Abstract The way bodies are perceived has not received much attention in ethical discourse. It has always been accepted that one of the fundamental principles in evaluating ethical dilemmas in bio ethics is the respect for autonomy. This notion has dominated medical ethics for several decades. Medical ethicists however have quite frankly forgotten about the perception of bodies. In this post modern era, ethicists and medical practitioners are challenging and considering in what ways the impact of disease has on an individuals “autonomous decision making”. This discourse considers current and historical thoughts on autonomy and challenges its relevance in bioethics today. Autonomy is viewed from a genuine and an ascriptional perspective. By reviewing various arguments it is concluded that autonomy is still an important, but not an absolute, consideration in bioethics. Embodiment is discussed from a phenomenological perspective with the various notions of embodiment reviewed and evaluated. The impact that various states of embodiment have, from its normal physiological state that includes different ages, racial makeup and gender, to diseased states, on autonomy is reflected and discussed. This impact, it is argued, questions the role that autonomy plays in decision making. Emphasis is placed on respect for embodiment to seek a resolution to the impasse presented by certain ethical dilemmas where the respect for autonomy is found to be flawed.

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Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of gross morphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the detriment of the others, often leading to an artificial emotion-cognition distinction even within emotion science itself. Attempts to reconcile this by putting the gross components back together, such as Jesse Prinz’s “embodied appraisal theory”, are, I argue, destined to failure because the vernacular concept of emotion which is used as the explanandum is not a natural kind and is not amenable to scientific explication. I examine Antonio Damasio’s proposal that emotion is involved in paradigmatic ‘cognitive’ processing such as rational decision making, and argue (1) that the research he discusses does not warrant the particular hypothesis he favours, and (2) that Damasio’s account, though in many ways a step in the right direction, nonetheless continues to endorse a framework which sees affect and cognition as separate (though now highly interacting) faculties. I further argue that the conflation of ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ may be the source of some confusion in emotion theory and that affect needs to be properly distinguished from ‘emotion’. I examine some dissociations in the pain literature which give us further empirical evidence that, as with the emotions, affect is a distinct component along with more cognitive elements of pain. I then argue that affect is distinctive in being grounded in homeostatic regulative activity in the body proper. With the distinction between affect, emotion, and cognition in hand, and the associated grounding of affect in bodily activity, I then survey evidence that bodily affect is also involved in perception and in paradigmatic cognitive processes such as attention and executive function. I argue that this relation is not ‘merely’ casual. Instead, affect (grounded in fine-grained details of internal bodily activity) is partially constitutive of cognition, participating in cognitive processing and contributing to perceptual and cognitive phenomenology. Finally I review some work in evolutionary robotics which reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the particular fine details of embodiment, such as molecular signalling between both neural and somatic cells matters to cognition. I conclude that cognition is ‘properly embodied’ in that it is partially constituted by the many fine-grained bodily processes involved in affect (as demonstrated in the thesis) and plausibly by a wide variety of other fine-grained bodily processes that likewise tend to escape the net of contemporary cognitive science.

Thesis advisor: Sharlene N. Hesse-Biber / Birth Visionaries: An Examination of Unassisted Childbirth By Lauren Ashley Brown Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, Thesis Chair This exploratory study inquires into unassisted childbirth, the act of giving birth without the presence of any birth professional (doctor, midwife or doula). Unassisted birth is on the radical fringe of alternatives to the dominant techno-medical birth common in American hospitals today. My research questions are what are women's motivations for choosing unassisted childbirth and what is the lived experience of unassisted childbirth? I will answer these questions through nine in-depth interviews and a grounded theory data analysis. My approach comes from a focus on the everyday lived experience of women as problematic as well as insights from anthropology of birth and feminist postmodern sociology of knowledge. This study is relevant to public health policy on pregnancy and birth, to those working on questions of technology and culture, and to those concerned with how biosocial rituals shape embodied experience. My findings also contribute to research about power in contemporary society, specifically how the body can be a cite for social control and resistance. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Sociology.

