Sweatshop labor has been condemned by scholars, activists, students and consumers in more developed countries on charges of wrongful exploitation, and a failure to respect the dignity, and basic needs of sweatshop workers. This paper surveys charges against sweatshop labor, and some of the more influential arguments for, and against, rectifying the background structural injustices that perpetuate it. I argue that in certain sweatshop cases, compensating workers below a prima facie morally acceptable level can be most successful in striving towards the duty of beneficence that employers owe to their employees. Therefore, we ought to pursue utility-maximizing acts over others in better alignment with a deontic duty to compensate employees at a certain level. I eventually conclude that this debate is a paradigm example of deontological versus utilitarian moral judgments. Sometimes, utility maximizing acts are morally impermissible. Sometimes, adhering to deontic duties instead of committing a wrong to produce a right is morally required. In the circumstances that I describe, the morally right acts ought to be those that are most successful in maximizing overall utility for the most number of people. This responsibility coincides with acts that may not compensate workers at a prima facie morally acceptable level, but incidentally maximize overall utility, welfare and autonomy for some of the world’s most marginalized and impoverished people.

This paper will discuss arguments for and against the regulation of insider trading, examining economic discussions of efficiency and philosophical outlines of justice based arguments. I will also outline the development of legislation in the United States over the last century, and examine recent events in order to identify the current sentiments regarding government prosecution. The most efficient outcome for the market is found through actions guided by justice. By using regulation as a restraint to unbounded self-interest, investor confidence in the fairness of the market remains high and individuals are protected from abuses to their property and rights.

Who are you? And did you have any say in choosing who you are? Identity is a complicated issue, it is both individualistic and necessarily relies on your environment and peers. I believe that as it stands, your identity may be a result of both solitary and societal thinking. However, I think that society and government act as the sole authenticators of an individual’s identity. I do not believe this is how an individual’s life ought to be treated. Thus, I am arguing in this thesis that the individual has the capacity to choose their own identity, and that society and government ought to authenticate the decisions made by individuals. In order to prove my claim I will first specify the types of identity I will be discussing in this thesis. I will then explore the theories of three philosophers: Anthony Appiah, Ian Hacking, and Charles Taylor. In chapters 2 & 3, I will first analyze Anthony Appiah, who in arguing against the existence of race posits several ideas about identity including a theory of identity. Second, in chapter 4, I will analyze Ian Hacking, who presents a theory of identity creation, named labeling theory, and then presents a counter-theory of identity creation. Third, in chapter 5, I will analyze Charles Taylor’s claims about the effect recognition has on identity formation. Continuing to analyze Taylor in chapter 5, I will also analyze the importance of championing the politics of difference both to the individual and towards my claim. I will then provide examples of how my claim may be actualized in chapter 6, alongside counterarguments to my claims. Last, I will conclude my thesis in chapter 7.

Habituation in the Aristotelian tradition claims that we develop our moral virtues through repeated and guided practice in moral actions. His theory provides important insights for moral education and as a result many contemporary philosophers have debated how to properly interpret his writing. This thesis will explore Aristotelian habituation and the competing interpretations surrounding it, namely the cognitivist and mechanical views. It will then criticize the mechanical view and argue that the intrinsic valuation of virtuous actions evidences a cognitivist interpretation of habituation in the Aristotelian tradition.

