More now than ever, the status of war refugees and the standard of how certain global actors are obligated to treat them is of the utmost importance. Often, within a conventional sense of justice it is difficult to determine blame for the suffering of refugees because multiple actors play significant roles in the events leading up to displacement. This paper is an analysis of five prominent arguments regarding justice in migration for war refugees. I also present my own formulation of a principle that dictates how we should treat refugees. In conceiving this principle, I concentrated specifically on people displaced from Iraq and Syria. This focus came directly in response to the recent Executive Order 13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” I examine the philosophical conceptions of moral repair, moral blame, and humanitarian obligation within the context of the executive order and the sociological factors and implications in its institution.

“An American Philosophy of Punishment: Moral Permissibility, the Inferiorities of Punishment, and a Case for Pure Restitution” is an examination of the paradigm of criminal punishment currently implemented in the United States and the inherent flaws of ‘punishment’ as a system of justice. The characteristics of punishment are evaluated from a perspective, “punishment by necessity,” which attempts to justify criminal punishment for a lack of viable alternatives. David Boonin, in his book, The Problem of Punishment, offers a robust alternative paradigm of criminal justice- ‘pure restitution’. Boonin advances two arguments: (1) ‘pure restitution’ is capable of replacing punishment as a paradigm of criminal justice and (2) restitution should replace punishment because punishment is morally impermissible. This paper considers two of the most notorious objections to Barnett’s pure restitution, the “irreparable harms” and “third party victims” objections, as well as the moral status of punishment. The “irreparable harms” objection claims that the inability of restitution to entirely repair victims in crimes against the person indicates that restitution cannot offer any remedy, and that this inability is unacceptable. This objection fails to recognize the possibility for partial reparations, nor that punishment is equally incapable of wholly repairing the victims of these crimes. The “third party victims” objection claims that by compelling the offender to make restitution to the victim, the state is harming individuals in proximity to the offender, but the state is prohibited from harming individuals. This objection fails to consider the critical distinction of intent and culpability; the state does not intend to harm third parties by exacting restitution, but does so as a foreseeable consequence, whereas the offender caused an intentional harm, and thus carries a higher degree of blameworthiness. Additionally, the present implementation of restitution is considered by considering the relevant legal precedent, the Constitutional situation of restitution, and a hypothetical implementation scenario, which highlights the potential for “crime insurance/ tax”, and the other practical implications of implementing restitution.

Philosophers usually seek for and justify moral and political orders by two methodologies. Rationalism claims that social organization of human beings should fit with human nature, and believes that a predefined conception of human nature, defined in terms of human capacities for the exercise of reason, can be established as the independent criterion for choosing and justifying the proper moral and political order. Institutionalism, on the other hand, believes that human nature is at least significantly shaped by the actual construction of moral and political orders by human beings, and by internalizing the social institutions in which they live, they create themselves. In this essay, I argue that rationalism is not a good methodology because it does not reflect the correct relationship between human beings and their institutional life. I will develop a philosophical theory of institutionalism, and argue that an institutionalist justification of the ideal of liberal democracy will encourage a political development towards liberalization and democratization. I will also argue that Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy is such an institutionalist justification, and although it might seem to suggest otherwise, it not only speaks to citizens of western democracies, but also speaks to all moral persons from all other societies. The political development towards liberalization and democratization is a normative demand for any human society, if such a society strives to be a well-ordered society with long term legitimacy and stability. The exact degree of liberalization and democratization for any particular society will depend on the available means of communication and organization, but the normative demand for such a political development is present in every human society. Institutionalism represents human freedom in human beings‘ creation and justification of social institutions, which are man-made rules and norms aimed at guaranteeing social order among interacting human agents. As a ―liberalism of freedom,‖ institutionalism is therefore committed to a highest ideal of human institution building: institutions of a society should be justified to, and be obeyed by, all the members of this society, so that such a society is a political autonomy. In these terms, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy, although dependent on a public political culture of modern western democracies, is nevertheless not limited to this context. As an instantiation of institutionalism, Rawls‘s theory has a dimension of universalism. Ultimately, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy encourages every other human society on this earth to develop towards the ideal of liberal democracy.

