Abstract
Finding something disgusting involves a particular sensuous experience and
an evaluation that the thing is of little or no value. Sensuous properties such
as digustingness are constituted by these two aspects, the sensuous and the
evaluative. In “The Authority of Affect” (2001a), Mark Johnston argues
for a detectivist account where our affective states detect mind-independent
properties of sensuous value, like disgustingness. He argues that the other
two standard positions, projectivism and dispositionalism, do not account
for the authority of affect or are incoherent. In this paper, I argue that he
is wrong to rule out dispositionalism for being incoherent and that it does
account for the authority of affect. In addition, I argue that it is best able to
capture the nature of sensuous properties and that it should be the default
account of the relation between sensuous properties and affect.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/7126 |
| Date | 28 July 2009 |
| Creators | Carman, Mary Elizabeth |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf, application/pdf |
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