A substantial body of literature suggests that depression influences how individuals communicate. Much of this work utilizes cognitive frameworks to explain observed differences in language of those with increased depression, as language is traditionally viewed as a cognitive process. Although cognitive models somewhat explain these observed patterns in language, an increasing amount of literature also recognizes the interconnectivity between cognition and affect. Currently, no studies examine the impact of affect on language. Thus, the current study sought to address this gap in the literature by explaining changes in language using both cognitive and affective frameworks through an examination of the influence of depression and temporary affective state on language. As in previous studies, analysis of linguistic samples from 136 adults demonstrated that depression predicted specific linguistic trends; specifically, depression positively correlated with self- and shared-identity focus. The present study took this a step further by demonstrating that induction of temporary affective states also caused changes in linguistic style, with a negative affective induction group showing more self-focus language whereas those induced with positive affect demonstrated decreased negative emotion language. I end the thesis with a discussion of the importance of the current findings, as they suggest depressed mood may be an explanatory factor in the linguistic patterns of depressed individuals

Alors qu'il existe de nombreuses études qui démontrent la manière dont une seule réaction affective impacte une décision, il n'y a pratiquement aucune recherche qui s'est intéressée à l'impact des réactions affectives multiples. De plus, les mécanismes médiateurs de cet impact sont encore débattus, et de nombreux modèles de médiation sont proposés, mais ceux-ci n'ont jamais été testés et comparés conjointement. Dans cette thèse, huit études ont été conduites qui s'intéressent de plus près à ces deux enjeux. Les résultats montrent que les réactions affectives multiples se combinent afin d'impacter la prise de décision et que dans cette combinaison les sentiments sont moyennés. Cependant, la combinaison n'a lieu que lorsque les réactions affectives sont liées à la même source de décision (p. ex. deux réactions associées à une potentielle récompense). Quand, d'autre part, les réactions affectives sont associées à deux sources de décision indépendantes (p. ex. l'une des réactions associées à une tâche et l'autre à une récompense potentielle), il n'y a pas de combinaison, et les personnes s'appuient uniquement sur l'affectivité associée à la source conséquentielle (c.-à-d. les récompenses). Enfin, le modèle de médiation, le plus systématiquement obtenu, était celui dans lequel seules les réactions affectives immédiates étaient médiatrices entre la source de l'affect et la décision. Les résultats élargissent la littérature en démontrant le phénomène de combinaison affective ainsi que les conditions aux limites qui gouvernent son impact sur la décision, ils offrent un nouvel aperçu sur ce qui agit comme médiateur de cet impact, et ils fournissent une base solide pour de futurs travaux visant à étudier l'impact des réactions affectives multiples sur les décisions. / While there is plenty of research showing how a single affective reaction impacts a decision, there is practically no research which looked at the impact of multiple affective reactions. Moreover, the mediating mechanisms of this impact are still debated, with several mediation models proposed, but never tested and compared at the same time. In this thesis, eight studies were conducted that took a closer look at these two issues. The results show that multiple affective reactions combine in order to impact the decision and that in this combination, feelings are averaged. However, the combination only happens when the affective reactions are related to the same decision source (e.g. two reactions associated with a potential reward). When, on the other hand, the affective reactions are associated with two independent decision sources (e.g. one reaction associated with a task and the other with the potential reward), there is no combination and people only rely on the affectivity associated with the consequential source (i.e. the rewards). Finally, the most consistently obtained mediation model was where only immediate affective reactions mediated between the affective source and the decision. The results extend the literature by demonstrating the phenomenon of affective combination along with the boundary conditions that govern its impact on the decision, they offer new insights into what mediates this impact, and they provide solid ground for future work aimed at looking at multiple affective reactions’ impact on decisions.

Positive affect, which has been broken down into four lower-level facets (i.e., joviality, attentiveness, self-assurance, serenity), has demonstrated numerous ties to physical and mental health. The experience of positive affect can be regulated by emotion regulation strategies. However, few studies have assessed their relationship, and no studies have examined the relationship using the lower level facets of positive affect. The link between positive affect and emotion regulation may be of particular importance for individuals at increased risk for bipolar disorder, as both are disrupted in individuals with the condition. The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between positive affect and emotion regulation while also exploring whether risk for bipolar disorder moderated their relationship. Undergraduates (N = 155) completed measures of emotion regulation, affect, and bipolar disorder risk at baseline. Using ecological momentary assessment (EMA), participants completed surveys 3 times a day for 7 days. Hierarchical linear models were estimated and revealed significant effects between certain baseline emotion regulation tendencies (experiential avoidance/ psychological inflexibility, rumination, behavioral social avoidance) and daily positive affect facets as well as between daily emotion regulation use (i.e., reappraisal, acceptance, reflection, savoring, mindfulness social support, suppression, rumination, procrastination) and daily positive affect facets. Bipolar disorder risk was not found to moderate the relationship. Findings support the use of strategies emphasized in evidence-based treatments and highlight the importance of daily practice of emotion regulation skills.

