India is celebrated as the largest democracy in the world but is it truly democratic? Is it the nation-state that its founder’s envisioned it to be? Has it addressed it ancient issue of social diversity? This paper seeks to assess the present problem faced by the Indian Democracy; problems based on India’s inherent social diversity. Furthermore the paper seeks to recommend a solution based on Amartya Sen’s Open Impartiality approach that will allow the country to reassess its democratic platform. The paper also aims at providing a starting point to execute Sen’s approach by exploring the vision of two of India’s independence leaders: Mohandas Karamchandra Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore.

Most recent attempts at solving the Non-Identity Problem have focused on providing a deontological solution to the problem, often by giving special attention to rights. In this paper, I argue for a solution that focuses on highlighting the morally permissible second-personal reasons and claims that nonidentity victims may have. I use a natural marriage between a Kantian conceptualization of what it means to be free and equal—being one’s own master—and Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach to identify the rights that all individuals, current and future are assigned. I claim that these rights, or capabilities, are what all are entitled to master for themselves in the Kantian sense. I conclude with a solution that produces intuitively correct results and dissolves the nonidentity problem altogether.

This paper will examine specific processes involved within the decision-making process of how to allocate limited health care resources. I will start by discussing how in order to compare and differentiate between health states, we have created ranking systems, based on the health state’s impact on people’s quality of life, which health states need more care, and which can be most effectively treated. We evaluate impact on quality of life by assigning quality weights to years of life lived with that health state, which we call quality-adjusted life years, or QALYs. Next, I will discuss the problems with assigning quality weights to health states; specifically, the disability paradox, meaning the distinct differences between quality weights assigned by non-patients versus patients. After that, I will explain how depression defies the trend of the disability paradox, and causes our prior arguments about why patients and non-patients rate health states different to contradict themselves., This leads me to suggest that we should consider a different way of deciding between different quality weights. I examine the arguments for choosing higher or lower quality weights, and conclude that because we have a moral imperative to provide health care resources to those in need, particularly those who are disadvantaged, we should take the lower quality weights and err on the side of overspending on health states. Ultimately, this will create the greatest change in funding for health states like depression that go against the disability paradox. Finally, I address the economic trade-offs we have to consider if we make the decision to spend more on treating health states.

In this essay, I argue that the institution of journalism plays a vital role in informing citizens of a deliberative democratic society, and that to effectively fulfill this role, journalists must report the news objectively. I first examine the historical evolution of objectivity as it pertains to journalism. Then, I elaborate on some of the philosophical concepts that provide the foundation for objectivity. Next, I introduce John Rawls’ idea of public reason, which provides an improved understanding of the role of journalism within a democratic society. I claim from this that journalism must re-envision its role as guardian of the public political forum. Finally, I bring these various discussions together by drawing in the requirements that Stephen Ward lays out in his theory of pragmatic objectivity, and argue that these are necessary to help journalism legitimize its authority to safeguard this forum. In doing so, journalism can ensure both that citizens are objectively informed and that the public forum offers them a sphere in which they can effectively participate in the governance of their democracy.

Infants with life-terminating conditions (ILTCs) are those whose conditions prevent them from living more than two years. When these infants have difficulty assimilating food and fluids orally, doctors can provide nutrition and hydration through artificial means. While artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) can provide benefits, it can also result in complications leading to pain and/or distress in addition to that which an ILTC may already be experiencing from one or more underlying conditions. Many medical experts maintain that withholding or withdrawing ANH can help a patient’s body produce its own analgesics. I consider four categories of ILTCs: 1) infants who receive prognoses of two weeks or less; 2) infants who will live longer than two weeks but no more than two years and who are not suffering or in distress; 3) infants who are not dying, but are in distress from the use of ANH; and 4) infants who are not dying, but are in distress from their conditions and/or ANH. I argue that in addition to providing natural analgesics, withholding or withdrawing ANH is a form of comfort care that prevents the occurrence of further complications requiring additional medical treatments and keeps ILTCs content. Under certain circumstances, the withholding or withdrawing of ANH should be obligatory. As it stands, the whole of Catholic teaching on ANH is inconsistent. Operating from the sanctity-of-life ethic, the Church teaches that ANH is an ordinary, therefore obligatory, form of care. But this position contradicts the view that any form of care presenting a grave burden to a patient and/or his family is extraordinary and therefore optional. In addition, by making ANH obligatory, the Catholic Church causes families to undergo heroic suffering (i.e., enduring more than what can be expected or asked of anyone), which the Church says is not required of everyone. I argue that rethinking the Catholic position on ANH will enable the Church to offer practical moral guidance for families to comfort ILTCs, help ILTCs and their families avoid heroic suffering, and provide spiritual care families of ILTCs need, all while still respecting the sanctity of life of every person.

