This thesis demonstrates that “Pleasure and Necessity”, a section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, both should and can be re-written, bringing the female reader out of the margins and into the texts of Hegel’s Absolute system. First, I demonstrate that the Phenomenology is a Bildungsroman that is both important for the reader’s philosophical education and Hegelian science itself. I provide an interpretation of “Pleasure and Necessity”, demonstrate that this section alienates the female reader, and discuss why Antigone is not a solution to this problem. Rather, I conclude that this stage should be re-written. Furthermore, I argue that “Pleasure and Necessity” can be re- written because the Phenomenology already contains the outline of its own re-writing insofar as it corresponds to the Logic. Finally, I re-write “Pleasure and Necessity” as “Impulse and Ought”, using new figures to re-stage the logical operation that occurs in the original text.

The experiences of those with difficult to diagnose conditions, chronic illnesses, and disability lack intelligibility in an able-bodied world. Much of this originates in the disjuncture between first- and third- person experience as accounted for between patients and their doctors, caregivers, and the greater public. Utilizing the insights of feminist philosophy and disability studies, I will explore how these marginalized identities face consequences in the real world for their embodiment. I propose that the best methodology to examine the experiences of chronically ill, hard to diagnose, and disabled individuals’ experiences is through the phenomenological perspective. Through utilizing case studies, I will demonstrate the importance of first- to third- person encounters in medicine and receiving adequate treatment. By examining such experiences, as well as my own, through such a perspective, I argue we can work towards creating a more equitable world for the chronically ill, hard to diagnose, and disabled. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

This project introduces the case of the Feminist Female Slave [FFS], a female submissive in a BDSM relationship with a male Master. This case is used in order to strengthen discourse in three main areas: feminist relational autonomy, BDSM theory, and feminist community politics. I argue that the FFS offers a case in which feminist autonomy theorists can serve to grow and develop their own approaches in a way that is inclusive of the diversity of women’s sexual expression, as she challenges our narrow notions of female subservience and asks us to rethink what it means to express an autonomous women’s sexuality. In BDSM theory she asks us to reflect upon our reliance upon superficial notions of consent and the lack of space for a critical dialogue, and finally, in feminist politics she asks us to consider what it means to belong to feminist communities, or what it means to feel as if one can lay claim to a feminist identity. Each of these considerations is brought to light in this project because of the interesting balance that the FFS’s relationship holds between her feminist identity, sexual politics, and sexual and romantic practices. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. This is an apparent example of what human development practitioners and political philosophers call an adaptive preference (AP): a preference, formed under oppressive circumstances, that seems to perpetuate the agent’s own oppression. Prevailing opinion is that forced tradeoffs—especially following Serene Khader’s taxonomy—, like the case presented above, are a type of AP: one in which a person makes a decision because of a limited option set. In this paper I argue that no paradigm cases of forced tradeoffs should not be classified as APs. Instead, I offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression. I defend this new definition by exploring the implications of changing the definition. In particular, forced tradeoffs involve different kinds of interventions from other kinds of adaptive preferences and including forced tradeoffs risks committing testimonial injustice against those who have limited option sets. / Master of Arts / Abstract: Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. Most philosophers and workers in human development think of this as an example of an adaptive preference. An adaptive preference is a preference that a person has that is formed under oppressive circumstances that seems to perpetuate that person’s own oppression. In this paper I show that this is a form of a forced tradeoff adaptive preference: one in which a person makes a decision because they don’t have other options. I argue that forced tradeoffs should not be considered adaptive preferences. I then offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression.

<p>In this dissertation I argue that the currency of the childhood obesity “epidemic” as a health crisis is derived largely from processes of representation and reproduction through which fatness has been re-calibrated as something pathogenic. I develop the position that the “childhood obesity epidemic”—influenced as it is by neoliberal notions of what constitutes a healthy individual and a vital body politic—risks exacerbating, rather than mitigating, the vulnerability of children.</p> <p>The methodology of this project uses the example of lifestyle to illustrate how consensus about the presence of an “obesity epidemic” has been built, the concept of lifestyle being read as representative of how particular constellations of anxiety regulate what counts as true in the developing body of social knowledge concerning childhood obesity. I contend that the problem of lifestyle captures the complexities of the “childhood obesity epidemic” because children are presupposed, in obesity discourses, to be more vulnerable to the sweeping set of social trends brought under the rubric of the “obesity epidemic” than adults.</p> <p>In what follows, I investigate the rationale for anti-obesity through an investigation of a series of analogous clusters, cases of persuasive ideas borne out of the moral panics subtending childhood obesity. I ask what it means that the child’s diminished capacity for autonomous decision-making is considered to be especially critical in the face of popular culture’s media “bombardment.” More broadly, I focus on the delimiting effect that anti-obesity’s politicization of lifestyle has had on recent attempts to think through the articulation of health, consumerism, environment, and the government of risk.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The Gulabi Gang is a feminist vigilante based in northern India. They are known as a group that uses physical violence to fight systems of oppressive power. The idea of a Gulabi Gang vigilante, interacting with the people and the state will be discussed, while incorporating John Locke’s social contract theory into the argument as a way to critique vigilantism, or as a basis of critique to then argue why the Gulabi Gang’s vigilantism is necessary. After both sides of argument are weighed, possible solutions of how the Gulabi Gang can better their organization will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

