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SELF-RESPECT AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:uky.edu/oai:uknowledge.uky.edu:philosophy_etds-1011
Date01 January 2016
CreatorsLogan, Benjamin A.
PublisherUKnowledge
Source SetsUniversity of Kentucky
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceTheses and Dissertations--Philosophy

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