With few exceptions, not enough attention has been paid to the phenomenon of
ethnic minority rule over hostile majorities in the studies of ethnic conflict. This thesis
attempts to account for the ability of ethnic minorities to rule over hostile majorities for
continuous periods of time, and to devise a theory for the study of this phenomenon by
comparing three cases: the Alawis in Syria, the Tutsis in Burundi and the Sunni Muslim
minority in Iraq.
The major argument of the thesis is that the phenomenon in question does not
occur randomly. There are certain conditions that motivate an ethnic minority to seek
political power, and to be able to attain it and maintain continuous rule despite the
hostility of the majority. Naturally, each case has its particular characteristics, yet
common patterns underlying minority rule over hostile majorities can be found, and an
analytical framework can bJe devised.
The examination of the three cases leads to the conclusion that minority rule has
to be explained by examining how the identities of the minority and majority were
formed, how they have been shaped throughout the history of interaction between the two
groups, and how they have influenced the relationship between the groups. There is also a
need to study how political entrepreneurs manipulate traditional markers and modern
issues for instrumental gains. On this basis, it is possible to understand the political
salience of the identities, the level of hostility and the reasons why the minorities seek
political power. Attaining it or retaining it, and maintaining it for a continuous period of
time is dependent on an authoritarian government structure, which includes,
indispensably, considerable army involvement in politics. Persistent minority rule is also dependent on its ability to legitimize itself, primarily by creating a unified identity.
Success in forming such a unified identity implies a decrease in the saliency of elements
of identity that' distinguish between the groups, and ultimately a decrease in the level
hostility. This allows the minority rule to persist. If, however, this "unified identity" does
not have the desired outcome of mollifying the majority, the ruling minority can, and
will, use its military monopoly of coercive power to subdue internal opposition. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/9214 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Haklai, Oded |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 5451755 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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