This dissertation contributes to the philosophy of empathy and biomedical ethics by drawing on phenomenological approaches to empathy, intersubjectivity, and affectivity in order to contest the primacy of the intersubjective aspect of empathy at the cost of its affective aspect. Both aspects need to be explained in order for empathy to be accurately understood in philosophical works, as well as practically useful for patient care in biomedical ethics. In the first chapter, I examine the current state of clinical empathy in medicine including professional opinions about empathy, the dominant definition being employed, and the problems that arise from this definition. By trying to define empathy in a way that is useful to the current presuppositions in medicine, clinical empathy aligns with simulation theory, which has three problems: the discrepancy between the way empathy is defined and the way it is explained, the lack of diversity that this theory of empathy allows in our understanding of others, and the lack of affective understanding and affective engagement involved in the patient-physician interaction. These three problems are used to derive three questions that are important for any theory of empathy: (1) What is the phenomenon being explained? (2) What is the intersubjective context of empathy? (3) What is the affective dimension of empathy? The best theory of clinical empathy can be formulated by answering these three questions as they relate to phenomenological theories, which are more attuned to overcoming presuppositions. Chapters two and three each examine a different phenomenological approach to empathy from opposite extremes in their theories of intersubjectivity. Husserl and Stein begin from an isolated, transcendental subject that needs empathy to bridge the gap between itself and others, while Scheler begins from a primary intersubjectivity in which self and other are undifferentiated, making empathy a largely unnecessary skill. Despite their strongly opposed positions, and the acknowledgement that their theories of intersubjectivity necessitate their theories of empathy, I argue that both fail to understand the affective dimension of empathy. Husserl and Stein leave no room in empathy for it to be an affect, while Scheler prioritizes affects that reunite subjects, but leaves empathy itself as a non-affective skill. Chapter four explains Gallagher’s interaction theory as a more moderate approach to the relation between empathy and intersubjectivity. He draws on the insights of the other two theories, but conceives of empathy as a multi-leveled phenomenon that allows for an understanding of others. While this theory does aid in addressing the intersubjective context of empathy in a way that best solves the first two problems with clinical empathy, interaction theory still fails to fully address the affectivity of empathy, maintaining empathy as a largely cognitive ability. Gallagher does acknowledge the affective core of empathy, but he does not explain the way in which it is affective. In response to this problem, I explain Anya Daly’s application of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of reversibility to affectivity as a possible solution to the problematic gap in Gallagher’s theory. Chapter five focuses on theories of clinical empathy in order to address the neglected affective aspects of empathy, and respond to the problem of detached concern. The problems caused by detached concern are explained, as well as why the theories discussed in the middle chapters are still unable to solve them. This is done in two parts. In the first part, I explain the basis of this issue in the cognitive/feeling divide, as explained in the philosophy of emotion. Then, I give a brief overview of the phenomenology of affectivity to be used as a guide to the affectivity of empathy. In the second part, I examine three theories of clinical empathy that attempt to solve the problem of detached concern, noting their strengths and weaknesses based on their similarities to phenomenological approaches to empathy and affectivity.

The price of emission permits is deemed too low to mitigate climate change. In three studies, policy approaches to pricing carbon in a market setting are examined. First, the emission permit market is analyzed comparatively to how the ethanol mandate impacted prices in the corn market. This leads to the realization that the marketization of carbon is more like a currency than a physical commodity. The next study examines emission permits as a monetary policy tool. Emissions correlate GDP output, thus central banks can use emission permits as forward guidance, as a means to optimize the price for climate change mitigation, and as an alternative to interest rates. Opinions of thought leaders are used to question the acceptability of emission permits as a monetary policy tool. The final study is an ethical analysis using deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics within a pragmatic philosophical context, analyzing carbon as a monetary policy tool. In order for carbon as a monetary policy tool to be considered ethically acceptable, it must satisfy the temporal, spatial and institutional dilemmas of climate change articulated in Stephen Gardiner’s Perfect Moral Storm. Under this ethical standard, it is found that using carbon as a monetary policy tool can help address these concerns, but not solve them alone. This research is presented using transdisciplinary methods which provide a unique and holistic approach to policy formation not yet presented in the literature. This research is relevant to policy makers in central banking, the IMF and World Bank.

