I analyze the potentially self-destructive tension inherent in liberalism between conceptions of negative liberty and positive liberty. In doing so, I utilize Aristotle’s theory of virtue to show that virtue is the best method of resolving this tension. In addition, I demonstrate that liberal virtues are best construed as virtues of intellect to be exercised in the public sphere. In particular, I show the importance of not construing liberal virtues as virtues of character (often referred to as moral virtues), because advocating such virtues is, in fact, contrary to the central tenets of liberalism. That is, I argue that it is illiberal to ask liberal citizens to develop a certain moral character, and that it is, instead, essential for said citizens to develop intellectual virtues as a method of resolving this tension within liberalism between the virtues needed to sustain liberalism and liberalism’s resistance towards promoting those virtues.

This essay investigates whether Amartya Sen’s or Martha Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach is better suited to justify civil disobedience. The theoretical framework of my study is critical discourse analysis. This aims to establish the most significant conditions for the justification of civil disobedience. An interpretation of the conception of civil disobedience is presented. The investigation assumes that civil disobedience is justified when people advocate for a change in a policy or a law that limits the securing of basic capabilities. A major part of the essay is devoted to clarifying how the idea of basic capabilities relates to civil disobedience. I also emphasize the importance of human dignity as a universal value. I argue that this value is crucial to realizing why some capabilities are more basic than others. I show that Nussbaum is in a better position than Sen to explain when civil disobedience can be justified. This is because Sen lacks a framework of basic capabilities leaving it up to each nation to assess which capabilities ought to be secured.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

The discussion regarding the second amendment and gun control in the United States has been a controversial and highly debated topic for many years. However, with the several school shootings taking place, the discussion about gun controls has been taken to a new level. The purpose of this essay is to give an overview of the debate and answer to the main question ”how is the relationship between freedom and rights expressed in the debate about strengthened gun control, in relation to positive and negative liberty, and over time?  In order to achieve the purpose, three different kinds of analyzes have been made. First, two pro-contra analyzes were made on two different occasions. Next, the arguments found was examined through two concepts of liberty: positive and negative liberty. Lastly, a comparison was made between the arguments from the two different occasions. The results show that there are three different core issues in the debate, and that positive liberty is dominating the pro-gun control side, while negative liberty and individual rights are dominating the contra-gun control side. The debate has not been going through a radical change. However, some arguments have grown stronger over the years.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

Copyright is conventionally justified as an incentive to produce and disseminate works of authorship. We can justify and theorise copyright more richly, not least because empirical evidence does not support the incentive narrative. Rather than focussing on quantitative matters such as the number of works incentivised and produced, we should consider copyright's qualitative influence on culture. A threshold objection to such an approach is the risk of cultural paternalism. This objection can be overcome. Rather than specifying paternalistic standards of merit for works, we can target the conditions under which their creation and consumption takes place. I argue, firstly, that we should adopt the following high-level principles: (i) that the conditions of creation and consumption of works should be conducive to democratic deliberation (democracy) and (ii) that they should facilitate the development of human capabilities (autonomy). Secondly, I propose that we pursue three mid-level objectives, which are helpful indicia of democracy and autonomy: - a fair and wide distribution of communicative and cultural power (inclusiveness); - diversity in the content and perspectives available to the public (diversity); and - conditions that permit authors and users of works to engage rigorously with the conventions of the media in which they operate (rigour). It is often said that copyright obstructs important qualitative objectives, like freedom of expression, and that we could better pursue these goals by weakening copyright and relying on non-proprietary alternatives. My approach produces a more optimistic, but also more complicated, view of copyright. While copyright's qualitative influence is not optimal, reductions in the strength and scope of copyright sometimes produces conditions and incentive structures that are worse for inclusiveness, diversity and rigour than stronger copyright. For example, both attention and wealth are highly concentrated in networked information economies driven by free sharing of content, and this is bad for diversity or inclusiveness. Online business models, based on surveillance of users' consumption of free works, are corrosive of autonomy and democracy. Merely removing copyright-based restrictions on the sharing of works is not a panacea for copyright's ills. A qualitative theory such as mine equips us to better understand and calibrate more richly the trade-offs involved in copyright policy decisions, and encourages us to treat copyright as part of a broader, qualitatively-oriented information and cultural policy.