La plupart des lectures contemporaines des Essais ignore la pensée morale de Montaigne. Ici, je maintiens que Montaigne épouse ‘une éthique de la modestie’ en même temps qu’il rejette toute éthique normative. En particulier, je cherche à aborder comment Montaigne suggère que nous connaissons la vertu et agissons si deux individus ne partagent pas le même perspective et on ne peut pas être le même sujet éthique deux fois. Je vais commencer par discuter la position épistémique de Montaigne par rapport aux universels pour illustrer comment Montaigne met en question l’universalité des lois éthiques et un bien connu a priori comme certains nominalistes et comment la notion de la contingence qui accompagne cette attitude a des implications pour le sujet. Ensuite, je vais explorer comment Montaigne partage et part des penseurs anciens, surtout les sceptiques, afin de façonner une méthode empirique qui a son point de départ dans l’individu. En fouillant sa méthode, qui a son modèle dans le chapitre « De l’expérience », je vais démontrer comment cet aspect de la pensée de Montaigne empêche sa morale de succomber au nihilisme, parce qu’il affirme qu’il reste des phénomènes qu’on peut connaître à posteriori. Je voudrais montrer comment la méthode des Essais aide les individus à exercer leur jugement pratique et former leur intention face aux circonstances changeantes indépendamment des croyances. English Translation : [Most contemporary readings of the Essays ignore Montaigne’s moral thought. In this paper, I assert that Montaigne espouses ‘a modest ethics’ at the same time that he rejects all normative ethical systems. Specifically, I seek to address how Montaigne suggests that we can know virtue and act if no two individuals share the same epistemological position and an individual can never be the same ethical subject twice. I will argue that Montaigne denies human knowledge of metaphysical universals and in this regard resembles medieval nominalists, who held that humans only know individuals and particular instances a posteriori. I will demonstrate that Montaigne’s epistemological modesty influences his ethical position, as he repudiates our capacity to identify an a priori good or a télos to which we should all strive. Because I think that this negative aspect of the Essays does not lead to moral nihilism, I will explore how Montaigne draws and departs from classical thinkers, specifically the Skeptics, in order to fashion an empirical method with the individual ethical subject at its center. I will show how the study of experience outlined in the Essays helps the moral subject to make practical judgments and form intentions with regard to particular circumstances, independently of belief.]

This paper will argue in three sections that Thus Spoke Zarathustra necessarily implies an aristocratic political system. In the section "Zarathustra’s Value Theory," I lay out Zarathustra's theory of value creation. In the second section, "Possible Interpretations of Value Creation," I describe three different perspectives that can be used to understand Zarathustra’s value theory. In the third section, "Zarathustra and Politics" I provide a critique of modern liberalism and an alternative coherent with Nietzsche's philosophy, aristocracy.

The goal of this thesis is to develop the foundation and structure for a virtue ethics theory grounded in a specific notion of care. While there has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics theory, the theory has its roots in Aristotle's work as well in the medieval writings of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas worked out many of Aristotle's ideas in much more detail. However, while Aquinas offers a very rich and compelling ethical theory, it is problematic because it is very tightly wrapped in his theology. A key component in Aquinas's theory is charity. Charity is one of Aquinas's theological virtues, which express the relationship between humans and God. Charity is the love of God and of neighbor and he construes it as the foundation for all the other virtues. My thesis explores the idea of replacing charity with the virtue of care. The virtue of care to be used in this essential role is primarily based on recent work on the ethics of care by Nel Nodding. The virtue of care, as I develop it, combines three interrelated parts: instinctive, maternal and relational care. By comparing and contrasting care and charity, I demonstrate that the virtue of care can fill the role of charity. In this capacity care can serve as a naturalistic foundation for a virtue ethics theory. Since the ethics of care is relatively new, it has yet to take shape. I propose building a care-based virtue ethics theory on the structure of Aquinas's theory. This new care-based virtue ethics theory also benefits from utilizing many of the components of Aristotle's theory which are found in Aquinas's work. My argument is that care can fulfill the role of charity in Aquinas's theory. Care-based virtue ethics theory is a completely naturalistic version of Aquinas's virtue ethics theory. My thesis contains both the foundation for this different kind of care-based virtue ethics theory and some direction for future work on revising Aquinas's theory using the virtue of care. The essence of this care-based virtue ethics theory is captured in the notion I outline of a virtuoso human.