Legalism, as one of the most useful philosophies of government, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. The work of Han Fei—one of the most influential proponents of Legalism—has been scrutinized and critiqued for centuries as immoral. I intend to show Legalism, especially the Han Feizi, is moral through focusing on four aspects of Han Fei’s work. First, his understanding of human nature. Han Fei states people are born with a hatred of harm and a love of profit. This understanding of human nature can never lead to a cognitive distortions in governing. So it is a moral basic of a philosophy. The second element is a focus on the context of Han Fei’s writings. If his works are read in detail back to his age, one cannot reach an immorality conclusion. Then, based on his understanding of subjects and his correspondingly suggested strategies, his goal is moral because he wants to built a peaceful and stable society, which was unobtainable at that time. Finally, Han Fei’s conception of punishment, which has been thought of immoral, actually is a moral tool to protect the majority of subjects who are innocent.

Acting ethically is a core facet of the counseling profession's identity, safeguarding clients from undue harm (ACA, 2005). Through an increased understanding of both detrimental and positive factors that can influence counselors' perceptions of ethical behaviors, the counseling profession can intervene accordingly; this knowledge may assist in managing the problem related to unethical infractions. However, ethical behavior is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon, leaving many factors to be explored and examined. Workplace aggression, exposure to normative unethical behaviors, and an integrated modal of morality constitute some of these factors that warrant further investigation. A dearth of research currently exists within the counseling profession that examines the effects of workplace aggression and exposure to normative unethical behavior on counselors' perceptions of ethicality. Additionally, mediating variables in the context of acting ethically have scantly been researched within the counseling profession, including moral development and the moral foundations of care, fairness, and justice (integrated modal of morality). The present study investigated these various variables and the subsequent affects/relationships that ensued on counselors' perceptions of ethicality. Two phases of research were conducted: a pilot study (n = 166) that assisted in the development a Perceived Ethical Perceptions Instrument and a main study (n = 76) that assessed perceived ethicality contingent on the variables of workplace aggression, normative unethical behaviors, and the integrated modal of morality. Results from this study substantiated the complexity inherent within perceptions of ethicality, indicating that certain contextual factors may affect facets of perceived ethicality differently. of particular interest, the current study indicated that workplace aggression and the occurrence of unethical infractions by work supervisors/bosses and peers necessitated further investigation.;Keywords: ethical perceptions, workplace aggression, integrative modal of morality.

<p>This dissertation explores the way in which different conceptions of human agency have helped to shape the course of jurisprudential thought. The overarching aim is to bring to the surface the deeper commitments of Hartian positivism in its various engagements with rival accounts of the nature of law. In particular, I argue that although contemporary positivists take their account of law to be metaphysically noncommittal, views of what it is to be a human agent continue to motivate, if implicitly, their positions on such enduring jurisprudential questions as the nature and source of law’s normativity, the relationship between law and morality, and so on. In order to better understand these debates, we must therefore understand better the relationship between a theory of law and the conception of human nature that drives it.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Self-presentation of a corporation as a citizen committed to sustainable corporate responsibility can, according to scholarly findings, help the organization improve its reputation among key stakeholders. The purpose of this case study was to explore the success of one major airport in aligning communication strategies to improve its reputation. The research question involved how effectively a major German airport communicated its commitment to sustainable corporate responsibility to its key stakeholders during 2005--2009. Of particular interest was how key stakeholders perceived the airport's stance towards the impacts of aircraft noise. Corporate documents, newspaper articles, and semistructured interviews comprised the data. Data analyses of documents and interviews included coding segments of texts on key words related to sustainable corporate responsibility. Pattern matching helped aggregate coded text segments into respective coherent and consistent corporate messages. Randomly selected newspaper articles on the airport under scrutiny were coded on a Likert-type scale on how favorably they covered what types of themes. Subsequent qualitative analyses of hand notes fabricated during the coding process revealed how positively journalists wrote about specific events. Results indicated that the airport officials effectively communicated to the airport's key stakeholders regarding economic contributions to public welfare, engagements in neighborhood projects, environmental protection, and noise abatement. Implications for positive social change include the potential for dialogues between the airport and its critical stakeholders that could, in turn, further the long-term friendly coexistence of the airport, its neighbors, and the community.