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Les eaux françaises présentent un fort potentiel pour des applications hydroliennes. Dans ces zones à forts courants, d'intenses fluctuations de vitesse sont observées dans la colonne d’eau. Elles proviennent essentiellement des variations bathymétriques du fond marin et peuvent avoir un fort impact sur la production d’énergie et la fatigue des turbines. Afin de comprendre la génération de structures tourbillonnaires dans le sillage d’obstacles et de constituer une base de données pour des études numériques, les conditions rencontrées dans le Raz-Blanchard sont reproduites expérimentalement, dans un bassin à houle et à courant, en similitude de Froude et avec un nombre de Reynolds aussi élevé que possible. Dans cette étude, les variations bathymétriques réelles sont représentées à l'aide d'éléments canoniques : un cube, un cylindre, un plan incliné ou des combinaisons des trois. On distingue alors les variations bathymétriques supérieures à la moyenne (obstacle unique) des cas de rugosités moyennes (combinaison d’obstacles). Afin de caractériser le sillage derrière ces obstacles et d'étudier l’évolution de la turbulence dans la colonne d’eau, des mesures PIV et LDV sont réalisées pour différents taux de turbulence de l'écoulement amont. Les résultats montrent que le cylindre seul produit le sillage le plus étendu. Dans ce cas, de larges structures tourbillonnaires, remontant jusqu’à la surface, sont identifiées. Le développement de méthodes de traitement et d'analyse des données permettent de détecter les centres tourbillonnaires et de déterminer les propriétés de ces tourbillons. L'impact du sillage du cylindre sur le fonctionnement d’une hydrolienne tri-pales à axe horizontal est ensuite étudié. Suivant le positionnement relatif de la turbine par rapport à l'obstacle, l'hydrolienne peut subir de grandes amplitudes de chargements liées aux fluctuations de vitesse engendrées par l'obstacle dans l'écoulement. La mesure des efforts sur les pales et du comportement dynamique de la machine permettent de quantifier ces variations de chargements. Elles dépendent des structures tourbillonnaires impactant la turbine et du cisaillement du profil de vitesse. Ces résultats pourront être exploités pour de futures analyses de fatigue de pales ou autres composantes des hydroliennes. / French waters have a strong potential for tidal turbines applications. In these areas of strong currents, intense velocity fluctuations are observed in the water column. They ultimately come from variations in seabed bathymetry and can have a strong impact on tidal turbine energy production and fatigue. In order to understand the turbulent structures generation in the wake of obstacles and to build a data base for future numerical studies, the Alderney Race conditions are reproduced experimentally, in a wave and current tank, in Froude similitude and with a Reynolds number as high as possible. In this study, real bathymetric variations are represented using canonical elements: a cube, a cylinder, an inclined plane or a combination of all three. Cases with bathymetric variations higher than average (obstacle alone) are differentiated from average rugosity cases (obstacles combined). In order to characterize the wake behind these obstacles and to study how turbulence evolve in the water column, PIV and LDV measurements are made for various turbulence rates of the incoming flow. Results show that the cylinder alone produces the most spread out wake. In that case, large scale turbulent structures, rising all the way to the surface, are identified. The development of processing methods and data analysis allows the detection of vortex centres and the determination of their properties. The cylinder wake impact on a tri-bladed horizontal axis turbine behaviour is then studied. Depending on the position of the turbine relative to the obstacle, the turbine can be subject to large amplitude loads due to velocity fluctuations generated by the presence of the obstacle in the flow. Force measurements on the blades and turbine dynamic behaviour characterization allow to quantify those load variations. They depend on the turbulent structures impacting the turbine and the shear in the velocity profile. The results obtained could be exploited for further fatigue analyses on blades or on other tidal turbine components.

