Abstract not available.

Abstract not available.

This paper explores aspects of the scientific method which have proven inadequate to the task of producing verifiable and consistently repeatable experimental evidence for the existence of a particular category of phenomena, anomalous or psychic phenomena. The deficiencies of the method are not necessarily due to the esoteric nature of the phenomena and events being tested. Rather, the protocols of the method contribute to its inadequacy: reliance on observation, isolation of variables, and experimental controls, in short its fundamental functional criteria are perhaps its greatest impediment. The author suggests that applying the scientific method in the examination of anomalous or psychic phenomena was ill-advised from its inception because of these inadequacies, and concludes that it is quite possible that the method will never be the appropriate tool to uncover the mechanism by which anomalous phenomena manifest and operate. / Religion

<p>This thesis will attempt to show how computer simulated models can act as a tool for philosophers. To accomplish this goal, this thesis will be broken down into six sections. The first three sections will go into more detail regarding the nature of the term &lsquo;computer simulated model.&rsquo; They will discuss the history of computer simulated models, outline the process of constructing computer simulated models, and give context for the current use of computer simulated models in science. These sections will rely heavily on the work of Eric Winsberg to give a proper understanding of the functions of computer simulated models. The forth section will give a historical overview of different philosophical methods, including the dialectical method, Conceptual Analysis, and the work of Paul Churchland with Artificial Neural Networks. This section will also attempt to show how these philosophical methods relate to computer simulated models. The fifth section will discuss how American Pragmatism provides a positive framework for the utilization of computer simulated models by philosophers, specifically pulling from the works of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The sixth and final section will address the notion that computer simulated models are reliable without seeking truth and use that notion to tie together the argument that computer simulated models can serve as a tool for philosophers. </p>

No description available.

<p> We present two re-derivations of the Scharnhorst effect. The latter was first obtained in 1990 by Klaus Scharnhorst, soon followed by Gabriel Barton, and consists in the theoretical prediction that the phase velocity of photons propagating in a Casimir vacuum normal to the plates would be larger than <i> c.</i> (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.) </p>

<p>My dissertation aims to answer two questions: (1) Is democracy epistemically valuable? (2) Is the epistemic value of democracy, if it has any, necessary for justifying its legitimacy? I argue that democracy in certain form can be epistemically valuable. However, I also argue that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying its legitimacy. To defend the epistemic value of democracy, I propose a post-deliberation version of Condorcet&rsquo;s jury theorem. I argue that this version of the jury theorem can avoid the common challenges against the classic version. To reject the necessity of epistemic value for democratic legitimacy, I argue that, given that the epistemic value of democracy is subject to disagreement, it cannot be used to justify legitimacy. In addition, I provide a purely proceduralist argument for democratic legitimacy, which appeals to the egalitarian principle that every citizens ought to be equally respected by the state. This argument, if succeeds, shows that the epistemic value of democracy is not necessary for justifying democratic legitimacy. </p>

<p>Public reason theorists argue that it is permissible for the state to enforce political norms, such as laws or constitutional principles, when those norms are acceptable to ?reasonable people.? Reasonable people are neither actual people, with all their flaws, nor are they perfect people; they are rather a partially idealized group ? realistic in some ways and idealized in others. Each of the major public reason theorists ? John Rawls, Gerald Gaus, Jonathan Quong, Joshua Cohen ? idealizes reasonable people to a different degree, but they all share two claims: 1) Reasonable people hold diverse views of the good life. Nevertheless, 2) Reasonable people can all accept basic liberal political norms grounded in freedom and equality. My dissertation begins by arguing that theorists are not free to choose any level of idealization, but are constrained in this choice by the justifications of their theories. In particular, idealization is constrained by one essential part of public reason?s justification, which I call the ?diversity argument.? The diversity argument explains the first element of reasonable people: why do they disagree about the good? The answers, I argue, attributes certain realistic qualities and tendencies to reasonable people, which therefore constrains how much we can idealize them. In chapters on the major public reason theorists, I argue that they all offer a diversity argument that does not match the level of idealization that they employ. As a result, they are unable to show that liberal norms are acceptable to reasonable people, appropriately idealized. In the final chapter, I argue that the mismatch in these theories goes even deeper, which we can see when we ask why we must accommodate disagreement at all. The answers that philosophers have given us ? reasonable disagreement is the inevitable result of human reasoning, human psychology, or free conditions ? also apply to irrational disagreement. Irrational influences such as implicit bias and motivated reasoning are also inevitable results of who we are and how we live, which means we must accommodate these realistic tendencies in political justification. So, if public reason theories must now accommodate disagreement among reasonable-but-sometimes-irrational people, what could be acceptable to all such people? I conclude by suggesting a new direction for public reason theories. People who disagree about the good life, but recognize their common biases, can still justify their views to each other by supporting institutions that mitigate those biases, such as non-discrimination laws and deliberative institutions. This requires a new kind of social contract theory ? one that is grounded in the shared recognition of our limitations, rather than our shared reasons.

No description available.

No description available.