In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.

Justice, and what is just, have been discussed by many with no true definition to go by and both political and moral theories alike have tried to find the right definition of what justice is supposed to be. This study will use three political theories to tackle the question if the american election system can be considered just or unjust. The three theories are John Rawls’s Justice as fairness, Thomas Hobbes and the social contract and lastly Robert Nozick’s libertarianism. To analyse the framing of question a normative ‘givet-att’ analyse method will be used, to form arguments from the values presented in the three different theories of justice. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are in the cases of Rawls and Hobbes theories quite similar, on how the election system should be interpreted. Nozick’s theory on the other hand gives a different conclusion compared to the other two. However, the goal of this study is not to find one true answer to whether the election system can be called just or not, but rather to show it from different perspectives of justice and how that can affect the view of the election system.

A social problem that has created many debates is the issue of the gender distribution in a workplace where the main aim has been to create an equal workplace between the sexes without discrimination or favouring other genders. This has meant that it is necessary to break down male-dominated occupations to a more equal distribution between men and women, more specifically male-dominated occupations that are often leading roles within companies and organizations. According to the new directive by the European Parliament, all EU countries must take measures when it comes to increasing the number of women in management. The directive discussed during Session’s info November 21-24, 2022, plenary session in Strasbourg requires companies with more than 250 employees to carry out transparent recruitment within the company to ensure that at least 40 percent of nonexecutive board members or 33 percent of all board members are represented by women no later than July 2026 (EU. 2022). One country that has received harsh criticism is Sweden, which chose to vote no to the proposal, which has led to Sweden ending up in the same party as Hungary and Poland, which are often associated with Europe's worst countries when it comes to equality issues. This essay will analyse whether the quota system is the right way to achieve equality and how it in turn is a fair method to use. By implementing the different theories of John Rawls, Robert Nozick and liberal feminism we can for a better perception and understanding of what is "justice".

The present work approaches the matter of the Law of Property and its social function according to John Rawls theory of justice, having the intention to understand what the role of the property is to the author, the ways of property which are considered fair by him and, if it answers to the principles of justice and property which fitted with its social purpose. For such, it deals with, firstly, in chapter 1, the conteporary conception of law of property, which is inserted within a more humanitary, cooperative pespective of society and reciprocity, longing to a socialeconomical harmony and the effectiviness of certain human necesseties to improve the pespective of the citizens lives. Carrying on in this chapter, it is studied Locke s concept of private property to demonstrate the points where his theory disagree with John Rawls theory, thus it brings more individual view of property and it adopts a restricted conception of this right. Locke defends the unlimited accumulation of wealth, being the property turned, only, to the individual growth of the owner and to benefit the business, and then not existing a distributive and cooperative justice. Macpherson criticizes Locke s theory since it is extremely individualist. Chapter 2 aims to analyse the main ideas of Rawls theory of justice, seaching for the main and fundamental concepts so that chapter 3 is well-understood. Rawls supports the distributive justice and encourages the social cooperation. For this author, the basic liberties are inegotiable and the object of his theory is the basic structure of the society as an equitative system of social cooperation among free and iqual citizens. In order to reach this, the individuals make an agreement under the veil of ignorance to formulate the principles of justice which will run the institutions of a democratic constitutional fair society. Chapter 3 fights against the matter of the law of property for this author, a big suppoter of the distributive justice and of the social cooperation, which understands the law of property as basic good, because it helps to accomplish the expectations of the citizens lives, and it must also be capatible to the other rights and liberties which belong to a social system to provide a honored life. Rawls thought was a target for criticism by Robert Nozick, whom rescued Locke s theory of appropriation, not agreeing with the notion of distributive justice and of social cooperation, counteracting in several points to the Rawls theory of justice. However, according to the philosophers Álvaro de Vita, Will Kimlicka and Van Parijs, the defense of John Rawls theory was made, because they support the thought of this author, abova all objections shown by Nozick. Thus, the right of property must have a social mean to promote certain basic needs of the individuals, and this is clear in Rawls work so that he believes in social cooperation, in the effectiviness of human dignity, of self-respect, of self-steem and of their own citizenship, through a distributive justice. / O presente trabalho aborda a questão do direito de propriedade e sua função social a partir da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com a intenção de compreender qual o papel da propriedade para o autor, as formas de propriedade consideradas justas para ele e, se atende aos princípios da justiça a propriedade que cumpre com uma finalidade social. Para tanto, trata-se, primeiramente, no capítulo 1, a concepção contemporânea de direito de propriedade, o qual está inserido numa perspectiva mais humanitária, cooperativa, de sociabilidade e reciprocidade, buscando a harmonia econômico-social e a efetivação de certas necessidades humanas para melhorar as perspectivas de vida dos cidadãos. Dando continuidade a este capítulo, é estudado o conceito de propriedade privada de Locke, com a finalidade de demonstrar os pontos em que sua teoria contrapõe-se à teoria de John Rawls, pois traz uma visão mais individualista de propriedade e adota uma concepção restrita deste direito. Locke defende a acumulação ilimitada de riquezas, estando a propriedade voltada, unicamente, para o crescimento individual do proprietário e para beneficiar o comércio, inexistindo uma justiça distributiva e cooperativa. Macpherson critica a teoria de Locke por ser extremamente individualista. O capítulo 2 intenciona analisar as principais idéias da teoria da justiça de Rawls, buscando-se os conceitos principais e fundamentais para que o capítulo 3 seja mais bem compreendido. Rawls defende a justiça distributiva e incentiva a cooperação social. Para este autor, as liberdades básicas são inegociáveis e o objeto de sua teoria é a estrutura básica da sociedade como um sistema equitativo de cooperação social entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Para que isso seja alcançado, os indivíduos realizam um acordo, sob o véu da ignorância , para formular os princípios da justiça que regerão as instituições de uma sociedade constitucional democrática justa. O capítulo 3 enfrenta a questão do direito de propriedade para o autor, grande defensor da justiça distributiva e da cooperação social, que entende o direito de propriedade como um bem básico, pois auxilia nas realizações das expectativas de vida dos cidadãos, devendo ser compatível com os demais direitos e liberdades pertencentes a um sistema social para proporcionar uma vida digna. O pensamento de Rawls foi alvo de crítica de Robert Nozick, o qual resgatou a teoria da apropriação de Locke, não concordando com a noção de justiça distributiva e de cooperação social, contrapondo-se em inúmeros pontos à teoria da justiça ralwsiana. Mas, com base nos filósofos Álvaro de Vita, Will Kymlicka e Van Parijs foi realizada a defesa da teoria de John Rawls, pois defendem o pensamento deste autor, acima das objeções apresentadas por Nozick. Asim, o direito de propriedade deve ter uma finalidade social para promover certas necessidades básicas dos indivíduos, e isso, percebe-se na obra de Rawls, pois ele acredita na cooperação social, na efetivação da dignidade humana, do auto-respeito, da auto-estima e da própria cidadania, por meio de uma justiça distributiva.

