This dissertation aims to determine what should be the appropriate base ethical limits of health care markets in the United States. I argue that because we do not value health care goods and services as commodities, treating them as commodities available for market sale can only be ethical when health care markets accord with at least the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services. I begin by establishing the theoretical foundation of my argument by expositing three theories of commodification and ethical markets that critically examine the relationship of goods to the market. Each theory shows how commodification often fails to account for the non-market value(s) we attribute to many goods. I then apply these theories to health care goods and services to show how they are not properly valued merely as commodities, and to lay the foundation of my argument regarding the ethical limits of health care markets. I then argue why honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services should be considered the base ethical limits of health care markets by examining how each ideally applies to both health care and the market. Lastly, I apply my argument to two health care markets: the pharmaceutical industry and a possible legal organ market. For the former, I show how many of the practices of the pharmaceutical industry violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. For the latter, I show the extent to which a legal organ market in the United States could or would violate these limits.

Homosexuality is an important and controversial topic in political, philosophical, ethical and religious spheres. We are exposed to the debate of homosexuality in the media on a regular basis and issues related to homosexuality have been taken up by the Supreme Court, politicians and religious institutions. Needless to say, the debate surrounding homosexuality has captured the attention of almost everyone in society to some degree. It is my goal in this thesis to give a candid overview and analysis of the arguments surrounding homosexual sexual conduct. First, I will present an argument by John Corvino, who posits that homosexual conduct can realize the same concrete goods of love, happiness, and pleasure, among others, that heterosexual conduct can realize. Namely, if homosexual conduct can produce these goods, then there is no reason on the face of things to treat homosexual conduct as morally inferior to heterosexual conduct. I will then consider an objection by Michael Levin who asserts that even if this is true, there is a prudential reason to discourage homosexual conduct because it leads to unhappiness. This fact counts prudentially against homosexual conduct and undermines Corvino’s argument. I will then examine an argument by Alan Goldman, who presents a definition of sex which he believes best matches our common intuitions and judgments in regards to what sexual activity is and isn’t. Goldman argues against definitions of sexual activity which posit that the purpose of sexual activity is to fulfill some external goal or purpose to sex itself, such as reproduction or love. Rather, Goldman outlines that sex is essentially a physical desire for contact with another’s body. If Goldman’s definition is correct, then his definition entails that homosexual conduct is not immoral. Afterwards, I will give my own thoughts as to what moral conclusions we should draw about homosexual conduct based on the above arguments.

A great virtue of our fairly liberal society is its willingness to allow, legally and socially, individuals to choose their own lifestyle, free from interference or coercion. For this reason, there is rightly a strong resistance and hostility to government regulation of wholly self-regarding behavior – acts which only affect the actor. Whether justified by an appeal to sovereignty or utility, that which one does to oneself is seen as beyond the jurisdiction of government. Yet the problem of the so-called obesity "epidemic" – the explosion in the prevalence of overweight and obesity in recent decades – is a case of self-harm which does indeed warrant government intervention. This thesis considers utilitarian and autonomy-based arguments against interference in self-regarding action, then show why obesity merits intervention nevertheless.