This dissertation examines how gender and temporality are co-constitutive of one another and what temporalities underlie the actuality of gendered life. I weave together the insights of feminist phenomenology and feminist poststructuralism in order to argue that temporality produces and constrains the actuality of lived gender as racialized, heterosexist, and cissexist. More specifically, I argue that this is done through sexual violence. Ultimately, I suggest that the temporality of sexual violence is encrusted into the dominant configurations of gender and into the bodily life of gendered subjects solidifying what gendered subjectivity can become. / 10000-01-01

In this thesis, I demonstrate how the numerous forms of oppression are grounded in a hierarchical and binary thinking that permeates racism and sexism and that is present throughout the feminist movement. It is this biased thinking that creates further divide among diverse social groups resulting in a foundation for justifying oppressive practices. I argue that the human rights framework is the best by which to defeat this problematic thinking, fostering a collectivity among disparate people and establishing a more appropriate footing upon which to face the problems of feminism. In the end, I claim that there must be a global commitment to end oppression that begins with educating people as to the unjustified harm created by biased and binary thinking and to the effectiveness of a human rights approach in eliminating any validation of oppression.

Who are you? And did you have any say in choosing who you are? Identity is a complicated issue, it is both individualistic and necessarily relies on your environment and peers. I believe that as it stands, your identity may be a result of both solitary and societal thinking. However, I think that society and government act as the sole authenticators of an individual’s identity. I do not believe this is how an individual’s life ought to be treated. Thus, I am arguing in this thesis that the individual has the capacity to choose their own identity, and that society and government ought to authenticate the decisions made by individuals. In order to prove my claim I will first specify the types of identity I will be discussing in this thesis. I will then explore the theories of three philosophers: Anthony Appiah, Ian Hacking, and Charles Taylor. In chapters 2 & 3, I will first analyze Anthony Appiah, who in arguing against the existence of race posits several ideas about identity including a theory of identity. Second, in chapter 4, I will analyze Ian Hacking, who presents a theory of identity creation, named labeling theory, and then presents a counter-theory of identity creation. Third, in chapter 5, I will analyze Charles Taylor’s claims about the effect recognition has on identity formation. Continuing to analyze Taylor in chapter 5, I will also analyze the importance of championing the politics of difference both to the individual and towards my claim. I will then provide examples of how my claim may be actualized in chapter 6, alongside counterarguments to my claims. Last, I will conclude my thesis in chapter 7.

This thesis examines the role of woman within Nietzsche’s late-middle period, through The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as well as interrogating the more social or political elements of nihilism, in order to conceptualize a novel reading of Nietzsche’s figure of the Overman. The motivation for this project is to create an understanding of the Overman that stands in stark contrast to those interpretations of Nietzsche advanced and deployed by those on the far-right of the political spectrum, who historically have used Nietzsche’s ideas to justify acts of cruelty and violence through an appeal to preservation of the self and of the same. I begin with the idea that woman is representative of truth for Nietzsche through her embodiment of difference, both internal to herself and within her relationship to man. This view of woman within the thesis is led by the work of Luce Irigaray in her work Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, and a reading of her work alongside Nietzsche’s Gay Science comprise the first chapter. In the second chapter, I chart different typologies of nihilism as advanced by Gilles Deleuze and Alenka Zupančič in order to probe their status as “universal”. I also delve into the eternal return as the process through which nihilism is overcome and the Overman emerges, as perhaps an eternal return of the different rather than the same. In the final chapter, the lessons from the beginning of the thesis are applied to a reading of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra in order to read difference into that text toward the overcoming of nihilism and the birth of the Overman.