The general purpose of this dissertation is to explore casuistry--case-based reasoning--as a discredited, rehabilitated, and, most importantly, persistent form of moral reasoning. Casuistry offers a much needed corrective to principle-based approaches. I offer a defense of a "principle-modest" casuistry and explore the epistemology of casuistry, describing the prerequisite knowledge required for casuistry. I conclude by arguing that casuistry is best understood as a neo-premodernist approach to moral reasoning.

This dissertation offers a phenomenology of that mode of self-interpretation in which it becomes possible for an interpreter to intentionally participate in the production of moral norms to which the interpreter himself or herself feels bound. Part One draws on Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" in order to thematize the phenomenon I call "moral friction"; a condition in which an interpreter becomes explicitly aware of the historical and cultural contingencies of their own moral vocabularies, practices, and concerns and as a result find themselves incapable of feeling the normative weight implicit in these. Part Two draws on Heidegger's existential analytic of human being, Gadamer's development of Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Hegel's notion of "sublation" in order to map how novel interpretations can irreversibly displace the coherence of older interpretations. I call this form of interpretation "moral phenomenology." Finally, in Part Three, I utilize a selective phenomenology of musical improvisation to plot the unique temporal orientation of self-interpretation that results from intentionally deploying this irreversible displacement of older interpretations that involve normative moral implications. I call the form of life that is marked by this hermeneutic mode the "improviser." The result is a description of a form of life in which it becomes possible to explicitly participate in the production of moral norms within a historical and culturally contingent context that nevertheless preserves standards of rational justification for normative moral judgment without the need for atemporal first principles. The availability of this mode of self-interpretation displaces the sharp distinction between non-normative descriptive phenomenology and normative moral reasoning by placing the latter within a non-teleological historical practice that engages in the production of interpretations which irreversibly displace older interpretations--a practice that is governed by the critical cultivation of contingent moral norms within the open investigation into the good life for human being.

This dissertation formulates and describes a type of thinking called critical-reflective thinking. Examples of critical-reflective thinking appear in the works of many major Western philosophical figures, including the main thinkers considered here, Plato, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Henry David Thoreau. Although this list of thinkers is eclectic, these philosophers come together in describing a common phenomenon, although they do not thematically designate or explain it. Their works illustrate a type of thinking in which people are invited by prompting events to consider their presuppositions—notions they have taken as true without prior consideration. I have deemed this phenomenon “critical-reflective thinking” to emphasize its dimensions of self-reflection and critical consideration. By exploring examples from the works of the authors listed above (among others, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Elaine Scarry), I formulate critical-reflective thinking as a specific phenomenon. In Chapter One, I formulate this important type of human thought by describing its occurrence, especially the invitation of the prompt and the disclosure and examination of presuppositions. In Chapter Two, this dissertation explicates the value of taking part in this type of thinking. Since critical-reflective thinking allows people to consider previously unreflective aspects of their understanding (i.e. presuppositions), by taking part in critical-reflective thinking, people stand to grow in self-awareness and become liberated to new possible ways of seeing the world and going about life. Given the value of such growth and liberation, it is important to explore how humans can develop the practice critical-reflective thinking. Chapter Three explores strategies for cultivating critical-reflective thinking. Plato, Heidegger, Arendt, and Thoreau suggest five such strategies: spending time in solitude, taking leisure, developing an open attitude, practicing wakeful attentiveness, and acquire virtues such as humility, courage, and fortitude. Formulating and exploring the phenomenon of critical-reflective thinking not only provides a theory of a type of thinking, but also describes an important aspect of human experience. This dissertation encourages readers to consider their own experiences of thinking. It also poses the challenge of leading a more examined life by critically-reflecting on notions we often take as given.

