I analyze the potentially self-destructive tension inherent in liberalism between conceptions of negative liberty and positive liberty. In doing so, I utilize Aristotle’s theory of virtue to show that virtue is the best method of resolving this tension. In addition, I demonstrate that liberal virtues are best construed as virtues of intellect to be exercised in the public sphere. In particular, I show the importance of not construing liberal virtues as virtues of character (often referred to as moral virtues), because advocating such virtues is, in fact, contrary to the central tenets of liberalism. That is, I argue that it is illiberal to ask liberal citizens to develop a certain moral character, and that it is, instead, essential for said citizens to develop intellectual virtues as a method of resolving this tension within liberalism between the virtues needed to sustain liberalism and liberalism’s resistance towards promoting those virtues.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

The recent years have seen the revival of neo-Roman republicanism through the works of Philip Pettit, who has replaced Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of positive/negative liberty with freedom as nondomination. This essay compares the neo-Roman conception of nondomination to the liberal conception of noninterference, with the purpose of clarifying whether nondomination is a distinct concept of liberty and preferable to that of noninterference. The essay highlights the exchange between Pettit/Skinner and Carter/Kramer, wherein Carter and Kramer make their case for ‘pure negative liberty’, which is claimed to be the proper articulation of negative liberty. Pure-negative theorists believe that nondomination is a strand of negative liberty, adding nothing new to the concept, whereas their republican counterparts disagree. My essay argues that nondomination is a distinct, preferable concept of liberty, thanks to its view on fundamental unfreedom and the mere presence of arbitrary power, which the pure negative view fails to account for satisfactorily.

The discussion regarding the second amendment and gun control in the United States has been a controversial and highly debated topic for many years. However, with the several school shootings taking place, the discussion about gun controls has been taken to a new level. The purpose of this essay is to give an overview of the debate and answer to the main question ”how is the relationship between freedom and rights expressed in the debate about strengthened gun control, in relation to positive and negative liberty, and over time?  In order to achieve the purpose, three different kinds of analyzes have been made. First, two pro-contra analyzes were made on two different occasions. Next, the arguments found was examined through two concepts of liberty: positive and negative liberty. Lastly, a comparison was made between the arguments from the two different occasions. The results show that there are three different core issues in the debate, and that positive liberty is dominating the pro-gun control side, while negative liberty and individual rights are dominating the contra-gun control side. The debate has not been going through a radical change. However, some arguments have grown stronger over the years.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

The thesis presents Charles Taylor's conception of liberalism where the negative concept of liberty is rooted in a positive moral ideal of authenticity. First of all, both the main motivations which led liberals to defend the pure negative concept of liberty and Taylor's claim that these motivations all depend on the atomistic ontology is examined. Later, this atomistic basis is refuted and Taylor's holistic approach is offered which relies mainly on concepts of the personal identity and of the so called strong evaluation. Following this, concept of authenticity is presented as the implicit ideal of modern identity. Authenticity is interpreted as a pluralistic moral ideal appreciating uniqueness although containing some general moral demands. The thesis also shows that such a concept of authenticity presupposes negative liberty. Finally, some political consequences of such a liberal theory are provided.