In 1900, Sigmund Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams, establishing climacteric concepts for psychoanalysis and creating a structure upon which he built the theory and his career. 20 years later, he had entirely revised these concepts that solidified the foundation of psychoanalysis. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud notably theorizes the ‘death drive’ for the first time, a radical but necessary break from the economics of the pleasure principle. Often, the death drive is taken to be the most important contribution of this essay, but I argue that the lasting message to be gleaned from Freud is what he concludes Beyond the Pleasure Principle with: “We must be ready, too, to abandon a path that we have followed for a time, if it seems to be leading to no good end. Only believers, who demand that science shall be a substitute for the catechism they have given up, will blame an investigator for developing or even transforming his views.” In this thesis, I argue that we can develop a necessary Ethic from this way that Freud approached the formation of his work. Drawing on the further developments from Jacques Lacan, I claim that one can take theory of the gaze as an ethical moment: the point at which one is faced with a disruption that they are tasked to carry out “to see where it will lead,” as Freud puts it. Further, I utilize this formation of the Ethic to read the films of Abbas Kiarostami’s “Koker trilogy” to highlight the points at which we can locate the characters, form, and content of these films as realizations of such ethical moments.

Character development in higher education is essential for enhancing ethical awareness and moral reasoning. However, inconsistent perspectives exist concerning the impact of ethics education on students' ethical awareness and moral reasoning. This phenomenological study examined the perceptions of senior-level undergraduate business students on their own ethical belief systems and changes in ethical awareness. Astin's student development theory on the environmental effects on learning formed the conceptual framework. The research questions explored how the 4-year undergraduate business school experience changed the students' ability to recognize and evaluate ethical concerns in relation to the ethical aspects of coursework. Thirteen undergraduate seniors pursuing a business degree from a Catholic college were purposively selected. In-depth interviews were used to obtain data about ethical self-awareness, recognition of ethical issues, understanding ethical concepts, and assessing core values. The study followed Moustakas' recommendation for phenomenological analysis, a modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method. Emergent themes included the meaning of moral character development, the perception of the college business curriculum in relation to students' core values, and the approaches used to affect ethical situations. The findings suggest that the business curriculum increase the students' exposure to ethical situations and introduce decision tools that could be useful in ethical dilemmas. Recommendations involve considering a pretest and posttest design and Astin's entire inputs-environment-outcomes model as the theoretical framework. The implications for positive social change include the development of character education toward moral competencies and ethical decision-making skills of future business leaders.

Ethical breaches in many organizations can be traced to failures in ethical leadership, which undermine trust. If a leader's ethical behavior in their private life and settings is perceived as influencing workplace ethics, it may in turn affect organizational trust levels and the development of trust. A quantitative study based on the social learning and moral theory was conducted to determine whether a difference exists between a leader's self-perceptions of their ethical behaviors inside and outside of the workplace, and whether it affects their perceived personal trustworthiness. Participants' (N = 94) scores on work and nonwork versions of the ethical leadership scale were compared using a paired-samples t test, which determined no significant differences in their ethical behaviors inside and outside of the workplace. Then multiple regression analyses were conducted, which indicated that the model containing both independent variables regarding ethical behavior inside and outside the workplace significantly predicted changes in the dependent variable personal trustworthiness: F (7, 86) = 6.025, p < .001. The model explained 27% of the variance in personal trustworthiness. The model also significantly predicted changes in scores related to propensity to trust; F (10, 83) = 3.692, p < .001. The model explained 23% of the variance in propensity to trust. This research will aid leaders in understanding more about the perception of their own ethics and how this plays into the cultivation of trust. It also has implications that may influence leadership among all types of work environs, including government organizations and industry.

We can best understand the moral obligations of citizens and officials concerning public reason as set out by John Rawls when two differing standards latent in his body of work are made explicit. The weaker standard, which I call Public Representation (or PR), is exegetically supported primarily by the proviso found in his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. PR allows that citizens may deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to whatever perspective and using whatever reasons they please, so long as they believe the positions they advocate are adequately just and adequately justifiable with public reasons. I present PR as establishing a moral minimum citizens and officials bear an obligation to satisfy on pain of failing to garner an adequate degree of justice, respect, legitimacy, and stability. The more demanding standard, which I call Public Judgment (or PJ), is exegetically supported by quotes found throughout Rawls’s work, but especially in Political Liberalism, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. PJ requires that citizens deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to a public perspective with public reasons, that they only advocate positions and offer justifications they consider most reasonable, and that they share their thought processes in public. PR is nonobligatory, but achieves significant gains according to each of the four key political values mentioned above, which gives dedicated citizens good reason to embrace it. Chapter one lays out and explores the big picture concepts framing the project; chapter two sets out Rawls’s view on public reason according to the primary texts; chapter three presents four contemporary liberal theorists’ views on public reason – Nicholas Wolterstorff, Robert Audi, David Reidy, and Micah Schwartzman; chapter four uses the lessons of chapter three to help fully unpack and compare Public Representation and Public Judgment; and chapter five considers three potential objections to my view and offers corresponding replies.

