Essaruchì durmiciulighja in ogni umanu.