Proxy conflict seems to be on the rise as the contemporary form of armed conflict, particularly manifesting itself in the Middle East and North Africa. While proxy conflicts enjoy increased attention in academia, little research has focused on the type of support a sponsor provides to its proxy. This thesis contributes to the literature by asking under what circumstances does sponsor provide soft power support to proxies in proxy conflict? I employ a qualitative most-similar case design of Iran’ssupport to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr organization in Iraq, as well as United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya. The theoretical argument posits that mobilized sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy facilitate a trust that induces the sponsor to provide soft power support in addition to the baseline support of hard power. The empirical findings give mixed support for the argument, as both sponsors provided soft power support, albeit at somewhat various degrees. Notably, Iran mobilized deeper and broader amongst the organizational structure of the proxy and its followers, while UAE arguably only engaged with Haftar as a strong leader but less so with NLA as an organization and its followers. Therefore, there seems to a difference in how the two sponsors penetrated their mobilization of proxies.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-446104 |
| Date | January 2021 |
| Creators | Andreas Instebø, Jamne |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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