The initial concern of this thesis is to understand the historical conditions that conditioned the two writers (Akyigitzade Musa and Mehmed Cavid) who had written on economic issues in the late Ottoman era, in addition to display their perception of state in their essential works. Thus, in order to locate these two writers in a historical time-frame and to explore the understanding and the reality of the Ottoman state at the end of the nineteenth century, the thesis is dealing with the major issues of the Ottoman modernisation history in a concise sense, and it is aiming at disposing the righteous stead and the importance of these two writers in the Ottoman economics literature, while giving an overall review of Ottoman economic perspectives in terms of their relationship with Western economic thought. Finally, the thesis tackles the personalities and biographies of these writers in order to expose the social conditions that determined the thinking of these writers, and lay out the anatomy of the state as conceptualised by them on the basis of their original texts. So, following the ascertainment of these structures, their impact over the work and the life of these two writers is being considered. Thus, it is an attempt to provide an explanation of the physical and mental conditions that structured the writings and their perception of the state.

In the wake of the First World War, reformers across the Western world questioned laissez-faire liberalism, the self-oriented and market-driven ruling doctrine of the nineteenth century. This philosophy was blamed, variously, for the war, for industrialisation and for urbanisation; for a way of life shorn of any meaning beyond getting and keeping; for the too great faith in materialism and in science; and for the loss of a higher, transcendent meaning that gave a unifying altruistic or spiritual purpose to individual existence and to society as a whole. For many, the cure to these ills lay in reforming the liberal social framework in ways that made it more fulfilling to the whole person and that strengthened ties between individuals. Dartington Hall was an outstanding practical example of this impulse to promote holistic, integrated living. It was a well-financed, internationally-minded social and cultural experiment set up on an estate in South Devon in 1925 by American heiress Dorothy Elmhirst (née Whitney) and her second husband, Leonard, son of a Yorkshire squire-parson. The Elmhirsts' project for redressing the effects of laissez-faire liberalism had two components. Instead of being treated as atomised individuals in the capitalist market, participants at Dartington were to achieve full self-realisation through a 'life in its completeness' that incorporated the arts, education and spirituality. In addition, through their active participation in running the community, they were to demonstrate how integrated democracy could bring about the perfection of individuals and the progress of society as a whole. The Elmhirsts hoped that Dartington would provide a globally applicable model for a better way of life. This thesis is a close study of Dartington's interlinked constellation of experiments in education, the arts, agriculture and social organisation - experiments that can only be understood by tracing them back to their shared roots in the idea of 'life in its completeness'. At the same time, it explores how Dartington's philosophy and trajectory illuminate the wider reform landscape. The Elmhirsts' community echoed and cross-pollinated with other schemes for social improvement in Britain, Europe, America and India, as well as feeding into the broad social democratic project in Britain. Dartington's evolution from an independent, elite-led reform project to one split between state-led and communitarian reform matched the trajectory of other such enterprises begun in interwar Britain, making it a bellwether of changes in reformist thinking across the century.

Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme. / Neoliberalism, a term commonly used to describe the current paradigm of the state, is largely related to a disengagement of the state from issues of social welfare and is associated with the legitimization of socio-economic inequalities. For many critics, it also represents an ideology that does not consider justice as a collective ideal that should be pursued. This stands in contradiction with the fact that justice was a central theme in the works of many thinkers to whom we attribute the formulation of neoliberal thought. Considering this paradox, the main purpose of this Master’s thesis is to expose the conception of justice as expressed by two key neoliberal thinkers: the American journalist Walter Lippmann and the Austrian economist Friedrich A. von Hayek. This comparative perspective will allow me to single out what I call the "neoliberal conception" of justice, a conception that builds on a particular understanding of the market. In the first chapter, I present the central challenge of the neoliberal conception of justice by broaching the epistemological stance common to Hayek and Lippmann. In the second chapter, I present specific properties of this conception and discuss its principal blind spots. I also show that Hayek and Lippmann disagree when it comes to the notion of "responsibility". Finally, I compare the neoliberal conception of justice with that of libertarians, as presented by Robert Nozick in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia. In this third section, I argue that Hayek and Nozick’s respective criteria of justice drive a wedge between two otherwise rather similar conceptions. In contrast to a standard analysis that treats neoliberalism as an amoral project, I contend that recognition of the moral dimension of neoliberal discourse opens up a perspective from which it becomes possible to challenge the project on ethical grounds. Understanding the idea of justice underpinning contemporary neoliberalism, as rooted in the moral tradition presented in this essay, is necessary if we are to criticize this ideology on moral grounds.