Ein schwerer Rucksack lässt Hügel steiler wirken (Proffitt et al., 2003). Kaum wahrgenommene Gerüche beeinflussen Ordentlichkeit (Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005). Kaubewegungen beeinflussen, als wie vertraut man vorher gesehene Namen bewertet (Topolinski, 2012). Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit derartigen Auswirkungen von körperlichen Zuständen, Sinneswahrnehmungen und Handlun- gen auf psychische Zustände und Vorgänge, die als Embodiment bezeichnet werden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird zuerst Embodiment im Vergleich zur Computer- metapher des Informationsverarbeitungsansatzes definiert und Betrachtungen zu Metaphern für die menschliche Psyche im Allgemeinen aufgestellt. Danach werden verschiedene psychologische Mechanismen für Embodiment-Phänomene aufgezeigt. Kapitel 2 führt alle Embodiment-Phänomene auf drei verschiedene grundlegende psychische Mechanismen zurück, die alleine oder in Kombination alle Embodiment- Phänomene erklären können. Da die Untersuchung zugrundeliegender Mechanis- men bisher eher wenig verbreitet ist, werden außerdem empirische Testverfahren dargestellt, mit deren Hilfe zwischen verschiedenen Mechanismen für spezifische Phänomene unterschieden werden kann. Während die Inhalte dieser Arbeit also Embodiment-Phänomene sind, ist die Herangehensweise—die Untersuchung kog- nitiver Prozesse—in der Social Cognition Perspektive verwurzelt. Der empirische Teil der Arbeit untersucht einen spezifischen Embodiment-Effekt genauer, nämlich den Einfluss körperlicher Reinigung auf psychische Prozesse, die verkörperte Reinigung. In Kapitel 4 wird untersucht, inwiefern sich Hilfsbereitschaft nach eigenem moralischen oder unmoralischen Verhalten durch physikalische Reinigung ändert—inwiefern man sich also von einem moralisch positiven oder moralisch negativem Gefühl reinwaschen kann (zwei Experimente mit insgesamt 476 Teilnehmern). In Kapitel 5 wird untersucht, wie sich durch physikalische Reinigung die Änderungen in Optimismus und Selbstwert reduzieren, die durch Erfolg oder Misserfolg in einem vorangehenden Leistungstest hervorgerufen wor- den waren (drei Experimente mit insgesamt 372 Teilnehmern). Die Grundidee bei verkörperter Reinigung ist also, dass physikalische Reinigung nicht nur physis- che sondern auch psychische Rückstände entfernt. Das heißt, dass der Einfluss vorheriger Erfahrungen durch Händewaschen reduziert werden sollte. In dieser Arbeit sollen die psychologischen Prozesse untersucht werden, die den Einfluss von Reinigung auf die Psyche vermitteln könnten. Ausgehend von be- reits bekannten Auswirkungen körperlicher Reinigung auf verschiedene psychische Prozesse, werden zwei mögliche Erklärungen für das Phänomen der verkörperten Reinigung kontrastiert und über deren zugrundeliegende Prozesse spekuliert (Kapi- tel 3). Kapitel 4 vergleicht die Effekte verkörperter Reinigung, wenn die beiden Erklärungen konvergierende Vorhersagen machen (nach moralisch negativen Erin- nerungen) und wenn die beiden Erklärungen divergierende Vorhersagen machen (nach moralisch positiven Erinnerungen). Kapitel 5 untersucht dann eine der beiden Erklärungen genauer. Dafür werden verschiedene Aspekte der Reinigungshandlung variiert um die notwendigen und hinreichenden Kriterien für verkörperte Reinigung und damit auch die beteiligten psychischen Prozesse zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse des Einflusses verkörperter Reinigung in Kapitel 4 sind nicht interpretierbar, weil der vorausgesetzte Einfluss positiver und negativer moralischer Erinnerungen auf prosoziales Verhalten nicht nachweisbar war. Mit geändertem Grundparadigma ließ sich dann in Kapitel 5 ein stabiler Effekt verkörperter Reini- gung nachweisen. Eine Variation verschiedener Faktoren der Reinigung ergab, dass eine intentionale oder zumindest wissentliche Reinigung essentiell ist und dass sich diese Reinigung auf den eigenen Körper (und nicht auf einen Gegenstand) bezieht damit physische Reinigung zu psychischer Reinigung führt. Damit spielen sowohl inferentielle als auch automatisch Prozesse eine Rolle bei Effekten verkörperter Reinigung. Zum Abschluss der Arbeit werden die Erkenntnisse und Limitierungen der ak- tuellen Arbeit diskutiert und die beiden möglichen Reinigungserklärungen in einen anthropologischen Kontext gestellt. Anschließend wird der hier verfolgte Ansatz mit anderen Arten von Embodiment-Erklärungen verglichen. / The present thesis examines embodiment—the body’s influence on psychological processes. Bodily states, perceptions, and actions influence cognitive processes; for example, a heavy backpack makes hills look steeper (Proffitt et al., 2003); and faint odors influence orderliness (Holland, Hendriks, & Aarts, 2005). In Chapter 2, embodiment phenomena are reviewed and classified according to three possible underlying mechanisms. Additionally, empirical tests for distinguishing between the workings of these mechanisms are discussed. The empirical part of the thesis examines one specific embodiment in more detail, namely embodied cleansing. The basic idea in embodied cleansing is that physical cleansing reduces not only physical but also psychological remnants of the past. For example, Chapter 4 examines whether prosocial behavior after one’s own moral or immoral behavior is changed by embodied cleansing; and Chapter 5 examines how changes in optimism and self-esteem as a result of previous success or failure in an achievement test are reduced by embodied cleansing. The present thesis examines psychological mechanisms that could explain embodied cleansing. For that, Chapter 3 derives and contrasts two possible explanations for embodied cleansing. Chapter 4 tests the effect of physical cleansing when both explanations make converging predictions (with morally negative memories) compared to when the two explanations make differing predictions (with morally positive memories). However, the results of embodied cleansing on prosocial behavior after (im)moral recall could not be examined as (im)moral recall, against expectations, did not influence prosocial behavior in the present paradigm. Chapter 5 more closely examines one of the two explanations. For that, different aspects of the act of cleaning one’s hands are varied to examine necessary and sufficient criteria for embodied cleansing. The results show that deliberate cleaning is essential for embodied cleansing; additionally the cleaning action has to refer to one’s own body (and not to an object). Thus, a combination of inferential and automatic processes seem to play a role in embodied cleansing. Finally the results are discussed in relation to other embodiment effects and explanations.

