This paper examines the 1958-1959 Berlin crisis as a diplomatic experience, conducted by the U.S. and U.S.S.R as an alternative to war. Both nations had nuclear weapon capabilities that could transform a local conflict into general war. The potential for disaster, plus other limits, made a series of diplomatic encounters the only productive option. The diplomatic course also shielded American and Russian interests indirectly related to the conflict. Each nation and its leader had pragmatic reasons for practicing restraint. These included conservation of assets, political stability, and most importantly, poor chances for sustainable gains. Limited war doctrine was influential in establishing these policies.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uno.edu/oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-1373 |
| Date | 22 May 2006 |
| Creators | Williamson, Richard D. |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UNO |
| Source Sets | University of New Orleans |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations |
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