Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-148).

In the following study, a lexical emotion recognition test via written stimuli was administered to 10 (8 male and 2 female) brain injured participants. Performance of brain injured individuals was compared to 30 non brain injured adults. A two way analysis of variance (groups, conditions) revealed significant effects for groups, conditions, and the interaction of groups and conditions. Implications and significance of the present results for future research are discussed. / text

Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of gross morphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the detriment of the others, often leading to an artificial emotion-cognition distinction even within emotion science itself. Attempts to reconcile this by putting the gross components back together, such as Jesse Prinz’s “embodied appraisal theory”, are, I argue, destined to failure because the vernacular concept of emotion which is used as the explanandum is not a natural kind and is not amenable to scientific explication. I examine Antonio Damasio’s proposal that emotion is involved in paradigmatic ‘cognitive’ processing such as rational decision making, and argue (1) that the research he discusses does not warrant the particular hypothesis he favours, and (2) that Damasio’s account, though in many ways a step in the right direction, nonetheless continues to endorse a framework which sees affect and cognition as separate (though now highly interacting) faculties. I further argue that the conflation of ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ may be the source of some confusion in emotion theory and that affect needs to be properly distinguished from ‘emotion’. I examine some dissociations in the pain literature which give us further empirical evidence that, as with the emotions, affect is a distinct component along with more cognitive elements of pain. I then argue that affect is distinctive in being grounded in homeostatic regulative activity in the body proper. With the distinction between affect, emotion, and cognition in hand, and the associated grounding of affect in bodily activity, I then survey evidence that bodily affect is also involved in perception and in paradigmatic cognitive processes such as attention and executive function. I argue that this relation is not ‘merely’ casual. Instead, affect (grounded in fine-grained details of internal bodily activity) is partially constitutive of cognition, participating in cognitive processing and contributing to perceptual and cognitive phenomenology. Finally I review some work in evolutionary robotics which reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the particular fine details of embodiment, such as molecular signalling between both neural and somatic cells matters to cognition. I conclude that cognition is ‘properly embodied’ in that it is partially constituted by the many fine-grained bodily processes involved in affect (as demonstrated in the thesis) and plausibly by a wide variety of other fine-grained bodily processes that likewise tend to escape the net of contemporary cognitive science.

This thesis explores Bolivia’s state project of alternative modernization and, specifically, its instrumentalization of indigenous identity for political gain and capitalist growth. I examine both rural development in the TIPNIS reserve and urban development in the city of El Alto in order to analyze how state and capital interests target the affective life of residents; redirecting the energies of radical movements into projects of market expansion and hailing indigenous entrepreneurial subjects.

This thesis reads individual affects in the compositions of Edward Lear, Thomas Stearns Eliot, and Stevie Smith. My central question is the extent to which compositions can be driven by, perform, and treat affect. In exploring how rhythmical tendencies ally with the representations of affect in poets’ published verses and unpublished manuscripts, I investigate how feelings are patterned and performed by poets and their poems. My research method combines close reading and biographical research with examinations of unpublished archival materials housed in the Houghton Library in Harvard, Berg Collection in New York, and McFarlin Library in Tulsa. The three types of affect I examine are: tears in Edward Lear (chapter one), nerves in T. S. Eliot (chapter two), and aggression in Stevie Smith (chapter three). Each chapter is divided into three sections and a fourth concluding section. These are chronologically as well as thematically shaped to follow the progress of a life as it comes to terms with affect in writing. In Chapter One, Lear’s Tears: ‘Breaking’ looks at moments of emotional rupture or bursting in Lear’s verses; ‘Private melody’ explores how tearfulness is secreted into and by his compositions; ‘Turtle, you shall carry me’ examines Lear’s dramatisation of rhythm as carrying us through upset; and ‘Too deep for tears’ contemplates Lear’s playful surfaces as leading us unknowingly into tearful depths. In Chapter Two, Eliot’s Nerves: ‘Early jitters’ looks at Eliot’s rhythms as dramatising moments of nervous crisis in the Inventions of the March Hare drafts; ‘Nerves in patterns’ explores how he develops this technique throughout the 1920s as influenced by his personal, theoretical, and socio-medical context; ‘Sickly vehicle’ questions whether The Waste Land drafts dramatise nervous breakdown and its treatment; and ‘When words fail’ explores Eliot’s apprehension of rhythm as a way ‘to report of things unknown’ and ‘to express the inexpressible’. In Chapter Three, Smith’s Scratches: ‘Beast within’ looks at how Smith considers her Muse to be an aggressive other that scratches for release from within her; ‘Scratching out’ examines how fantasies of violence are played out in her verses to bring her ‘ease’; ‘Too low for words’ explores how off-kilter rhythms dramatise ‘mental disequilibrium’ in her writing after 1953; and ‘Darker I move’ uncovers, through a close examination of Smith’s dying rhythms, that her music lay deeper than her words. In my afterword on disorder and dancing, I argue that these discoveries illuminate our understanding of poetics, at whose heart lies a mysterious acknowledgment of the psychosomatic nature of expression and its drive to release and re-form thoughts and feelings. If poetic rhythm can dramatise attempts to articulate and control affect, then affect moves the human creature and its language in the same way as rhythms move through bodies of poetry. This small-scale observation has large-scale implications for literary practice as feeding on psychosomatic disorder while crafting compositions of thoughts and feelings lying beyond human articulation and comprehension.

Preserving Psychick Order is an investigation into the subliminal, of a body processing trauma and transition. I explore how my mind and body filter memory, fear, and the impact of the past into the present. Since childhood, making dolls has been a way for me to express complex feelings, especially as they relate to dynamics between biological and found family. By tenderly modeling dolls after my own transforming physical features and mental processes, I make connections between the effects of my mind on my body and vice versa. I like to describe the resulting forms as queer monsters trying to camouflage themselves poorly in my parents’ home in rural Georgia. Unconscious becomes conscious, inside moves outward, and unmasking realizes the self and the trickster within.

Owing to the environmental change, ongoing advances in internets and information technology , the time¡Bspace and mass have changed. To respond to the changes, enterprises definitely should follow the trend and make appropriate adaptation. Virtual enterprises are sure to be the organization structure of the future. At present, in order to become virtual enterprises, many enterprises are making adjustment. However, partial reform or adjustment does not correspond to the definition of virtual enterprises. Therefore, only understand the characteristics of virtual enterprises, will we know how an enterprise adapts to the environmental changes. Through the review of literature and case study, this paper includes the characteristics of virtual enterprises as the followings : goal-function oriented¡Bthe emergence of knowledge-based workers¡Btremendous and closely-connected strategic alliance¡Bemploying information technology to proceed process reengineering. Obviously, the pattern of enterprises has been changed¡Fthus, classical analytical models have to make some adjustment. This study which is based on Michael Porter's theory tries to construct a new analytical framework, hoping to help the enterprises to respond to the changing environment that enterprises are facing. The study contends that virtual enterprises should develop efficiency effect and to attract customers to use network effect and special effect to take advantage of learning effect to build entry barrier cooperation revenue to build close relationship with the supply. By synthesizing the practical experience of the case study and outcome of the analysis, this paper has presented some strategies for enterprises to cope with the changing environment. Hopefully these strategies could give other firms some inspirations.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 348-377). Also available via the Internet.

Diss.--Wien, 2003. / Sources et bibliogr. p. 332-374.

Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jan 12, 2010). Advisor: Janis Crowther. Keywords: worry, rumination, experiential avoidance, non-suicidal self-injury, functional model. Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-55).