This essay compares the theory of human rights and human responsibility to the reality in the Swedish government. The aim is to understand what the            philosophers in this case study are saying about human rights and responsibility. The essay also asks how the philosopher’s theories compare to the reality in the Swedish State.  When comparing the theory of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Robert Nozick to the Swedish government and laws we understand that Rousseau is the most conservative and yet the one out of the three philosophers that are closest to  Swedish State reality. Locke is not very different from Rousseau and a lot of how the Swedish State works is compatible whit his thoughts. Nozick, being the one that is most liberal, is then the one that has ideas that are most different from the Swedish State 2021 even though Sweden is known to be one of the most liberal and equal states in the world.

Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme. / Neoliberalism, a term commonly used to describe the current paradigm of the state, is largely related to a disengagement of the state from issues of social welfare and is associated with the legitimization of socio-economic inequalities. For many critics, it also represents an ideology that does not consider justice as a collective ideal that should be pursued. This stands in contradiction with the fact that justice was a central theme in the works of many thinkers to whom we attribute the formulation of neoliberal thought. Considering this paradox, the main purpose of this Master’s thesis is to expose the conception of justice as expressed by two key neoliberal thinkers: the American journalist Walter Lippmann and the Austrian economist Friedrich A. von Hayek. This comparative perspective will allow me to single out what I call the "neoliberal conception" of justice, a conception that builds on a particular understanding of the market. In the first chapter, I present the central challenge of the neoliberal conception of justice by broaching the epistemological stance common to Hayek and Lippmann. In the second chapter, I present specific properties of this conception and discuss its principal blind spots. I also show that Hayek and Lippmann disagree when it comes to the notion of "responsibility". Finally, I compare the neoliberal conception of justice with that of libertarians, as presented by Robert Nozick in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia. In this third section, I argue that Hayek and Nozick’s respective criteria of justice drive a wedge between two otherwise rather similar conceptions. In contrast to a standard analysis that treats neoliberalism as an amoral project, I contend that recognition of the moral dimension of neoliberal discourse opens up a perspective from which it becomes possible to challenge the project on ethical grounds. Understanding the idea of justice underpinning contemporary neoliberalism, as rooted in the moral tradition presented in this essay, is necessary if we are to criticize this ideology on moral grounds.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

This work deals with the different concepts of justice that are presented by works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Seeing that they are liberal authors, the first chapter is devoted to liberalism and its forms. Rawls is presented as a supporter of modern liberalism and Nozick is presented as a representative of classical liberalism, concretely libertarianism. The second chapter discusses how both authors describe natural state. The third chapter is devoted to it how Rawls and Nozick talk about conception of liberty. The following chapter describes and compares their theories of justice: justice as fairness and justice as entitlement. The fifth chapter deals with the final reflection on the theories of both authors. There are presented various reactions and interpretations of the mentioned theories. At the same time, there is shown considerable asset of Rawls?s Theory of Justice and Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia which both influenced political-philosophical discussion.

Ce mémoire a pour but de miner le projet libertarien d'une défense de la structure de la propriété libérale basée sur le principe de propriété de soi. Loin de nier le concept de propriété de soi, nous adoptons le principe associé à la pensée libertarienne et démontrons que l'adoption d'un tel principe nous mène à la restructuration du concept de propriété vers un concept qui est cohérent avec les valeurs égalitaristes et démocratiques. Nous espérons, ceci faisant, pouvoir montrer l'incohérence du projet libertarien, et fournir les outils nécessaires afin que les égalitaristes puissent défendre leurs idées en terrain libertarien. / The purpose of this thesis is to try and undermine the libertarian project of defending the liberal structure of ownership through its use of the principle of self-ownership. Far from denying the concept of self-ownership, we adopt the principle associated with libertarian thought and show that the adoption of such a principle leads us to a restructuring of the concept of ownership towards one that is coherent with egalitarian and democratic values. We hope that, by doing so, we are able to show the incoherence within libertarianism and give the tools necessary for egalitarians to defend their ideas on libertarian grounds.

<p>I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In his book, <i>Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality</i>, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but <i>through </i>the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a <i>full</i> self-consciousness.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the <i>conditions</i> necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.</p>