Embodiments are virtual personifications of the user in real-time distributed groupware. Many embodiments in groupware are simple abstract 2D representations such as avatars and telepointers. Although current user embodiment techniques can reveal information related to position and orientation, they show far less than what is available in a face-to-face situation, and as a result, collaboration can become more difficult. The problem addressed in this research is that it is difficult for groupware users to recognize and characterize other participants using only their embodiments. The solution explored in this thesis is to provide more information about groupware users by enriching their embodiment. This scheme encodes state and context variables as visual augmentations on the embodiment. Providing information about characteristics such as skill, expertise, and experience can be valuable for collaboration; increasing the information in visual embodiments makes it easier and more natural for collaborators to recognize and characterize others, and thus coordinate activity, simplify communication, and find collaborators.<p> Rich embodiments were tested in three separate experiments. The first experiment showed that users are able to recall a large number of variables displayed on embodiments, and are able to accurately determine the values of those variables. The second study showed that rich embodiments are useful in terms of collaboration and interaction in an actual groupware context a multiplayer game. The final study further examined information-rich embodiment in a shared drawing task, and further revealed the potential of increasing awareness using embodiment.

Embodiments are virtual personifications of the user in real-time distributed groupware. Many embodiments in groupware are simple abstract 2D representations such as avatars and telepointers. Although current user embodiment techniques can reveal information related to position and orientation, they show far less than what is available in a face-to-face situation, and as a result, collaboration can become more difficult. The problem addressed in this research is that it is difficult for groupware users to recognize and characterize other participants using only their embodiments. The solution explored in this thesis is to provide more information about groupware users by enriching their embodiment. This scheme encodes state and context variables as visual augmentations on the embodiment. Providing information about characteristics such as skill, expertise, and experience can be valuable for collaboration; increasing the information in visual embodiments makes it easier and more natural for collaborators to recognize and characterize others, and thus coordinate activity, simplify communication, and find collaborators.<p> Rich embodiments were tested in three separate experiments. The first experiment showed that users are able to recall a large number of variables displayed on embodiments, and are able to accurately determine the values of those variables. The second study showed that rich embodiments are useful in terms of collaboration and interaction in an actual groupware context a multiplayer game. The final study further examined information-rich embodiment in a shared drawing task, and further revealed the potential of increasing awareness using embodiment.

This study purports to explore how apprentices in microbiology, through interaction and multimodal activities, acquire the knowledge and skills that are necessary for doing scientific experiments. It aims to examine the ways novices learn to scrutinize and discuss the data under investigation, how experts communicate scientific knowledge about microbes to novices, and how experts and novices together create new scientific knowledge during the apprenticeship. Furthermore, this study aims at explaining the various ways narratives contribute to the socialization of the apprentice into the workplace and the scientific field, and how stories help retain knowledge, gained in one situation, to be used in other contexts and situations. To achieve this aim, I videotaped daily activities in a small microbiology lab, focusing on detailed observations of experts and novices as they engaged in teaching and learning. I was especially interested in what kinds of innovative symbolic communication resources would be invoked during such educational activities. In addition, I collected data pertaining to how the apprentice was socialized into this particular community of practice. I applied a ‘situated learning’ approach to the analysis of the instructional data, as well as discourse analytic and social semiotic methods of analyzing verbal and nonverbal, embodied interaction. I found that researchers, by using embodied and semiotic resources, created moments of shared participation between themselves and their scientific objects. Likewise I found that gestures shaped objects and concepts, and brought these into an intersubjective space where researchers, tools, instruments, and concepts interacted in a collaborative architecture. I named the specific literacy prevalent in scientific experimentation (reading and understanding graphs, diagrams, pictures, etc.) as ‘science literacy’, to distinguish it from the term ‘scientific literacy’, a general understanding of popularized scientific topics. Blurred boundaries were discovered between the living organisms and their semiotic representations whenever the expert and the novice referred to the living organisms in their discussions concerning graphs and diagrams. The researchers changed their terminology, depending on the bacteria changing from animate to inanimate status. Finally, I discovered the significance of contextual tellability in narratives functioning both as introduction to the workplace and as memory devices. / text

In this thesis, the author explores the connections between developments in the fields of neuroscience and neuropsychology and the theoretical study of embodiment in political and literary theory. Through examination of the development of neuroscience and its interactions with theoretical approaches to embodiment, the author argues that the current approach to interdisciplinary work in the area is limited by entrenched disciplinary boundaries. Examining how these disciplinary boundaries limit the scope of the study of cognition and embodiment presents the necessity of a new approach. Based in the work of Elizabeth A. Wilson and David Wills, the author presents a new approach, the embodied cognitive approach, as an alternative interdisciplinary approach. / Graduate / 0615

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