Submitted by PPG Filosofia (filosofia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2018-04-16T17:34:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CELESTINO TEPERERO FERNANDO.pdf: 1022365 bytes, checksum: e268631125f7e92cb43a0aa9649d3ab0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-03T20:15:42Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CELESTINO TEPERERO FERNANDO.pdf: 1022365 bytes, checksum: e268631125f7e92cb43a0aa9649d3ab0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-03T20:18:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CELESTINO TEPERERO FERNANDO.pdf: 1022365 bytes, checksum: e268631125f7e92cb43a0aa9649d3ab0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-22 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the moral value of human action in Kant's practical philosophy. Kant argues that morality is the principle of universal reason, capable of limiting human impulses, since, by virtue of natural needs. The moral conscience in this circumstance is a product of pure practical reason, which enables the application of theory to practice in function of the freedom of the transcendental subject to think and act. However, the categorical imperative is the command of moral actions, which is found in the autonomous subject, through the relation between goodwill and freedom. And dignity is a quality that naturally finite beings have as moral beings. The dignity of the human is translated in his capacity to act according to the representation of laws determined by himself, so that man should not be subject to any other purpose than that of his own reason, namely that of his own morality, which implies the fulfillment of "duty for duty. Faced with this idea, the human person is himself the measure and source of duty (Solen). Because reason knows only what it has projected itself. Whereas the pure "I" of the person is only possible when there is recognition that he is a being of duties, right and autonomous. Kantian formality starts with the distinction between morality and legality in order to allow coexistence between them. It is also in this position that the concept of law has its roots. For the author, the relationship between ethics and law is a relationship of subordination. / A presente disserta??o tem como objetivo compreender em que consiste o valor moral do agir humano na filosofia pr?tica de Kant. Kant defende que a moral ? o princ?pio da raz?o universal, capaz de limitar os impulsos humanos, em virtude das necessidades naturais. A consci?ncia moral nessa circunst?ncia ? produto da raz?o pura pr?tica, que possibilita a aplica??o da teoria ? pr?tica em fun??o da liberdade do sujeito transcendental de pensar e agir. Contudo, o imperativo categ?rico ? o comando das a??es morais, que se encontra no sujeito aut?nomo, mediante a rela??o entre a boa vontade e a liberdade. E a dignidade ? uma qualidade que naturalmente os seres finitos t?m enquanto entes morais. A dignidade do humano se traduz em sua capacidade de agir conforme a representa??o de leis determinadas por ele mesmo, de modo que, o homem n?o deveria estar submetido a qualquer outro fim que n?o o de sua pr?pria raz?o, a saber, o da pr?pria moralidade, que implica o cumprimento do ?dever pelo dever. Diante dessa ideia, a pessoa humana ? ela pr?pria que ? a medida e a fonte do dever (Solen). Porque a raz?o s? conhece aquilo que ela mesma projetou. Enquanto que o ?eu? puro da pessoa s? ? poss?vel quando h? reconhecimento que ? um ser de deveres, direito e aut?nomo. A formalidade kantiana parte na distin??o entre moralidade e legalidade de modo a possibilitar a coexist?ncia entre elas. ? tamb?m nessa posi??o onde o conceito de direito tem as suas ra?zes. Para o autor, a rela??o entre ?tica e direito ? uma rela??o de subordina??o.

The chapters contained in this dissertation are three essays on the nature of practical authority, and the role it plays in the thought and action of those subject to it. In chapter 1, I criticize a recent and influential philosophical theory of authority, Joseph Raz’s service conception, and argue that it is inadequate because it does not recognize that authority thwarts an obedient subject’s ability to express her personality and character traits in action. In chapter 2, I argue that, in cases of personal authority, the issuing of a command involves the authority supplying the content of an intention to act to the subject, and that this breaks down the self-other asymmetries which theorists of self-knowledge have assumed exist with respect to the ‘privileged access’ one is said to have to one’s own mind. In chapter 3, I argue that in cases of both personal and non-personal (e.g., institutional) authority, there is a further problem in exercising and obeying authority which has gone unrecognized. I draw on recent work in social psychology to show that authoritative directives fix a subject’s understanding of her own actions across time and thus thwart the otherwise dynamic process of the development of the subject’s self-conception. I show that these arguments constitute a new burden in justifying authority and therefore revive the anarchist objection that authority and autonomy are conceptually incompatible. / text

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

