This paper aspires to answer the question of what mistakes the United States Air Force committed during operation rolling thunder in the Vietnam war. The purpose of this is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the operation and moreover to contextualise the mistakes that were made and that according to modern papers of military failures are continuing to be made. There have been studies that have sought to explain the operations failures but by using the framework of the prevalent theorists John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories i hope to shed new light on this topic. By using John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories concerning the use and implementation of airpower important factors missing from the planning or execution of this operation can be identified. One overarching problem with the operation is the continued meddling by politicians and civilian cabinet members in the planning and execution of the operation. A fear of Chinese involvement also lead to incredibly strict rules of engagements that forbade american pilots from even returning fire in some instances. A lack of commitment and constant ceasefires hindered the operation from succeeding in putting enough pressure on the north vietnamese and allowed them to rebuild what was destroyed. One last key factor was the lack of coordination between the aerial and ground forces, this deminitied the effectiveness of both.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:fhs-9170 |
| Date | January 2020 |
| Creators | Moback, Filip |
| Publisher | Försvarshögskolan |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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