<p>Since the late 1970s, the rapidly expanding literature subsumed under the activity-based paradigm has increased significantly our understanding of urban travel behavior and provided insights into new approaches to replace current models of urban travel demand-namely, the Urban Transportation Modeling System. A basic tenet of this paradigm is that decision-making occurs in a household context, taking into account interactions among household members. This differs, however, from the reality of activity-based research to date. With few exceptions, the decision-making unit in both empirical studies and modeling efforts is the individual, not the household. In this dissertation, it is argued that there is a need to develop activity-based travel demand forecasting models at the household level. To this end, a conceptual framework is proposed for modeling daily household activity-travel behavior. This framework is developed for the heads of five common household types and consists of two modules: Activity-Episode Generation and Activity-Episode Scheduling. The statistical models underlying the former module are discussed and estimated using data from a trip diary survey conducted in the Greater Toronto Area in 1987. The Activity-Episode Generation module is then implemented as an object-oriented simulation model. This model is used to evaluate the effects of a large-scale adoption of the compressed workweek on the daily number of out-of-home activity episodes for the heads of households in the Greater Toronto Area in 1986.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Master of Philosophy / This thesis examines the roles played by philosophy and science in the development of knowl-edge and understanding from ancient times to the present day. It is maintained that the sole contributor to this development has been science, philosophy for the most part acting as an impediment, contrary to the philosophically inspired myth that philosophy lays the groundwork for science, and consonant with the suspicions of most scientists who give thought to the matter. This thesis is expounded from two perspectives, the historical and the analytic. From the historical perspective, Part I of the thesis, the development of scientific ideas is traced in its philosophical context, principally that of the physical sciences from the time of Galileo, but also touching on the position of science in Greek thought. It is concluded that science effectively began with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and pro-gressed from that time generally in opposition to philosophical dogma, and, once established, almost entirely independently of it. From the analytical perspective, Part II of the thesis, some recent and contemporary philosophical issues in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, cen-tred principally on issues concerning the connection between mind and the world, are evalu-ated for their contributions to our current knowledge and understanding. The evaluation is that, by its resort to inappropriate terminology, for the most part philosophy generates confu-sion in matters that in everyday terms are inherently simple and in scientific terms are more complex than philosophers ever imagined—the issue of consciousness is given particular attention. The discussion devolves upon the view, also put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his later years, that controversy in these areas of philosophy arises largely from a confusion of theory with the referents of theory, of word with object, and from the consequent ideological commitment of philosophers to irreconcilable positions in the realist–idealist spectrum. The thesis maintains that although it is a scientific (that is, empirically based) fact that theories, concepts, percepts and the like are constructs of the human mind (suggesting an idealist view, and therefore a fact causing difficulty for realists), it does not follow that the referents of these constructs are themselves constructs of the human mind—indeed, the proposition that they are is without meaning (and hence the realism–idealism dualism is meaningless). This is because the referents of constructs are accessible only by means of those constructs, which do not speak of their own basis in the human mind—the reality of an object referred to depends on the empirical validity of the construct by which the reference is made (and, of course, it may not be real in this sense at all, but be an illusion or a deliberate fiction), not on some philosophical notion of reality. Thus, for example, while the theory of evolution is a human construct, there is no sense in which evolution can be spoken of as a human construct or oth-erwise—evolution is dealt with in its entirety through its theory. Such a resolution of age-old philosophical controversy reflects no more than the human condition (as epitomised by Neurath’s simile of “sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea”), which is fully en-compassed by the scientific approach, and from which there is no escape by means of any religious or philosophical construction.

The resistance of Stenotrophomonas maltophilia to antimicrobial agents has become a major medical and public health problem. The frequent treatment of S. maltophilia borne infections with the same anti-microbial agent over a period of time inherently results in the pathogen developing resistance to the drug. A polyclonal antibody cocktail, D-Squared David L Scott 01 (D2-DLSO1) was used to recover surface exposed immunogenic polypeptides (SEIP’s) from the cell walls of S. maltophilia. Bioinformatics strategies (Blast analysis, sequence alignment hydrophilicity/hydrophobicity plots) were performed to identify epitopes of ferric enterobactin receptor (Fep A) homolog in S. maltophilia. Data showed that D2-DLSO1 recognized regions along the Fep A peptide sequence that was confirmed in an enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) assay. The amino acid sequences of Escherichia coli (E. coli) Fep A Iron receptor could serve as a target for the development of anti S.maltophila IgG that are useful in protection against infections caused by S. maltophilia and other Gram negative bacteria. Individual S. maltophilia surface exposed immunogenic polypeptides were evaluated in growth inhibition studies and ELISA was used to determine applicability as targets for immunological neutralization. The data suggest that serial dilution (100-fold increments) of D2-DLSO 1 antisera (1 02 dilutions) representing ljig/ml showed significant binding ofD2-DLSO1 to S.maltophilia antigens as compared to controls. The data indicated that D2-DLSO1 inhibited the proliferation of S. maltophilia and several Gram negative bacteria. However, D2-DLSO1 did not show any inhibition of proliferation on Gram positive bacteria (Staphiococcus. aureus), suggesting that there are no common conserved sequences among Gram negative and Gram positive bacteria. Human monoclonal antibodies (DLS-10/ DLS-1 1) recovered from transgenic mice were capable of inhibiting the proliferation of S. maltophilia in vitro. These monoclonal antibodies showed potential of being excellent therapeutic agents for infections caused by S. maltophilia and possibly other Gram negative nosocomial pathogens.

