Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 356-368).

In this thesis I examine the notion of ethical subjectivity as characterized by an original relationship to alterity. Drawing upon Derrida, Levinas and psychoanalytic theory, I give a picture of a subject who is fundamentally responsive and inexorably bound to others, and I discuss the ethical and political implications of this condition. I extend the discussion of 'others' to include technology, suggesting that our ethical responsibility to alterity has been radicalized through deconstruction.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available by subscription via World Wide Web.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Indiana University of Pennsylvania. / Includes bibliographical references.

<p>In this thesis, I will examine the consequences of applying the legal philosophy of Joseph Raz in real world situations. I will argue that if most legal systems actually attempted to adhere to, and accept his theory in all its parts, the legal systems in question would have serious problems. In particular, the legal authorities and officials which represent the legal systems in question would be confused about the extent of their authority. After I prove my claim, I will offer a solution to the problem.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p>Emission permit markets are being actively implemented as a regulatory method to control various types of pollution in the United States because of the potential efficiency improvements they offer. In Canada, regulators have been more cautious, frequently citing concern that proposed Canadian markets are expected to be thin and/or dominated by a single firm. In these circumstances, such a firm could manipulate prices to reduce its own emission control costs while increasing the total cost of pollution control across the market. Such activity might also cause emission permit markets to be viewed as unviable on efficiency and equity grounds. This thesis investigates the potential problems such markets might experience if one firm (or a group of firms) has the ability to manipulate market prices to their advantage. Given the lack of empirical data, experimental economic methods are used in an attempt to determine whether it is reasonable to assume violations of the basic competitive market assumptions should be expected to seriously undermine the efficiency benefits emission permit markets offer in a controlled setting.</p> <p>The experiments reported here show that in double auction markets with one dominant firm and a number of fringe firms, strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in the laboratory. The dominant firm uses emission permits in a socially inefficient manner in order to reduce its costs, increase its profits and exclude rivals in downstream product markets. Far from finding increased market efficiency and decreased cost of pollution control, this study confirms that implementing permit markets when there are firms with market power may decrease efficiency. The resultant loss in gains from trade could also reduce the political viability of emission trading programs.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 356-368). / Electronic reproduction. / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / ix, 368 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Religion, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.