I am bored. All around me are systems that perpetuate repetitive, reductive, and mundane modes of living. In an attempt to counter a culture obsessed with singular ways of existence and bite-sized perfection, I utilize moving mediums of video and performance to dive head first into a vast array of sloppy sincerity. The crisp, white-washed, analytical, and restrictive is loudly replaced with the empirical, haphazard, and instinctual. My intention is to create and encourage raw, performative-based work that is as multifaceted as unbridled life itself. This alive and physical practice hosts a conglomeration of sweat, memories, heartbreaks, hymn singing, line dancing, cake eating, wig wearing, bedroom jamming, live streaming, code switching, hallway running, body dragging, easter egg hiding, angst, and hair salons. This is a refusal to slice up, organize, and distill myself and my work into one dish with convoluted, explanatory rhetoric stamped with institutionalized approval and topped with the cherry of MFA status for the sake of being justified and relevant. I have zero obligations to make polished art, resolve things, or pinpoint what makes me “me”, because humans are not boxes and art does not have to be finite.

Cette thèse a pour ambition de résoudre le problème central de la philosophie morale et politique qu'est celui du consentement à la soumission par la construction d'un concept philosophique de soumission et par la résolution du problème dans le cadre de la soumission féminine. Nous montrons 1/ que l'étude de la soumission est nécessaire à une théorie du pouvoir, qu'elle implique de changer de perspective pour adopter le point de vue de ceux sur qui le pouvoir s'exerce et décrire leur expérience, mais qu'elle semble contradictoire avec la liberté naturelle des individus; 2/ que lorsque l'on restreint l'analyse du problème du consentement à la soumission à la façon dont il se pose dans le cadre des rapports homme-femme, il est impossible de tenir ensemble le concept de consentement et celui de soumission. Si l'on adopte une perspective libérale, le consentement de l'agent prévaut et dissout la soumission dans sa spécificité; si, au contraire, l'on insiste sur la dimension structurelle de la soumission féminine, le consentement n'apparaît que comme un manifestation de la fausse conscience des opprimées; 3/ qu'en surmontant la dichotomie entre individu et structure par les apports de la théorie économique et de la philosophie beauvoirienne, le consentement à la soumission n'apparaît plus comme une contradiction mais comme un choix rationnel des femmes qui s'explique par leur situation et l'ambiguïté de leur existence. La soumission est fondée sur un consentement mais qui diffère du consentement juridique du libéralisme et, ainsi, n'est pas contradictoire avec la réalité de l'oppression qui se joue dans ce consentement même. / This dissertation aims at resolving a central problem in moral and political philosophy, the problem of consenting to one' own submission, by building a philosophical concept of submission and resolving of the problem in the specific context of female submission. We argue that 1/ studying submission is crucial for a theory of power, that it implies a change of perspective in order to adopt the stand point of those on whom power is exerted and to describe their experience, but that such a study seems at odds with the natural freedom of individual; 2/ when one narrows the analysis to the problem of consent to submission in the context of male/female relations, it is impossible to hold together the concept of consent and the concept of submission. From a liberal perspective, the agent's consent prevails and dissolves submission in its specificity; conversely, when emphasizing the structural dimension of female submission, consent only appears as a demonstration of the false consciousness of the oppressed; 3/when one overcomes the agency/structure dichotomy through the methods and results of economic theory and Beauvoir's philosophy, consent to submission stops appearing as a contradiction, and is instead revealed as a rational choice of women, explained by their situation and the ambiguity of their existence. Submission is thus founded by a consent -a consent that is not the liberal legal consent and, as such, is not contradictory to the reality of the oppression at stake in this very consent.

The purpose of this thesis was to explore selected works from William Shakespeare, Edmund Spenser, and John Keats, in order to expose textual instances of feminist thought. This analysis was aided with feminist theorists falling under the main strains of queer theory, materialism, and gender performance. Specifically, this thesis focused on the ways in which women, particularly virgin daughters, were viewed as property by their male kin. It also looked at how these women engaged in various symbolic masquerades and/or actual cross-dressing as a response to the aforementioned phenomenon. Finally, the thesis exposed how these masquerades can be construed as a queering of identity—manifested through reversals of power and rejection of patriarchal institutions like marriage.

This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.

