The purpose of this thesis is largely to consider the de Stoicorum repugnantiis in sympathetic terms as part of Plutarch's wider philosophical output. It argues that Plutarch's approach in the work could not be that of a negative Sceptic, since Plutarch held his own positive beliefs (a form of Platonism) and, although he draws heavily on the arguments of the Sceptical Academy, he saw Scepticism itself as a positive tool. Section II of the thesis traces the history of the polemical motif of self-contradiction, which turns out to be based on a specific argument used by the Academy against Stoic ethics. Plutarch adopts this argument as it stands and uses it extensively; but he also identifies the Stoic inconsistencies he uncovers as symptomatic of the Stoics' doctrinal diversion from Plato, and on this basis he sets out to show that when the Stoics diverge from Plato in any area of doctrine (logical or physical as well as ethical) they likewise fall into self-contradiction. If it is right to think that Plutarch has not chosen his arguments randomly, it becomes increasingly unlikely that he has presented them randomly. So section III considers the idea that Plutarch might have organised his arguments following a standard Academic pattern. Section IV presents a study of each of Plutarch's arguments in the de Stoic, rep. not only to confirm his Platonising interests, but also to demonstrate that the contradictions fall into 'sections', each of which deals with topics drawn from a common area in standard Academic polemic. Section V considers the conclusions that can be drawn from the themes that underlie each section: in fact, it happens that a structure emerges which presupposes a distinctive outlook within Academic literature, and so suggests that Plutarch has made use of a particular work to guide his process of composition.

This thesis investigates the connection between two branches of the Ancient Stoics’ study of dialectic, or what we would call “logic.” Specifically, we look at the overlap between the fields of Stoic logic (the Stoics’ study of propositions) and Stoic grammar (the Stoics’ study of language). While Stoic logic is now highly regarded as a field of study, Stoic grammar is often seen as irrelevant or inferior when compared to other systems of grammar. For the Stoics, however, the two were not so separable. Over three chapters, I look into the value of studying Stoic grammar as a way to approach the field of Stoic logic through a thorough investigation of the Stoic concept of the sundesmoi, or connectors. In the first chapter, I provide a rough ancient historiography of the sources available to us on Stoic grammar. Although we do not have many extant works which discuss Stoic grammar at length, I highlight four which are of particular value to us. In the second chapter, I do close readings of the Stoics’ definitions of sundesmoi, comparing them to definitions given by their grammatical rivals known as the Alexandrian grammarians. By comparing the Stoics’ definition to the Alexandrians’ more technical one, it is possible to see what made the Stoics’ definitions unique. Finally, the third chapter looks at examples of types of connectors and their use in proposition formation. Looking at the examples “if,” “and,” and “or,” I identify the ways in which these particular connectors align and differ from the Stoics’ general definition of sundesmoi. I conclude by considering how looking at the sundesmoi from a grammatical perspective allows us to approach Stoic logic in a different way. Stoic grammar may be more obscure than other forms of grammar, but it is useful for approaching Stoic philosophy more generally. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / This thesis investigates the connection between two branches of the Ancient Stoics’ study of dialectic, or what we would call “logic.” Specifically, we look at the overlap between the fields of Stoic logic (the Stoics’ study of propositions) and Stoic grammar (the Stoics’ study of language). While Stoic logic is now highly regarded as a field of study, Stoic grammar is often seen as irrelevant or inferior when compared to other systems of grammar. For the Stoics, however, the two were not so separable. Indeed, in the thesis, I argue that although Stoic grammar is obscure to modern audiences, it is a useful tool for understanding other branches of Stoic philosophy, particularly Stoic logic. Using the Stoics’ conception of connectors (sundesmoi) as a case study for investigating Stoic logic and Stoic grammar, I show the benefits of understanding Stoic grammar as a way to approach Stoicism as a whole.

This dissertation concerns two aspects of Plutarch’s ethics that have received relatively little attention: the link between his metaphysics and ethics, and Plutarch’s use of diatribe, a rhetorical style primarily associated with Stoics and Cynics, as a means of targeting a wider audience of educated elite for his philosophy. I argue that Plutarch’s De virtute morali links his ethics with his understanding of Platonic metaphysics. De virtute morali also serves as model for Plutarch’s ethical treatises on specific topics. I analyze the following works: De curiositate, De garrulitate, De vitando aere alieno, De vitioso pudore, and De superstitione. In these, Plutarch identifies a vicious behavior (κρίσις) and suggests methods of self-training to eliminate the vicious behavior (ἄσκησις). Self-training always involves the subordination of emotions to reason (μετριοπάθεια), rather than the elimination of emotions (άπάθεια) advocated by the Stoics. Plutarch uses diatribe, in which the author adopts a conversational tone and addresses the reader in second person, both in κρίσις and ἄσκησις, as well as in his arguments against Stoic άπάθεια. Since Stoicism was the most popular philosophical adherence among educated elites during the time when Plutarch began to write, I argue that Plutarch adopts rhetoric associated with the Stoics as a means of promoting Platonism, and himself as its interpreter, in a culture where intellectuals required the patronage of the educated elite for their personal livelihood and the livelihood of their schools.