Different kinds of collectives help to coordinate between individuals and social groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable individuals to live fulfilling lives. Collectives, as part of the process of socialization, contribute to the normalization of behaviors, and consequently, structure our ability to be self-reflective autonomous agents. Contemporary philosophy of action models characterize collective action as the product of individuals who have the proper motivations to perform cooperative activities (bottom-up); or they begin with the social-level phenomena and explain this in terms of individual actions and the mental states that motivate them (top-down). One general goal of this project is to show how and why both of these approaches through focusing solely on the individuals involved fail to capture and account for important types of group actions: those of economic group agents. Group agents, one kind of organized collective, are unique in that they have the potential to develop group-level decision-making processes that result in the capacity of the group to engage in practical reasoning. Because of this capacity, group agents can be stable and respond to reason--capacities we would not expect from other kinds of collectives. Inasmuch as we value the possibility of influencing the reflexive dynamics that perpetuate social institutions, understanding the range of organization structures and their agential capacities will open up the possibility of altering the course of those dynamics toward more just systems of organization. Understanding what kinds of group agents currently operate within the systems of organizations that make up social institutions is the first step in determining how to move toward developing group agents that are also moral agents. By analyzing how different systems of constraint--inside and outside the firm--inform one another to influence the possibility of design and the group's possibilities for action, I use Christian List and Philip Pettit's account of group agency as a springboard to develop a more adequate account of how structure influences and constrains the possibilities of economic group agents in non-idealized circumstances (i.e. this world, with our history). My chapters include 1) a taxonomy of organization structures and an analysis of how a narrow conception of organization structure in jurisprudence can lead to systems of constraint that limit the rights and freedoms of individuals even as it seeks to extend them, 2) an evaluation of the popular accounts of collective action (cf. Raimo Tuomela, 1997; Michael Bratman, 1993, 1997, 2009; and Christian List and Philip Pettit, 2011) that could be made to accommodate the actions of certain kinds of economic associations, 3) an exploration of the standards of evaluation that influence these powerful group agents, and how these standards limit the economic group agent's capacity to engage in moral reasoning, and 4) an analysis of the group agent's reasoning capacity and the internal mode of interaction between group agent and group members that perpetuate group agency. I argue that we can understand group agents that have the capacity to be moral agents as the products of a particular kind of decision-making process within an organization's structure. The decision-making process, together with the organization structure and group member support, produces and sustains judgments and actions at the level of the group that cannot be reduced to the beliefs and actions of particular members. In this way, the group displays a systematic unity of actions based on its own judgments. That is, the group exhibits agency. Moral group agents exhibit more than practical reasoning; they also demonstrate the capacity for critical reflection upon the ends they pursue. Member buy-in promotes a tight connection between group members and their role in bringing about and sustaining group agency, and is the foundation of the group agent. Without a holistic organization structure, a member's personal identities could undermine group aims, thereby undermining group agency. Group moral agency, I argue, begins with promoting an organizational way of life conducive to collective flourishing and respect for members.

The prevalence of corporate social responsibility has been continually increasing over recent years. The debate of whether a business should act in a manner that furthers societal needs or if they should simply focus their efforts on maximizing shareholder value is of popular interest since it affects the fundamental structures of how a business will operate. One of the major influencing theories in favor of social responsibility is the stakeholder theory. The opposing viewpoint is the shareholder theory, which highlights that the sole responsibility for a corporation is to act in a way that maximizes profits. This thesis will outline the stakeholder and shareholder theories to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the debate and then offer a critical and philosophical analysis of shareholder theory to ultimately argue why the moral significance of a promise better promotes maximizing shareholder value.

This Thesis will examine how the framing of ‘trolley problems’ incorrectly motivates arithmetic rankings of states of affairs by removing context. This is problematic because the context of these problems provides the tools to solve moral dilemmas by allowing one to analyze the relevant motivations, moral implications, duties, values, and personal and societal obligations that one has. I will discuss Samuel Scheffler’s charge that a paradox exists within agent-centered restrictions and how his abstract paradigmatic case leads to arithmetic rankings of choices, which are both unrealistic and lead to tragic and morally unacceptable decision making. I will argue that Allen Wood’s Middle Theory can help dispel the apparent paradox and demonstrate a better way to examine ‘trolley problems’. I will further discuss how Martha Nussbaum’s analysis of tragic questions illuminates the issues surrounding such problems providing a morally acceptable way to account for the occasional unavoidable harm that results in decision-making caused by solving ‘trolley problems.’ Taken together, Wood’s and Nussbaum’s theories and analysis provide potential solutions to ‘trolley problems.’

This study was designed to survey and compare current undergraduate business ethics curricular strategies and preferences among national liberal arts colleges in the United States. There are 180 national liberal arts colleges as classified by the U.S. News and World Report Rankings with a significant percentage of these liberal arts colleges offering economics and/or business administration majors. The primary purpose of the study was to examine the survey responses of business school administrators (and/or professors) who work with undergraduate business education in national liberal arts colleges regarding undergraduate business ethics education. The three research questions address curriculum approaches for undergraduate business ethics education currently in use in the national liberal arts colleges, preferences regarding specific instructional approaches to undergraduate business ethics education and preferences for the measurement of learning outcomes in business ethics education. The study utilized an online survey and resulted in a 30.55% response rate (55 responses). Results of the study indicate differences in terms of the curricular strategies (standalone business ethics courses, ethics integration throughout the curriculum, or a combination) currently being used in the national liberal arts colleges, but also that there are very similar preferences for instructional methods (case study, lecture, online, face-to-face), business ethics faculty and the measurement of learning outcomes in teaching business ethics at the undergraduate level.