Recent studies on the economic status of women in Miami-Dade County (MDC) reveal an alarming rate of economic insecurity and significant obstacles for women to achieve economic security. Consistent barriers to women’s economic security affect not only the health and wellbeing of women and their families, but also economic prospects for the community. A key study reveals in Miami-Dade County, “Thirty-nine percent of single female-headed families with at least one child are living at or below the federal poverty level” and “over half of working women do not earn adequate income to cover their basic necessities” (Brion 2009, 1). Moreover, conventional measures of poverty do not adequately capture women’s struggles to support themselves and their families, nor do they document the numbers of women seeking basic self-sufficiency. Even though there is lack of accurate data on women in the county, which is a critical problem, there is also a dearth of social science research on existing efforts to enhance women’s economic security in Miami-Dade County. My research contributes to closing the information gap by examining the characteristics and strategies of women-led community development organizations (CDOs) in MDC, working to address women’s economic insecurity. The research is informed by a framework developed by Marilyn Gittell, who pioneered an approach to study women-led CDOs in the United States. On the basis of research in nine U.S. cities, she concluded that women-led groups increased community participation and “by creating community networks and civic action, they represent a model for community development efforts” (Gittell, et al. 2000, 123). My study documents the strategies and networks of women-led CDOs in MDC that prioritize women’s economic security. Their strategies are especially important during these times of economic recession and government reductions in funding towards social services. The focus of the research is women-led CDOs that work to improve social services access, economic opportunity, civic participation and capacity, and women’s rights. Although many women-led CDOs prioritize building social infrastructures that promote change, inequalities in economic and political status for women without economic security remain a challenge (Young 2004). My research supports previous studies by Gittell, et al., finding that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have key characteristics of a model of community development efforts that use networking and collaboration to strengthen their broad, integrated approach. The resulting community partnerships, coupled with participation by constituents in the development process, build a foundation to influence policy decisions for social change. In addition, my findings show that women-led CDOs in Miami-Dade County have a major focus on alleviating poverty and economic insecurity, particularly that of women. Finally, it was found that a majority of the five organizations network transnationally, using lessons learned to inform their work of expanding the agency of their constituents and placing the economic empowerment of women as central in the process of family and community development.

Given the state of the planet at present —specifically, the linked global ecological and economic crises that conjure dark imaginings and nihilistic actualities of increasing resource depletion, poisonings, and wide-scale sufferings and extinctions—I ask What might we hope now? What points of intervention offer possibility for transformation? At best, the response can only be partial. The approach this thesis takes initiates from specific pre-discursive assumptions. The first understands current conditions as having been produced, and continuing to be so, through practices that enact and sustain neoliberal relations. Secondly, these practices are expressive of a subjectivity tied to a Cartesian worldview, which, therefore, needs to be interrupted at its foundational roots. Thirdly, the scaffolding that supports this subjectivity draws on Newtonian science and neo-Darwinian narratives deemed to be natural law and, therefore, ontological, immutable reality. Contrary to modernist thinking, I premise that these two strains, subjectivity and science, are neither autonomous nor ontological, but that they are materially and contingently integral. Finally, this thesis presumes that different and life-affirming trajectories are, in fact, desired. An integral framing of science and subjectivity provides a productive method of feminist science studies analysis and theorization. Observing the capitalist Western social imaginary through this lens reveals its philosophical and scientific infrastructures to be outdated and crumbling. Observing how emerging scientific narratives in quantum physics and systems-biology intersect with marginalized theories in process-philosophy and subjectivity reveals a life-affirming imaginary of difference, one that arrests nihilism and sets ethical trajectories in motion. Certain, though not all, percepts of feminist new materialism engage twentieth and twenty-first century sciences successfully to show that ethicality matters. Though many questions remain, this points auspiciously towards the possibility for a transformed politics of justice.

