abstract: Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Accountancy 2017
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:44248 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Contributors | Kim, Margaret Hyun-Mee (Author), Hillegeist, Stephen (Advisor), Reckers, Philip (Committee member), Kaplan, Steven (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
| Format | 46 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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