This dissertation applies theories and concepts of wireless communications and
signal processing to the security domain to assess the security of a Wireless secret
Key Generation (WKG) system against capable eavesdroppers, who employ all the
feasible tools to compromise the system’s security. The security of WKG is evaluated
via real wireless measurements, where adversary knows and applies appropriate signal
processing tools in ordere to predict the generated key with the communicating
pair. It is shown that in a broadband stationary wireless communication channel,
(e.g. commercial off-the-shelf 802.11 WLAN devices), a capable eavesdropper can
recover a large portion of the secret key bits. However, in an Ultra-wideband (UWB)
communication, at the same stationary environment, secret key rates of 128 bits per
channel probe are achievable. / Graduate
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/3766 |
Date | 22 December 2011 |
Creators | Ghoreishi Madiseh, Masoud |
Contributors | McGuire, Michael Liam, Neville, Stephen William |
Source Sets | University of Victoria |
Language | English, English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Rights | Available to the World Wide Web |
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