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This dissertation offers a novel interpretation of the metaphysical system Spinoza presents in his Ethics by considering it entirely in terms of power, affectivity and part/whole relations. I begin by arguing that the central concern of the Ethics is what I term ‘the problem of passivity’. Namely, if as part of nature, we are necessarily always subject to passive emotions, we could seemingly not become active to the point of adequate conception without ceasing to be a part of Nature. I argue that adequate conception, rather, requires a mereological conception of oneself as part of the whole of Nature. Since such understanding requires a conception of the whole in which these parts inhere, I explicate Spinoza’s conception of substance as that which enjoys an absolute and infinite power of existence. Inasmuch as this power of existence necessarily involves a coextensive power to act, I then argue that for Spinoza the whole of Nature is defined in terms of power. Consequently, the infinite modifications following from eternal substance ought to be considered as powerful parts of this potestative whole. Individual things are, then, to be defined as dispositional structures manifesting their capacities in interdependent relations. The thesis comes to explain this by using the Medieval mereological category of a ‘virtual whole’ (i.e. a unique particular power whose parts are inseparable from it, and only differentiated according to their own capacities). The dissertation concludes with a suggestion for further research on the possibilities that the presented theory of virtual mereology could have in relation to Spinoza’s ethico-political philosophy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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Research has supported the efficaciousness of mindfulness-based interventions on depression and general psychological well-being (Teasdale et al., 2000). Thus, researchers are beginning to examine the specific mechanisms of mindfulness's salutary effects (Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). As mindfulness has been increasingly linked to enhanced emotional awareness and emotion regulation (Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006; Chambers Gullone, & Allen, 2009), the specific act of objectively labeling affective experience has been proposed as an emotion regulation mechanism of mindfulness. Research has linked emotion regulation pathways in the brain with experimental tasks of affect labeling in individuals with high trait mindfulness (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007). The aim of this study was to examine affect labeling as an emotion regulation mechanism of mindfulness in the context of well-established cognitive models of depression. Specifically, the study investigated whether individuals asked to label facial stimuli with affective labels recovered from a negative mood more quickly, and with more emotional granularity, than those in a control condition. One hundred and forty-nine Temple University undergraduates completed measures of mood, emotion regulation, and cognitive style prior to a negative mood priming task and were randomly assigned to one of two labeling conditions: affect labeling or gender labeling (control). Emotion dysregulation proved to be an important predictor of affective response to the mood induction. Specifically, emotion dysregulation was positively associated with negative affect, and negatively associated with positive affect, preceding and following the mood induction. However, contrary to study hypotheses, HLM analyses indicated that speed and specificity of affective recovery did not differ across experimental condition; thus, affect labeling was not associated with more adaptive emotional regulation. In addition, cognitive styles and mindfulness failed to moderate the relationship between affect labeling and affective recovery in the expected direction. However, greater trait mindfulness was associated with less negative affective responses to the mood induction. Implications of study findings, strengths and limitations of the study, as well as future directions are discussed. / Psychology

Poor sleep is known to contribute to increased levels of pain. Preliminary findings suggest that negative and positive affect may mediate this relationship. Given that older adults are prone to both sleep disturbance and pain, the main objectives of the present study were to: 1) examine the relationship between sleep and pain in a non-clinical pain sample of community-dwelling older adults and 2) to examine whether negative and positive affect mediate the relationship between sleep and pain. Baseline measures from 82 older adults participating in the Active Adult Mentoring Project (AAMP) were used for secondary data analysis. A daily sleep diary was used to assess sleep efficiency (SE), total wake time (TWT), total sleep time (TST), and sleep quality (SQ). Affect was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), while pain was assessed on an 11-point Likert-scale. Findings only partially corroborated past research; SE, SQ, and TWT each predicted pain, while TST did not. In addition, neither positive nor negative affect was found to mediate the relationship between sleep and pain. Methodological and theoretical explanation for the lack of significant mediation are discussed. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the assessment and treatment of poor sleep among older adults with pain may be clinically relevant.