This thesis deals with different forms of strategic complementarities in industrial organization problems. Chapter 2 is an attempt to develop a unified approach to endogenous heterogeneity by constructing a general class of two-player symmetric games that possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties: payoff non-concavities and some form of strategic substitutability. While the second characteristic allows to show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, the second precludes these equilibria to be symmetric. Other two classes of games that always possess asymmetric, but never symmetric, pure-strategy equilibria, although they are not of strategic substitutes are also studied. This chapter also generalizes a number of models dealing with two-stage games, with long term investment decisions in the first stage and product market competition in the second stage. Chapter 3 investigates the effects of forward looking behaviour in technology adoption. The setup is an overlapping generations model where agents choose between two alternative networks taking into consideration both the installed base and the expected base. The latter element is the distinctive feature of the approach. It is shown that a unique equilibrium exists, on which agents coordinate their expectations. While exhibiting hysteresis, the equilibrium adoption path does not comply with technologies locking in. Network choices are characterized both in terms of their long run properties and the expected time of adoption. Chapter 4 studies the problem of a monopolist who produces a good with network externalities and faces the possibility of selling a new higher quality. Within the vertical product differentiation it identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for quality improvement to take place when a good, produced by a monopolist, exhibits positive network externalities. When network effects are not very strong, the monopolist produces both the high and the low quality and thus quality improvement takes place. In this case, he will use an introductory pricing strategy for the quality that benefits from network externalities, not maximizing however the network size. As the network effect becomes more important, the monopolist will have an incentive to practise introductory pricing and produce both qualities. Finally, if the network externality is higher than the intrinsic quality differential, quality improvement does not take place. Chapter 5 deals with the problem of an incumbent producing a low quality good with network externalities that faces the threat of entry by a higher quality good. In the framework of a vertical product differentiation model, it is identified a necessary and sufficient condition under which quality improvements are spontaneously adopted along, in spite of the existence of network effects. This condition says that the intensity of network effects on consumers' preferences should not exceed twice the differential of intrinsic qualities existing between the two variants. Finally, chapter 6 is concerned with the optimal path of prices of a monopolist who operates in a network industry for a finite horizon. Agents obtain intrinsic utility from the good and from the fact that in the past there have been other consumers using it. It is observed that the monopolist has an incentive to introduce the good at initially low prices and to increase the price as the time goes by. This chapter concludes with a necessary and sufficient condition under which the initial price, and only the initial one is zero. This condition is related both with the intensity of the preferences for the network and with the time horizon of the monopolist.

This dissertation investigates how competition among heterogeneous firms affects R&D in quality enhancement in a quality-ladder type framework for a Cournot oligopolistic industry. The research also analyzes the welfare implications of various policies that promotes R&D. Some of the theoretical predictions are then tested empirically using firm-level data for Bangladesh from the World Bank's enterprise survey. Chapter 1 shows that a rise in the cost of production of the competitor will induce a firm to invest more in R&D if and only if the quality difference between the existing product and the product emerging from R&D activities is sufficiently large. Also, welfare-reducing effect of helping a `minor' firm is lower in the presence of possible quality differences. Empirical results supports the theoretical findings. Chapter 2 shows that protecting domestic industry of high quality goods encourages firms to invest more in R&D. The size of the optimal tariff depends on the degree of product differentiation and market share of the foreign firms and is not necessarily positive. Chapter 3 shows that a small tariff imposed by the trading partner on the high quality good will deter R&D. However, as the tariff gets bigger, the relationship changes sign. The size of an R&D subsidy depends on the market share of the firms. Empirical results provide support to the theoretical findings.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第18759号 / 経博第510号 / 新制||経||273(附属図書館) / 31710 / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 教授 三野 和雄, 教授 矢野 誠 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

La naturaleza potencialmente anticompetitiva de las prácticas impartidas desde las organizaciones de profesionales ha sido racionalizada por la literatura económica y ha ocupado un lugar no menor en la agenda de los organismos de defensa de la competencia. Sin embargo, la economía empírica carece de estudios sobre el ejercicio profesional autorregulado. Este trabajo relaciona los mercados de servicios profesionales con los modelos de diferenciación vertical y emplea un modelo Logit Mixto para evaluar la conducta del desempeño médico en Argentina. La evidencia hallada sugiere la existencia de algún acuerdo de precios. / The potentially anticompetitive nature of some practices driven by professional organizations has been approached in economic literature and appears as an important issue in the antitrust organism's agenda. However, empirical economics lacks of a self-regulated professionals analysis. This work relates the market for professional services with vertical product differentiation models and uses a Mixed Logit model to assess the medical profession behavior in Argentina. The evidence suggests the existence of a price arrangement. / Tesis de la Maestría en Economía, bajo la dirección de Fernando Navajas, de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