This dissertation examines the political thought of Cicero in order to shed light on the question of the extent to which politics is or can be made rational. Much of modern political science and policy-making treats citizens as calculating pursuers of interests and preferences, if not as consistently rational. But this view has been powerfully challenged by evidence that human beings are far less adept at the determination and pursuit of our preferences than we believe ourselves to be. As a result, political scientists and policy-makers alike have begun to grapple with the question of how regimes committed to self-government ought to address the limits of our rational capacity, not only in the crafting of particular policies, but also in the rethinking of foundational and constitutional principles and institutions. By considering Cicero’s presentation of virtue and republican politics together with his analysis of the popular philosophical schools that were widely influential in his day, I show that Cicero recognizes and reflects on the pervasive irrationality in human decision-making. Like our modern critics of the irrationality of republicanism, the popular philosophical schools of Cicero’s day both deprecated politics for its inherent unreasonableness and sought to make the world as they experienced it conform to strict rules of reason. Through a reading of Cicero’s evaluation and critique of the schools in De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, and De Officiis, this dissertation aims to shed light not only on his account of the limits of reason in the political arena and the danger of attempting to overcome them, but also on his insistence that the irrational parts of human nature are the source of much that is beneficial in republican politics. Only by understanding this aspect of Cicero’s thought can we understand his reflections on the virtues of republicanism. / text

Spontaneous feeling has been a cornerstone of Romantic aesthetics since Wordsworth wrote his Preface to Lyrical Ballads. This dissertation unsettles the link between Romantic poetry and the overflow of emotion by arguing that writers from Wordsworth to Emerson persistently turned to Stoicism in reconsidering the role of the passions in both literature and the conduct of life. Drawing on poetry and a broad range of journals, letters, and intellectual prose, I argue that the Romantics were attuned to the way diffuse Stoic attitudes informed the politics and moral psychology of their age. More than a prompt for resignation or acquiescence, Stoicism was a radical and controversial term in a revolutionary age; philosophers like Kant, Spinoza, and Godwin drew on Stoic accounts of the passions in articulating their new ethical systems. In chapters on Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, and Emerson, I argue that the period most polemically invested in emotion as the mainspring of art was also captivated by the idea that aesthetic and ethical judgment demanded a transcendence of emotion. In their poetic search for "confirmed tranquillity," the writers in my transatlantic study transformed Stoicism's austerities as they confronted the limitations of sympathy and redefined their own relations to a cosmopolitan and war-torn world.

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Material goods play an important role in ethical life and moral education. Judging which goods are preferable to which − and which are therefore worth pursuing over which − is an ethically crucial process. The currently dominant paradigms of moral education (virtue education, cognitive developmentalism and care theory) do not satisfactorily contribute to this important topic. I argue that the resultant lacuna may be resolved by attending to the insight of the classical Stoics and their modern day neo-Stoic interpreters. Stoicism, I argue, provides a unique set of philosophical resources that fosters critical deliberation and reflection regarding the attribution of value to material goods. I begin this study by detailing the extant lacuna via discussion of virtue education, cognitive developmentalism and care theory as they relate to material good education. Once the lacuna’s existence is established I move on to introduce Stoic philosophy (both classical and contemporary). From this philosophy I construct a moral educational framework. This framework is then applied to two topics related to the material good lacuna: consumer education and environmental education. I conclude that, while Stoicism must be softened and revised for a modern pedagogical audience, its core philosophy has much to offer moral educationalists. / Theoretical, Cultural, and International Studies in Education

This thesis attempts to identify and analyse the influence of the tradition of declamation on characterisation in the dramatic compositions of the Stoic philosopher Seneca. Two argumentative lines structure this thesis: the first relates to a concept of ludism, which is argued to help re-visit declamatory rhetoric, and re-appreciate its functions in Roman society. The second one is twofold: first, that the concept of ludism - in the ways in which it is argued to be applicable to declamatory rhetoric - can describe effectively the influence of declamation on Senecan characterisation; and second, that it may allow us to re-visit the issue of the place of Senecan characterisation within the whole of Seneca’s philosophical writings, by putting into relief an educative function of Senecan characterisation.