Submitted by Rodrigo Martins Cruz (rodrigo.cruz@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2016-01-04T12:30:36Z No. of bitstreams: 2 andre_olimpio_martins.pdf: 2403767 bytes, checksum: 4b49a301c8017ae8a0db22438d3dbb77 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Martins Cruz (rodrigo.cruz@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2016-01-04T12:31:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 andre_olimpio_martins.pdf: 2403767 bytes, checksum: 4b49a301c8017ae8a0db22438d3dbb77 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-04T12:31:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 andre_olimpio_martins.pdf: 2403767 bytes, checksum: 4b49a301c8017ae8a0db22438d3dbb77 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (Capes) / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico (CNPq) / Funda??o de Amparo ? Pesquisa do estado de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG) / A Corrida de aventura ? uma competi??o praticada em contato com a natureza, na qual o competidor utiliza obst?culos naturais para a pr?tica de v?rias modalidades esportivas combinadas. O cortisol salivar (CT) pode ser utilizado como biomarcador do estresse e estados catab?licos. A concentra??o salivar de testosterona (TT) pode representar um marcador de estado anab?lico do, j? que seus efeitos fisiol?gicos est?o relacionados com o repara??o tecidual. A propor??o entre a atividade anab?lica/catab?lica pode ser dada pela an?lise da raz?o testosterona/cortisol (T/C). O objetivo deste trabalho foi quantificar as concentra??es de CT e TT de participantes de uma corrida de aventura, para determina??o do impacto fisiol?gico deste tipo de prova. O estresse e a recupera??o dos atletas foram inferidos pela an?lise da concentra??o de CT e TT e da T/C, 1 semana antes da competi??o (dia 1), 1 dia antes da competi??o (dia 2), no dia da competi??o (dia 3) e 1 dia ap?s a competi??o (dia 4). Frequ?ncia card?aca e VO2m?x foram registrados para avalia??o da intensidade de esfor?o da prova. As concentra??es de CT para o dia 2 e 3, n?o se elevaram em rela??o ?s concentra??es apresentadas no dia 1. Entretanto, no dia 4, as concentra??es de CT foram superiores em compara??o ?s concentra??es dos dias 1, 2 e 3. O ritmo TT normal foi observado nos 04 dias analisados e n?o foi observada varia??o nas concentra??es de TT. A raz?o T/C apresentou-se diminu?da no dia 4 em compara??o ao dia 1. Os resultados mostraram que a T/C apresentou-se reduzida em mais de 75% no dia 4. Conclus?es: 1. Corrida de aventura ? um evento multiesportivo de alta intensidade de esfor?o f?sico e desafia homeostase e alostase corporais; 2. O esfor?o do treinamento e da competi??o possivelmente mostrou-se desajustado ao preparo f?sico dos atletas analisados, j? que, o ritmo CT observado, tanto no per?odo pr?, quanto no p?s-competi??o, indicou estados de exaust?o e catabolismo intenso, respectivamente. Contudo, mais analises s?o necess?rias para compreender se o esfor?o da competicao foi realmente desajustado para o organismo do atleta ou se o esfor?o f?sico n?o foi intenso o suficiente para evocar uma resposta dos eixos end?crinos analisados. / Disserta??o (Mestrado) ? Programa Multic?ntrico de P?s-gradua??o em Ci?ncias Fisiol?gicas, Universidade Federal dos Vales do Jequitinhonha e Mucuri, 2013. / ABSTRACT Adventure racing is a competition practiced in contact with nature where the competitor uses natural obstacles to practice various combined sports. The salivary cortisol (CT) can be used as a biomarker of stress and catabolic states. The concentration of salivary testosterone (TT) may represent a marker of anabolic status since its physiological effects are related tissue repair. The ratio of the anabolic activity/catabolic can be given by analysis of the testosterone/cortisol ratio (T/C). The aim of this study was to quantify the CT and TT concentrations of the participants of an adventure race to determine the physiological impact of such test. Stress and recovery of athletes were inferred by analyzing the TC and TT and T / C concentration of: 1 week before competition (day 1), 1 day before competition (day 2), competition day (day 3) and 1 day after competition (day 4). VO2max and heart rate were recorded to assess the intensity of effort of competition. The concentrations of CT to day 2 and 3 did not increase compared to the concentrations showed on day 1. However, on day 4, the TC concentrations were higher compared to concentrations on days 1, 2 and 3. The TT regular rhythm was observed in 04 days and there was no variation in the concentration of TT. The ratio T/C appeared reduced at day 4 compared to day 1. The results showed that T/C appeared reduced by more than 75% in 4 days. Conclusions: 1. Adventure Racing is a multisport event of high intensity physical exertion and challenges homeostasis and allostasis body; 2. The stress of training and competition possibility proved inadequate to the physical preparation of athletes analyzed, since, CT rhythm observed in both pre and post-competition showed states of exhaustion and intense catabolism, respectively. 3. However, more analyses is necessary to understand if the competition was wrong to the athletic`s organism or if the effort was not intense enough to stimulate an answer from the endocrine axis analyzed.

Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2017-07-03T13:57:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 HortensiaTeresaTomazDaSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1192958 bytes, checksum: 0b5df57426b60caf7003292bc2aaf822 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-07-10T12:09:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 HortensiaTeresaTomazDaSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1192958 bytes, checksum: 0b5df57426b60caf7003292bc2aaf822 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T12:09:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 HortensiaTeresaTomazDaSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1192958 bytes, checksum: 0b5df57426b60caf7003292bc2aaf822 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-18 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo deste trabalho ser? investigar como Kant explica ou fundamenta o agir moral na Fundamenta??o da Metaf?sica dos Costumes e na Cr?tica da Raz?o Pr?tica. Com efeito, podemos dizer que o agir moral na primeira est? fundamentado na espontaneidade do agir dada pela liberdade. Na KpV podemos dizer que o agir moral ? fundamentado na lei moral como um factum da raz?o. Portanto, para mostrar esses dois pontos, o seguinte caminho ser? seguido: em 2.1 ser? mostrado o surgimento de uma nova concep??o de moralidade. Em 2.2 veremos que a nova concep??o interpreta a moralidade como autonomia. No ponto 3 examinaremos elementos que caracterizam a natureza do agir moral na GMS e na filosofia moral Kantiana. No ponto 3.1 veremos que Kant sustenta o agir moral na terceira se??o da GMS na ideia de que, quando nos pensamos enquanto livres, somos transportados a um mundo intelig?vel, poss?vel pela liberdade. Tamb?m falaremos, nessa mesma subse??o, sobre os problemas relacionados ao c?rculo vicioso, ? dedu??o da lei moral na GMS bem como ? distin??o entre um mundo sens?vel e intelig?vel. No ponto 4 sobre o factum da raz?o mostraremos o factum como sendo a consci?ncia da lei moral e como n?o sendo pass?vel de dedu??o. Mostraremos que Kant sustenta o agir moral na KpV em tal factum. Ainda introduziremos nesse mesmo t?pico, as duas interpreta??es poss?veis do factum da raz?o. Na subse??o seguinte, em 4.1 ser? mostrada a interpreta??o de Beck (1960) segundo a qual temos na KpV o que poderia corresponder formalmente a uma dedu??o do princ?pio moral. Em 4.2 analisaremos a interpreta??o de Allison (1990) segundo o qual o factum da raz?o pode ser compreendido como factum da raz?o, ou seja, como evid?ncia de que a raz?o pura ? pr?tica. Em 4.3 veremos que, ao contr?rio de Beck, Almeida (1998) ir? negar que seja poss?vel uma dedu??o da lei moral na KpV. Com efeito, Almeida (1998) ir? verificar que em raz?o dessa impossibilidade o sentido de factum da raz?o que se imporia seria o sentido cognitivista (ou intuicionista). Nessa mesma subse??o, tendo em vista a interpreta??o cognitivista exporemos a interpreta??o da Beck (1981) em que o mesmo rejeita o ponto de vista cognitivista. Na subse??o 4.4 veremos, basicamente, a liberdade enquanto condi??o do agir moral na KpV. E, por fim, concentraremos a nossa aten??o no sentimento moral na KpV. / The aim of this work will be to investigate how Kant explains or grounds moral action in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Indeed, we can say that the moral action in the first is grounded on spontaneity of action give by freedom. Therefore, to show these points, the following path will be followed: in 2.1 we will see the emergence of a new conception of morality. In 2.2 we will see that the new conception interprets the morality as autonomy. In section 3 we will examine elements that characterize the nature of moral action in the GMS and in the Kantian moral philosophy. In point 3.1 we will see that Kant sustains moral action in the third section of the GMS in the idea that when we think ourselves as free we are transposed into an intelligible world, possible for freedom. We will also speak in this same subsection of the problems related to the vicious circle, the deduction of the moral law in the GMS as well as the distinction between a sensible and intelligible world. In point 4 on the factum of reason we will show the factum as being the consciousness of the moral law and as not being able to deduction. We will show that Kant sustains the moral action in the KpV on the ideia of such factum. We will also introduce in this same topic the two possible interpretations of the factum of reason. In the next subsection in 4.1 we will show Beck?s (1960) interpretation according to which we have in KpV what could formally correspond to a deduction of the moral principle. In 4.2 we will see Allison?s (1990) interpretation according to which such factum of reason can be understood as factum of reason, that is, as evidence that pure reason is practical. In 4.3 we will show that, unlike Beck (1960), Almeida (1998) will deny that a deduction of the moral law in the KpV is possible. In fact, Almeida (1998), will conclude because of this impossibility, the sense of factum of reason that would be imposed would be the cognitivist (or intuitionist) sense. In this same subsection, in view of the cognitivist interpretation we will expose Beck?s (1981) interpretation in which he rejects the cognitivist point of view. In subsection 4.4 we will see freedom as a condition of moral in the KpV and, finally, we will focus our attention on the moral feeling in the KpV.