In dieser Studie analysieren wir die Interaktionen zwischen Multiproduktwettbewerb und drei Aspekten von Innovation: Research Joint Ventures mit asymmetrischen Unternehmen, Neue Produkteinführung, und Innovation mit Multiproduktunternehmen. Wir untersuchen Mechanismen und Effekte, die einen Einfluß auf die Marktstruktur, das Marktverhalten und das Marktergebnis ausüben, indem wir theoretische Modelle analysieren und empirische strukturelle Modelle schätzen. Diese Arbeit gliedert sich wie folgt: Kapitel 2 verdeutlicht die Interaktion von Multiproduktwettbewerb und der Innovationstätigkeit von Unternehmen. Wir präsentieren die gegenwärtigen theoretischen and empirischen Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Innovationen. In Kapitel 3 analysieren wir die Effekte zwischen Multiproduktwettbewerb und Anreize von asymmetrischen Unternehmen, Innovationen zu betreiben und Research Joint Ventures zu gründen. In Kapitel 4 und 5 konzentrieren wir uns auf die Interaktion zwischen Multiproduktwettbewerb und neuer Produkteinführung. Wir präsentieren zwei theoretische Modelle über vertikale Produktdifferenzierung und untersuchen die Anreize für die etablierten Unternehmen neue Produkte mit unterschiedlicher Qualität in den Markt einzuführen. Unternehmen können hierbei entscheiden, ob sie die vorigen Produkte weiterhin im Markt anbieten oder aus dem Markt ziehen. In Kapitel 6 untersuchen wir den Zusammenhang zwischen Multiproduktwettbewerb und Innovation mit Multiproduktunternehmen. Das Verhalten von Multiproduktunternehmen unterscheidet sich von Einzelproduktunternehmen, da Output- und Produkteinführungsentscheidungen auf zentraler Ebene getroffen werden. Wir analysieren die ,Dynamic Random Access Memory' Industrie (DRAM chips sind Halbleiterchips) mit Berücksichtigung von Multiproduktunternehmen und untersuchen Spillovers, Skalenerträge und Lerneffekte, als auch das Verhalten der Unternehmen im Produktmarkt und die Dynamik über den Produktlebenszyklus. In Kapitel 7 fassen wir die Forschungsergebnisse zusammen und bewerten diese im Kontext der gegenwärtigen Forschung. Darüber hinaus schlagen wir weitere Aspekte für zukünftige Forschungsarbeiten auf diesem Gebiet vor. Schließlich beschreiben wir in Kapitel 8 die Datenbanken, die in unseren empirischen Analysen Anwendung finden. email: siebert@medea.wz-berlin.de / In this study we theoretically and empirically analyze the interactions between multiproduct competition and three aspects of innovation: Research Joint Ventures with asymmetric firms, new product introduction, and innovation with multiproduct firms. We investigate the main mechanisms and effects that impact on market structure, behavior and performance by analyzing theoretical and estimating structural models.The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides insights into how multiproduct competition may interact with innovation. We survey current theoretical and empirical results on the literature of innovation. In Chapter 3, we analyze the effect of multiproduct competition on the incentives of asymmetric firms to innovate and to form a Research Joint Venture. In Chapters 4 and 5 we concentrate on the interrelation between multiproduct competition and new product introduction. We present two theoretical models of vertical product differentiation and investigate the incentives for incumbent firms to introduce new products in different quality areas. Firms are allowed to keep or withdraw their original products from the market. In Chapter 6 we will focus on the link between multiproduct competition and innovation with multiproduct firms. Multiproduct firms behave differently in the product market compared to single product firms. Decisions for product innovation or output are taken at a centralized level, so that a multiproduct firm takes the effects on other products into account. We analyze the Dynamic Random Access Memory industry (DRAM chips are semiconductor chips) with respect to multiproduct firms and investigate the Spillover, Economies of Scale, and Learning by Doing effects, as well as firms' behaviour in the product market, and the dynamics over the product life cycle. In Chapter 7 we summarize the results, assess the new research findings in the context of contributions to current research, and provide suggestions for future research. Finally, in Chapter 8 we provide a description of the databases we used in our empirical studies. email: siebert@medea.wz-berlin.de