This play demonstrates an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy in practice. The main character experiences loss and confusion, however, through this struggle arrives at a discovery of profound truth. If you've ever wondered how to live your life in the best way possible, the main character believes he's found the answer.

John Rawls was a political philosopher concerned with social justice, specifically the best way that society could be structured so that individual rights and duties were fairly distributed amongst everyone and division of advantages from social cooperation were optimally determined. He believed that this conception of justice rested in principles that would be agreed upon by free, self-interested and rational persons in a starting position of equality and fairness. The principles of the theory of justice are ones that are meant to enable this group of people to cooperate with each other while recognizing that individuals in the group both share the same interests and have conflicting interests. These principles can be understood as underlying our most strongly held ethical beliefs – the ones that exhibit our ability to make the right moral decisions. This paper explains Rawls’ theory of justice, Justice as Fairness, considers an alternative known as “mixed conception” and offers Rawls’ response to the alternative before delving deeper into the debate to understand whether Rawls’ theory of a “mixed conception” should be chosen for a society. Rawls was a notoriously difficult writer so this thesis spends a significant amount of time trying to explicate his views and arguments. With that being said, this thesis does miss out on some key secondary details but hopes to give a clear and compelling picture of his theory, especially the parts that relate to the debate. The debate centers on the choice between the difference principle, which calls for society to maximize the prospects of the least advantaged, and the social minimum principle, which has society set a social minimum that would allow citizens to lead decent lives and take measures necessary to ensure everyone can reach that minimum. In the end, I reach the conclusion that the social minimum principle, in combination with some of Rawls’ other principles, should be used as one of the main principles of justice in society.

In this thesis I establish a hitherto unseen parallel between John Rawls’ theory of justice and utilitarian accounts with respect to population ethics; I argue that the absurd conclusions which plague utilitarianism also plague Rawls’ theory. These are the repugnant and preposterous conclusions. I then argue that Kant's political philosophy offers the resources to escape these absurd conclusions because of a crucial metaphysical difference between theories governed by outcome-oriented considerations and those governed by freedom-oriented constraints.

John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant authored two of the most famous pieces of work in ethical theory (Utilitarianism and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, respectively), yet both fail for various reasons to give us direction by way of living good lives. This thesis begins by outlining those shortcomings, before offering Aristotelian virtue ethics as the solution. Virtue ethics, as conceived by Aristotle, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Julia Annas, delineates a process – grounded in our real lives – by which we may improve as people and therefore flourish, or live good, moral lives: the habituation of the virtues. Importantly, virtue ethics is a process, (not a set of outcomes) and is teachable, which distinguishes it from the other two theories. In developing the virtues, we are able to discover goods internal to the practices that define our lives, whether those are our work, our school, our relationships, or something else entirely. Furthermore, the virtue-ethical approach helps us learn from and grow in our emotional lives, as opposed to casting emotions aside as a skewing force contrary to morality. Virtue, as I will show, lays the groundwork for love, and therefore for flourishing relationships across our lives. In the final chapter, I examine a place where virtue and virtuous love are effectively taught and embraced: Camp Lanakila, in Fairlee, VT. I conclude by offering some takeaways from Lanakila that we may incorporate in our schools, our places of work and worship, our families, and our lives.

The fact of racial injustice in the US presents the difficult question of which emotional responses are (conceptually) appropriate to the perpetration of that injustice. Given that our answer must be informed by the nature of the injustice, this paper takes up Christopher Lebron’s diagnosis of the persistence of racial injustice against blacks in the US as a problem of social value in order to analyze a candidate response on the part of black americans. If Lebron’s theory accurately describes the problem, then it seems that anger appropriately responds to the injustice. The paper’s aim, then, is to give a positive account of black anger in response to the problem of social value. The account is informed by an analysis of “angry black literature,” i.e. a selection of essays from W. E. B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, and Audre Lorde. Approaching the subject within the framework of analytic philosophy, the paper concludes that anger is appropriate in virtue of its being a response to specific moral failures, and further notes that anger offers the ameliorative benefit of pointing out where those failures have taken place, and how we can avoid them in the future.