<p><a>While Nietzsche is known as a virulent opponent of conventional morality, the critical dimension of his philosophy cannot be divorced from his novel understandings of nature, society, and the self. This dissertation clarifies Nietzsche’s treatments of these notions by comparing his views to those of other figures in the western philosophical tradition. I defend a comparative approach to Nietzsche’s philosophy and provide an overview of my project in chapter one. In chapter two, I argue that although Nietzsche shares Stoicism’s emphasis on self-discipline and on the affirmation of fate, he rejects the Stoics’ teleological understanding of nature and their view of moral values as descriptively objective. This leads Nietzsche to value passion and suffering for helping us realize the world’s indifference to our all-too human concerns and for prompting value creation. In chapter three, I argue that Nietzsche agrees with Leibniz about the existence and character of unconscious perceptions and appetites – and about the way much of our metaphysics derives from our understanding of the self. Nevertheless, Nietzsche audits metaphysical notions such as God and substance on the basis of his rejection of Leibniz’s view of the self as a monad. This leads him to pursue a naturalistic understanding of consciousness, and of ideas, as emerging to satisfy unconscious drives. In chapter four, I examine Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notions of the will to power and the Overman. In addition to defending the viability of these interpretations, I show how they inform Deleuze’s later notions of desiring-production and nomadology. These studies demonstrate Nietzsche’s untimely relevance to ancient, early modern, and contemporary philosophical approaches.</a></p>

O estoicismo de Sêneca apresenta traços que refletem sua condição pessoal de homem novo, de ator na história do Império Romano e de um pensador bastante livre. As linhas de seu pensamento, que se pode chamar de estóico-senequiano, estão presentes em toda sua obra: de maneira explícita, nas epístolas e nos diálogos; e implícita, na tragédia Hércules no Eta. Para essa tragédia, Sêneca buscou, como modelo principal, As Traquínias de Sófocles, cujas personagens recebem um tratamento tal, que se pode ler, em suas palavras e em suas ações, a expressão das virtudes e dos vícios nos três níveis: cósmico, imperial e individual. A relação entre essas três instâncias é garantida, principalmente, pela tensão sujeito-objeto e pela analogia como processo de conhecimento. Em seu pensamento bipolar, pode-se ler a presença dos princípios que perpassam toda a Natureza: o ativo (do lado do sujeito) e o passivo (na vertente do objeto). A expressão máxima do princípio ativo é, no universo, o Logos; no Império, a razão do príncipe, que constitui sua alma; no homem, a razão diretriz. O vício é o desequilíbrio em qualquer uma das instâncias, e consiste numa inversão que deixa a Razão fora do lugar que lhe cabe segundo a perfeição da Natureza. O reequilíbrio, no âmbito do Universo, se faz pela \"conflagração universal\"; no Império, pelo comando de um príncipe virtuoso; no indivíduo, pela prática da virtude, sob o comando da razão. Como no indivíduo, a virtude, que é igual à sabedoria, à felicidade, à liberdade, é conquistada paulatinamente, o homem, em relação a ela, pode ser um stultus, um uacillans, um proficiens ou um sapiens. No Hércules de Hércules no Eta, convivem as três instâncias: a cósmica na conflagração universal, a do Império Romano, nas alusões político-históricas, e a do indivíduo, na trajetória exemplar do herói rumo à sabedoria e à apoteose. Sua trajetória, dividida entre um velho e um novo Hércules, promove, ainda, a passagem do tempo mítico para o tempo legal, do herói marcado pela hybris para o marcado pela uirtus. / Seneca\'s stoicism presents features that reflect his personal condition as new man, as an actor in the Roman Empire History and as a free thinker. His lines of thought, which can be named as estoico-senequiano, are in all of his works: explicitly, in his epistles and dialogues; and implicitly, in his tragedy Hercules on Oeta. As main source of inspiration to this tragedy, Seneca used Sophocles\' The Trachiniae, in which can be read, through its characters\' words and attitudes, the expression of vice and virtue in three levels: cosmic, imperial and individual. The relationship between these three levels is granted, mainly, by the tension subject-object and by analogy as a process of knowledge. In Seneca\'s bipolar thought, one can notice the presence of principles that go beyond all nature: the active (subject\'s side) and the passive (that concerns the object). The major expression of the active principle is, in the universe, Logos; in the Empire, the prince\'s reason, which constitutes his soul; in men, the guideline reason. Vice is the disequilibrium in any of these instances, and is defined as an inversion that takes reason out of its proper place in accordance with nature\'s perfection. The equilibrium is recovered again, in the universe\'s scope, through universal conflagration; in the Empire\'s scope, through a virtuous prince\'s command; in the individual scope, through practicing virtue under the control of reason. Since in human beings, the virtue, which is considered the same as knowledge, happiness, and freedom, is gained gradually, the men in relation to it can be a stultus, a uacillans, a proficiens, or a sapiens. In Hercules from Hercules on Oeta, the three instances are together: the cosmic through the universal conflagration, the one from Roman Empire through the historical and political allusions, and the individual one, through the hero\'s brilliant way to knowledge and apotheosis. His way, divided into an old and a new Hercules, promotes the passage from a mythical time to a legal time, from the hero marked by hybris to the one marked by uirtus.