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Quality provision in duopoly

This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:hhs-495
Date January 2006
CreatorsArgenton, Cédric
PublisherHandelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI)
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeDoctoral thesis, comprehensive summary, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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