Rhetoric as a discipline is still touched by the shadow of ancient Greece. Rhetoric was defined famously by Aristotle as the "available means of persuasion," codified into five canons in classical Rome, and has since been a central part of Western education to train speakers and writers to effectively move their audiences. However, particularly beginning in the mid-20th Century, the discipline's understanding of rhetoric as a means of persuasion (or even manipulation) passed down from our ancient roots began to shift to a sense of rhetoric as matters of ethics and a concern for the other. It begs the question: As a discipline, how did we get to a point where ethical concerns have increasingly entered the rhetorical conversation? With a theoretical focus, this study traces and examines how rhetoric's relation to ethics has transformed over the past 60 years from our discipline's Aristotelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance to the introduction of multiple new perspectives and voices. In suggesting that the goal of rhetoric is more than persuasion--a major focus of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the early 20th Century--this study traces a "turn" within our discipline from "confrontational" rhetoric to "invitational" rhetoric. It suggests that invitational rhetoric challenges a strict definition of rhetoric as persuasion seeks instead to understand rather than convert, support camaraderie and mutuality (if not unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge the speaker as much as the audience, and privilege listening and invitation over persuasion when appropriate. Rhetorical ethics is defined as the ethical decisions made in the everyday interactions that constantly invite us to make rhetorical choices that inevitably have consequences in the world. The study examines kairos/sophistic rhetoric, identification, and responsibility to establish a potential framework for rhetorical ethics, as well as listening and acknowledgement as methods for enacting this model. The ambition is a rhetoric of ethics that attends to everyday situations; accommodates different, often "silenced," voices; and offers the possibility of an ethical encounter with others. The study offers several possible conclusions about the nature of rhetorical ethics. Significant areas of continued study include issues of voice, agency, and marginalization--even invitational rhetoric does not guarantee that quieter or disadvantaged voices will be heard. In all, an(other) rhetoric is both a ripe topic for continued disciplinary attention, as well as a necessary component of everyday interactions with others that long to display love over hate, listening over silencing, inclusion over exclusion, and acceptance over rejection.

The non-identity problem attempts to explain the moral permissibility of certain procreative acts that determine a future individual’s existence. If we accept that this individual’s life is worth living, than we must also accept that these procreative acts are permissible. However, this is not the case. In this paper, I will argue against the permissibility of these acts and explain why our intuition, that these acts are morally wrong, is in fact correct. Because the non-identity problem affects particular persons, those whose existence is brought about, I argue in favor of a solution that explains that moral impermissibility in terms of the wrong done to this particular person. I do so by demonstrating why solutions offered by Derek Parfit, Elizabeth Harman, and Justin McBrayer have failed, whereas solutions offered by James Woodward and Gregory Kavka successfully explain moral impermissibility of non-identity acts in terms of wronging future individuals.

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The severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the high-profile nature of the public health response make it a natural context for exploring the current state of public health ethics. This paper explores this topic from two perspectives: justification and compliance. Libertarianism and utilitarianism are two frameworks that dominate the question of how public health interventions are justified. Consequently, this paper analyzes the events of the pandemic to determine how these frameworks fared in terms of offering reliable means of justifying the interventions needed to curb the spread of COVID-19. Consideration of these events suggests that a framework centered around actionable scientific health research may be able to offer a more reliable means of justifying interventions than traditional libertarian and utilitarian approaches. From the standpoint of compliance, I analyze data on the pandemic-related behaviors of Americans as well as their motivations. This analysis found that factors such as commitment to exercising freedom, distrust of public health institutions, and pursuit of higher priorities were the predominant motivations behind noncompliance. Furthermore, reflection on these realities indicates that they constitute a formidable obstacle to public health efforts. Given the swift action that public health crises such as pandemics demand, overcoming these obstacles in a timely manner such that free compliance is acquired is unlikely. As a result, it seems that the only option available to public health officials to effectively reduce the deadly consequences of another COVID-like pandemic is mandated enforcement of public health interventions.

“Our society is quickly reaching a point where notions of right and wrong have become so binary as to virtually eliminate all areas of grey. One result of increased regulatory and enforcement pressure is the suppression flexibility and creativity.” Kenneth S. Phillips Founder and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) HedgeMark International, LLC An Affiliate of BNY Mellon

Unethical behavior is prominent in the business world and typically leads to negative consequences for people and the environment. Business ethics education acknowledges that ethics teaching has a positive effect on business decisions; however, the problem was the lack of information that is specific to the factors and strategies required to best educate students in business ethics. This lack of information is demonstrated by continued ethical lapses. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to research what is known and unknown on the subject of teaching business ethics through a design intended to understand the lived experiences of ethics instructors. The ethical framework for this study was based on the virtue and justice approaches as a technique for analyzing ethical aspects of a decision, with the goal of improving ethical outcomes. Data collection was completed via interview questions regarding a successful strategy of teaching business ethics. To accomplish this goal, 15 business ethics instructors were interviewed individually to record their lived experiences relating to teaching ethics. Information relating to ethics course design, along with missing components, was the topic of questions. Data analysis using open and axial coding generated 7 major theme clusters that include highlighting character and virtue ethics, increasing concern for stakeholders, and employing the teachings of Socrates and other classic scholars as a basis. The implications for positive social change point to an opportunity for business schools to produce socially conscious leaders who engage in ethical conduct.

This paper explores the nonidentity problem, an influential puzzle in modern ethics which addresses the nature of our moral responsibilities towards future generations. I begin by laying out the two conflicting intuitions comprising the problem and providing several examples to illustrate how we conceive of the moral status of future people. I then examine two versions of consequentialism, averagism and totalism, which circumvent the nonidentity problem. However, these two solutions each pose their own respective problems; thus, I argue that a modification of totalism – the critical level view – is the most viable consequentialist answer to the nonidentity problem.