The main thesis of my dissertation is that Kant has a just war theory, and it is universal just war theory, not a traditional just war theory. This is supported by first establishing the history of secular just war theory, specifically through a consideration of the work of Hugo Grotius, Rights of War and Peace. I take his approach, from a natural law perspective, as indicative of the just war theory tradition. I also offer a brief critique of this tradition, suggesting some issues that are endemic to these kinds of theories. From this general understanding, the version of Kant’s just war theory present in Brian Orend’s work War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, is explored and rejected as another traditional just war theory. Orend attempts to shoehorn Kant into a tradition which Kant rejects as ineffective, and poorly grounded. Orend’s work is not without merit, and his view is reconceptualized in the last chapter. If not a traditional just war theory, then either a new category of just war theory needs to be established, or the thesis ought to be rejected. Thus, the next task is to defend against the claim that Kant does not have a just war theory at all, as claimed by Howard Williams in his work Kant and the End of War. This is rejected as insufficiently nuanced in its interpretation of Kant, and also for resulting in principles contrary to Kant’s moral theory. This view is also utilized in a new manner in the last chapter. Prior to describing the new category of just war theory, I consider the general approach Kant had to war. To do this, I explore his philosophical approach on ever more specific areas of philosophical investigation. I conclude that Kant has a dynamic and progressive understanding of the concepts he investigated, including philosophy, humanity, ethics, politics, and, eventually, war. In the penultimate chapter, I establish what I call a universal just war theory. I consider and name the traits of both a traditional just war theory and a universal just war theory, using Marxist Communism as an explanatory example of universal just war theory. This provides an intellectual space for Kant’s theory to reside, which is also consistent with his philosophical approach. The last chapter is devoted to the explanation and application of Kant’s universal just war theory. I offer an overarching principle for Kant’ view of conflict and defend it as a universal just war theory. I also revisit the place Orend and Williams views’ have in a proper understanding of Kant on just war. I end with an application of Kant’s universal just war theory to previous conflicts, as a demonstration of the practical value of this view. Thus, through first a negative argument against current conceptions of Kant’s views of just war theory, and then a positive argument for Kant’s general philosophical approach and a new category of just war theory, I offer an interpretation of Kant on just war theory. I argue this interpretation is superior to previous ones, and recommends real world applications for just war theorists to utilize.

In this paper, I will present a Kantian revision of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). In order to do so, I will explain the concept of jus in bello – focusing in particular on the distinction between intent and foresight. I will then argue that we ought to take an agency-inspired look at the DDE. Finally, I will conclude by arguing for my thesis that Boyle’s theory of agency, while good, needs to be revised in order to accommodate concerns stemming from Kant’s Formula of Humanity… namely consent.

Novice counselors may struggle to understand and follow ethical guidelines for boundary behaviors with clients. When counselors violate therapeutic boundaries, harmful consequences can result for clients and counselors. The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the possible relationship between novice counselors' (NCs') attachment to supervisors and NCs' ethical perceptions and boundary practices. This study addressed the possible predictor variables of age, gender, relationship status, and practice setting. Bowlby's attachment theory provided the framework for the study. Survey data from 114 NCs were analyzed using descriptive statistics and hierarchical linear regression. Each regression analyzed predictors of age, gender, relationship status, and practice setting in model 1 and added level of attachment anxiety and level of attachment avoidance to supervisor in model 2. Findings indicated that NCs' level of anxious attachment predicted serious boundary violations (BVs). Those with higher levels of attachment anxiety reported more BVs and perceived more items as BVs. Level of attachment avoidance also distorted ethical perceptions; those high in attachment avoidance considered more items to be boundary crossings and BVs. The variables of age, male gender, and an urban practice setting significantly predicted higher reported boundary crossings. Males more often did not consider behaviors to be BVs, and more females agreed with expert perceptions of items which were neither a boundary crossing nor a BV. Age was significant but contrary to previous findings because in this sample, as age increased, reported BVs decreased. Findings may lead to changes in how counselor educators and supervisors train NCs to manage boundaries in therapeutic relationships.