The recent invention of Google Glass has prompted me to contemplate how future technologies will affect the way we interact with one another. In this paper, I argue that Google Glass technology is the first sort of technology that will facilitate us to violate our genuine interactions with one another in a face-to-face setting. Once we diminish these types of interactions, we fail to respect one another on a fundamental level and as a result, we fail to genuinely pursue one of the most important classes of meaningful projects in our lives: developing and maintaining relationships.

This paper examines the popular philosophical theory of moral relativism. Traditionally, the theory argues that communities have their own conceptual frameworks of morality that are inaccessible to those outside of the community. Thus, one community cannot give another community a moral reason to change a practice. In this paper, I will examine David Velleman’s version of the theory presented in his book Foundations for Moral Relativism. This version posits that the drive towards mutual interpretability is a universal drive among human communities. From this drive stem all the practices and moral values of communities. However, Velleman does not believe that this implies that communities can understand each others’ conceptual frameworks. In this way, his account remains a normal version of moral relativism. I will argue that there are some cases in which a person can understand a different community’s conceptual framework enough to provide a reason for that community to change a practice. Importantly, my argument will not say that the reasons for change are moral reasons. They will be practical reasons based on the normative fact that human communities should strive towards mutual interpretability. Thus, my account will also maintain the crucial tenets of moral relativism. If accomplished, this argument will add a great power to the theory.

This thesis analyzes Martin Heidegger's early interpretation of Aristotelian concepts. The goal is to acquire an increased understanding of the ideas underlying Aristotle's political philosophy, as well as those underlying Heidegger's own later philosophy. The investigation begins with a critique of Kantian logic and the assumptions which underlie it, which are ultimately traced back to Aristotle. The passages that pertain to Kant's interpretation are assessed by Heidegger, who concludes that it is speaking, not explicit definition, that grounds possibility for life in a human sense. To demonstrate Heidegger's argument, the thesis transitions into an assessment of the Greek view of life and the way it influences Aristotle's investigation of the human being. The goal of the first three chapters is ultimately to demonstrate the manner in which speaking allows for a unique way of being in the world for the human being, a way of being that makes ethical disposition and thus moral excellence possible. Beginning in Chapter 4, the thesis discusses the Aristotelian concept of ends and endhood, ultimately outlining the manner in which Aristotle goes about his investigation in the Nicomachean Ethics which serves to re-emphasize the interpretation set forth in the first half of the thesis. After giving an account of eudaimonia, the thesis discusses rhetoric and politics in chapter five, since it is demonstrated that an ethical disposition cannot be acquired without both being and conversing with other people in a community. A brief account of Aristotle's conclusions in the Politics and Rhetoric follows, and the thesis concludes with an outline of the web of ideas that Heidegger has set forth in his interpretation. The thesis also provides an in-depth interpretation of key passages from the Metaphysics, Politics, Rhetoric, De Anima and Nicomachean Ethics which ultimately serve as examples of Heidegger's unique manner of interpretation to the reader.

Morality of abortion is a topic that tends to prompt heated politic debates. Setting politics aside, it is useful for one to contemplate certain questions if they wish to understand the complex moral dilemmas which abortion poses. One can philosophize and grapple with some of the following questions: Does the human embryo have moral status? Is the human embryo a person? Is it owed the same rights to life protection that a human baby or human adult have? Do we have a strong reason not to harm it? These questions often do not have definitive yes or no answers which apply universally to all cases yet; exploring them will allow one to gain a better understanding of one’s position on the issue of morality of abortion. If one’s intuition tells them that it is morally wrong or morally permissible to kill an early human embryo therefore, ending its potential to experience a future life similar to ours, grappling with these philosophical questions pertaining to the ethics of killing will provide insight that will either validate or contradict these intuitions. This thesis examines morality of abortion by analyzing theories proposed by Don Marquis and Elizabeth Harman in effort to get a sense of what characteristics are necessary for an entity to experience significant levels of harm, be granted moral status and have a strong reason not to be killed. These characteristics help one determine whether or not it is morally permissible to end the life of a developing human organism such as a human embryo.