<p> The purpose of the qualitative multiple case study was to understand and describe leadership experiences of nonprofit leaders and managers. Examining the leadership traits of adaptive leadership, change leadership, transformation leadership, and complex adaptive leadership provided the platform of this study is an endeavor to understand nonprofit leadership from the perspective of service delivery and programs for homeless veterans. In addition, this study seeks to understand the complex problems of the homeless veteran population specifically of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars through the lens of nonprofit leadership. This qualitative multiple case study seeks to illuminate the motivational strategies and tactics of nonprofit leaders and managers to engage homeless veterans to pursue access to certain Veterans Administration services and programs. The main source for the multiple case study data included the narratives from the semi-structured interviews of four nonprofit executives in Indiana with years of experience with the homeless veteran population as well as veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The knowledge and experience of the key executives of the four nonprofit organizations in the research study of the homeless veteran population made invaluable contributions to the qualitative multiple case study in the field of nonprofit leadership. The findings of the qualitative multiple case study were generally consistent with the existing studies relative to the homeless veteran population. Through the illumination of the thick, rich descriptions of the shared experiences of the nonprofit leaders and manager of the qualitative multiple case study called attention to the linkage with the literature to provide an explanation of the inability of homeless veterans to gain access to certain Veterans Administration services and programs. Thus, the current qualitative multiple case study begins to fill the gaps in the scientific knowledge base to resolve issues of the unmet needs of homeless veterans.</p>

<p> Multiverse cosmology exhibits unique epistemic problems because it posits the existence of universes inaccessible from our own. Since empirical investigation is not possible, philosophical investigation takes a prominent role. The inaccessibility of the other universes causes argumentation for the multiverse hypothesis to be wholly dependent upon typicality assumptions that relate our observed universe to the unobserved universes. The necessary reliance on typicality assumptions results in the Multiverse Circularity Problem: the multiverse hypothesis is justified only through invoking typicality assumptions, but typicality assumptions are justified only through invoking the multiverse hypothesis. The unavoidability of the circularity is established through argumentation for each of the two conjuncts that comprise it.</p><p> Historical investigation proves the first conjunct of the Multiverse Circularity Problem. Detailed study of the now-neglected tradition of multiverse thought shows that philosophers and scientists have postulated the multiverse hypothesis with regularity, under different names, since antiquity. The corpus of argumentation for the existence of the multiverse breaks cleanly into three distinct argument schemas: implication from physics, induction, and explanation. Each of the three argument schemas is shown to be fully reliant upon unsupported typicality assumptions. This demonstrates that the multiverse hypothesis is justified only through invoking typicality assumptions.</p><p> Philosophical assessment of cosmological induction establishes the second conjunct of the Multiverse Circularity Problem. Independent justification for typicality assumptions is not forthcoming. The obvious candidate, enumerative induction, fails: Hume&rsquo;s attack against inference through time is extended to inference through space. This move undercuts external justification for typicality assumptions, such as the Cosmological Principle, which cosmologists implement to justify induction. Removing the legitimacy of enumerative induction shows that typicality assumptions are justified only through invoking the multiverse hypothesis, thereby establishing the Multiverse Circularity Problem. </p>

Master of Philosophy / This thesis examines the roles played by philosophy and science in the development of knowl-edge and understanding from ancient times to the present day. It is maintained that the sole contributor to this development has been science, philosophy for the most part acting as an impediment, contrary to the philosophically inspired myth that philosophy lays the groundwork for science, and consonant with the suspicions of most scientists who give thought to the matter. This thesis is expounded from two perspectives, the historical and the analytic. From the historical perspective, Part I of the thesis, the development of scientific ideas is traced in its philosophical context, principally that of the physical sciences from the time of Galileo, but also touching on the position of science in Greek thought. It is concluded that science effectively began with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and pro-gressed from that time generally in opposition to philosophical dogma, and, once established, almost entirely independently of it. From the analytical perspective, Part II of the thesis, some recent and contemporary philosophical issues in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, cen-tred principally on issues concerning the connection between mind and the world, are evalu-ated for their contributions to our current knowledge and understanding. The evaluation is that, by its resort to inappropriate terminology, for the most part philosophy generates confu-sion in matters that in everyday terms are inherently simple and in scientific terms are more complex than philosophers ever imagined—the issue of consciousness is given particular attention. The discussion devolves upon the view, also put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his later years, that controversy in these areas of philosophy arises largely from a confusion of theory with the referents of theory, of word with object, and from the consequent ideological commitment of philosophers to irreconcilable positions in the realist–idealist spectrum. The thesis maintains that although it is a scientific (that is, empirically based) fact that theories, concepts, percepts and the like are constructs of the human mind (suggesting an idealist view, and therefore a fact causing difficulty for realists), it does not follow that the referents of these constructs are themselves constructs of the human mind—indeed, the proposition that they are is without meaning (and hence the realism–idealism dualism is meaningless). This is because the referents of constructs are accessible only by means of those constructs, which do not speak of their own basis in the human mind—the reality of an object referred to depends on the empirical validity of the construct by which the reference is made (and, of course, it may not be real in this sense at all, but be an illusion or a deliberate fiction), not on some philosophical notion of reality. Thus, for example, while the theory of evolution is a human construct, there is no sense in which evolution can be spoken of as a human construct or oth-erwise—evolution is dealt with in its entirety through its theory. Such a resolution of age-old philosophical controversy reflects no more than the human condition (as epitomised by Neurath’s simile of “sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea”), which is fully en-compassed by the scientific approach, and from which there is no escape by means of any religious or philosophical construction.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Sydney, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed 27 March 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy to the Dept. of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

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