Ce mémoire tente de faire une analyse de la philosophie de Spinoza sous le prisme d’une lecture féministe et, subséquemment, de proposer une nouvelle manière d’interpréter le philosophe. Dans un premier temps, principalement grâce aux travaux de Moiras Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd et Hasana Sharp, mais aussi ceux d’Alexandre Matheron, Étienne Balibar, Antonio Negri et Michael Hardt, cette recherche effectue une critique des aspects misogynes de la philosophie de Spinoza. Pour ce faire, nous mettons en relief les incohérences relatives à cette misogynie. Dans un second temps, en comparant les travaux des philosophes.esses susmentionné.es à une interprétation libérale de Spinoza, nous examinons en quoi la lecture féministe est la plus pertinente dans le cadre de cette recherche. Par la suite, il est question d’une réinterprétation des concepts de connaissance de soi, d’individu et de multitude. Par cela, nous abordons l’approche de Lloyd sur la question de la différenciation sexuelle. Dans un troisième temps, nous tentons de prendre l’analyse spinoziste pour expliquer et critiquer certaines problématiques contemporaines. Par la définition de l’hégémonie offerte par Hardt et Negri, nous verrons en quoi la formation d’une norme ne nécessite pas d’être quantitativement importante. Suivant la lecture de Gatens de Spinoza, nous voyons par ailleurs comment le corps masculin blanc fut érigé comme hégémonie, soit comme norme qui définit dans l’imaginaire commun le corps neutre. Finalement, nous tentons une critique de l’hégémonie qui, par le biais d’une lecture féministe de Spinoza, permet une production d’un nouvel imaginaire commun. Cette approche repose sur une analyse de la liberté et de la responsabilité que nous trouvons dans la lecture de Gatens de Spinoza, ainsi que la question de la connaissance de soi développé par Lloyd. / This master’s thesis attempts to analyze Spinoza's philosophy through the prism of a feminist reading and, subsequently, to propose a new way of interpreting this philosopher. In the first place, mainly thanks to the works of Moiras Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd, and Hasana Sharp, but also to those of Alexandre Matheron, Étienne Balibar, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt, this research criticizes Spinoza's philosophy in its misogynistic aspects. To do so, we highlight the inconsistencies related to this misogyny. In the second place, by comparing the works of the above-mentioned philosophers with a liberal interpretation of Spinoza, we examine how the feminist reading is the most relevant for this research. Subsequently, a reinterpretation of the concepts of self-knowledge, of the individual, and of the multitude is discussed. Through this, we address Lloyd's approach to the question of sexual differentiation. In the third place, we try to take the spinozist’s philosophy to explain and criticize some contemporary issues. Through the definition of hegemony offered by Hardt and Negri, we will see how the formation of a norm does not need to be quantitatively important. Following Gatens' reading of Spinoza, we also see how the white male body has been erected as hegemonial, that is, as a norm that defines what the neutral body is in the shared imagination. Finally, we attempt a critique of hegemony which, through a feminist reading of Spinoza, allows for the production of a new shared imaginary. This approach is based on an analysis of freedom and responsibility that we find in Gatens' reading of Spinoza, as well as in the question of self-knowledge developed by Lloyd.

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An ethical understanding of responsibility should entail a richly qualitative comprehension of the links between embodied, unique individuals and their lived realities of behaviour. Criminal responsibility theory broadly adheres to ‘rational choice’ models of the moral self which subsume individuals’ emotionally embodied dimensions under the general direction of their rational will and abstracts their behaviour from corporeal reality. Linking individuals with their behaviour based only on such understandings of ‘rational choice’ and abstract descriptions of behaviour overlooks the phenomenological dimensions of that behaviour and thus its moral significance as a lived experience. To overcome this ethical shortcoming, engagement with the aesthetic as an alternative discourse can help articulate the ‘excessive’ nature of lived reality and its relationship with ‘orthodox’ knowledge; fittingly, the comics form involves interaction of rational, non-rational, linguistic, and non-linguistic dimensions, modelling the limits of conceptual thought in relation to complex reality. Rational choice is predicated upon a split between a contextually embedded self and an abstractly autonomous self. Analysis of the graphic novel Watchmen contends that prioritisation of rational autonomy over sensual experience is symptomatic of a ‘rational surface’ that turns away from the indeterminate ‘chaos’ of complex reality (the unstructured universe), instead maintaining the power of rational and linguistic concepts to order the world. This ‘rational surface’ is maintained by masking that which threatens its stability: the chaos of the infinite difference of living individuals. These epistemological foundations are reconfigured, via Watchmen, enabling engagement beyond the ‘rational surface’ by accepting the generative potential of this living chaos and calling for models of criminal identity that are ‘restless’, acknowledging the unique, shifting nature of individuals, and not tending towards ‘complete’ or stable concepts of the self-as-responsible. As part of the aesthetic methodology of this reconfiguration, a radical extension of legal theory’s analytical canon is developed.

The purpose of this essay is to examine how Christians can and should speak about God if they take feminist criticism seriously. This purpose concerns two problems: the first starts with the proposition that God is essentially different from humans and things and at the fact that the language that we use to describe and speak about God is a human language. God is infinite, incorporeal, and timeless, while the human language normally is used to apply to finite, corporeal, and temporal things. How – if ever – can this language apply to God? To examine this problem further, I present four different theories of religious language. The second problem is actualized by feminists who criticize the standard within the Christian tradition to characterize God in predominantly masculine terms. Feminists have criticised religious language for being oppressive in several ways, and particularly to establish and maintain hierarchical structures in which women are subordinated men. In this essay I present and discuss feminist criticism of religious language and then distinguish four different strategies for feminists. I further examine three of these strategies, represented by Sallie McFague, Gail Ramshaw and Janet Soskice, dealing with the problem of religious language within the Christian tradition. In all three of these feminist strategies metaphors are found to be of great importance. Finally, I promote Soskice metaphor theory combined with an apophatic theory of language. Soskice stresses the importance of anthropomorphous metaphors and offer the possibility of using both male and female images when speaking about God. This strategy positively handles the proposition of God as essentially different but makes it possible for believers to refer to God (through metaphors). This is also the preferable strategy in line with feminist criticism.