<p>In this thesis, I will examine the consequences of applying the legal philosophy of Joseph Raz in real world situations. I will argue that if most legal systems actually attempted to adhere to, and accept his theory in all its parts, the legal systems in question would have serious problems. In particular, the legal authorities and officials which represent the legal systems in question would be confused about the extent of their authority. After I prove my claim, I will offer a solution to the problem.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich (gegen John Rawls und andere) erstens dafür, dass perfektionistische Gründe gute Gründe für Gesetze sind, die ein Staat erlässt, ohne, zweitens, die These zu teilen, die Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom vertritt, dass nur die Gesetze eines Staates legitim sind, die mit perfektionistischen Gründen gerechtfertigt werden können – weil alle anderen die Autonomie der Bürger notwendig verletzen würden. Im ersten Punkt halte ich den Perfektionismus für die Standardposition, und die gängigen liberalen Argumente für einen neutralen Staat überzeugen nicht, egal ob sie als ökumenische oder nicht-neutrale vertreten werden. Die ökumenischen Argumente, wie sie etwa bei Rawls und Bruce Ackerman zu finden sind, überzeugen nicht, weil sich ihre behauptete Neutralität letztlich als schädlich parteiisch erweist. Die nicht-neutralen Argumente, die unter anderem von Rawls und Charles Larmore angeführt werden, reichen nicht aus, um die Notwendigkeit eines Prinzips der staatlichen Neutralität zu begründen. Und zwar aus verschiedenen Gründen: Einer dieser Gründe ist, dass die Berufung der Konsequenzialisten auf den Wert der Autonomie übersieht, dass der Wert der Autonomie in Wertkonflikten anderen Werten nicht überlegen ist, und ein zweiter Grund wäre, dass Rawls in seinem Appell an die „Bürden des Urteils“, etwa in seinem Buch Political Liberalism, eher voraussetzt als zeigt, dass Respekt vor der Autonomie der Bürger die staatliche Förderung des Guten ausschließt. Zu dem zweiten Punkt mache ich geltend, dass es unerheblich ist, ob die These von Raz, dass Autonomie wertlos wird, wenn den Bürgern nicht ausreichend gute Optionen an Lebensformen zur Verfügung stehen, zwischen denen sie wählen können, überzeugend ist oder nicht, weil daraus nicht folgt, dass der Staat das Gute in jedem möglichen politischen System fördern muss. Es ist einfach nicht der Fall, dass die Zahl der den Staatsbürgern offenstehenden wertvollen Lebensformen unter eine Schwelle fällt, die den Wert der Autonomie erst möglich macht, sobald der Staat das Gute nicht fördert. / I argue, in this dissertation, first, that, contrary to the views of John Rawls and others, governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of perfectionist judgements, but second, that the claim, in particular as it is argued for in Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, that governments must make policy on a perfectionist basis, failing which the autonomy of citizens will be damaged, cannot be sustained. I argue the first point on the grounds that perfectionism is the default position, and that standard liberal arguments, which I categorise as either ecumenical or non-neutral, for a principle of state neutrality fail. The ecumenical arguments, which I discover in the writings of Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, fail because their purported neutrality turns out to be damagingly partisan. The non-neutral arguments, which I discover in the writings of, amongst others, Rawls and Charles Larmore, fall short of establishing the necessity of a principle of state neutrality for a number of widely-differing reasons, which include, for example, that a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy cannot establish that the good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in all conflicts of goods which might arise, and that Rawls’s appeal to the burdens of judgement, founds in his Political Liberalism, assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out state promotion of the good. I argue the second point on the grounds that although Raz is correct in arguing that autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the good in any and every possible political dispensation, as it is simply not the case that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their autonomy to be worth having.