Do the Palestinians deserve a state? To answer this question, one must first provide an account of collective self-determination (CSD) and when a group is entitled to it. This starts with looking at the origins of CSD, both to see if it truly is a right and, if so, what its nature is. I will argue that there is such a thing as a right to CSD, but due to its nature, it is not a universal right of all groups. Whether a group has a right to CSD depends on the conditions in which the group lives, and in this paper, I will tease out what these conditions are. The result of such an analysis will be a set of criteria by which one can judge whether or not a group is entitled to CSD, given the conditions in which the group lives. With this criteria, I will look at the Palestinian case in particular and determine whether or not the Palestinians have a right to CSD. If so, they have a right to an independent state, since any group that exercises true CSD can determine whether or not they choose to live in such a state.

In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.

Sen and Nussbaum generate very different degrees of obligation for the affluent under their theories of justice, despite each of them deriving their theory of justice from capability as a metric for quality of life. On one hand, Sen’s account of obligation seems very weak, while Nussbaum’s seems overwhelmingly robust. I argue that the sufficient/decisivereasons framework as put forth by philosopher Derek Parfit captures the nuances of their extremely different accounts of obligation. Further, I argue that this framework convincingly demonstrates that the accounts of obligation that Sen and Nussbaum offer in each of their versions of the capability approach are unsatisfying, as each approach occupies such extremes that they are unreasonable. In spite of this, supplementing the capability approach with a different and perhaps more centrist account of obligation can make the capability approach a more consistent and appealing theory of justice. To this end, I appropriate Thomas Pogge’s account of obligation.

This thesis analyzes Jason Brennan's paper "The Right to a Competent Electorate," then critiques his argument in favor of restricting voting rights to those deemed competent. I consider the practical and ethical implications of testing for competence, then conclude, contrary to Brennan, that granting all citizens voting rights is more just than restricting the voting population.

In this thesis, F.A. Hayek's argument is against social justice is given context, discussed, and evaluated. Hayek was one of the leading voices of libertarian ideology in the Twentieth Century. While Road to Serfdom is his most popular work, Hayek's philosophy is most fully expressed in his three volume set, Law, Legislation and Liberty. His thoughts against social justice are found the in the second volume, entitled The Mirage of Social Justice. It is the conclusion of the author that Hayek's argument against social justice, in the form of redistribution, falls short as it depends on a presupposition that an evolutionary moral and legal process will necessarily end in securing a libertarian style of government. The only possible means of salvaging the argument would to accept inherent and inviolable human rights, which Hayek fundamentally rejects as he claims the Kantian tradition.

Despite already having the most expensive healthcare system in the world, the U.S. is facing rapidly rising costs, a growing population not covered by health insurance, and outcomes that are no better, and frequently worse, than those seen in the majority of developed nations with universal healthcare. Popular justifications of keeping the state out of healthcare appeal to protecting individual liberty; those who assert that there is a universal right to healthcare usually fail to address this claim. This paper describes the kinds of obligations in healthcare that are consistent with, if not demanded by, theories of justice that emphasize liberty. I give three different perspectives on liberty, and compare their relationship with healthcare obligations. First, I examine a plausible account of liberty, based on the condition of equal freedom, given by Immanuel Kant and Arthur Ripstein, and show how this account necessitates a system of universal public healthcare. Second, I grant the specifically libertarian approach to liberty through inviolable self-ownership, which seeks to limit the abilities of the state – using a reasonable interpretation of the Lockean proviso, as given by left-libertarians such as Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, this approach undoubtedly brings about increased equality in a society, which would have positive implications for healthcare access. Third, I grant furthermore the right-libertarian limited reading of the proviso, and demonstrate that even with Robert Nozick’s unhindered rules for property ownership, right-libertarianism properly understood obligates the state to act in many important aspects of healthcare.