This thesis examines Robert Nozick’s critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice, focusing on the Chamberlain Argument as a challenging example in their debate. The Chamberlain Argument illustrates the tension between Rawls’s theory, which aims to distribute resources according to a certain pattern for social benefit, and its implications on individual freedom. Nozick argues that such patterned theories infringe upon individual liberty by coercively redistributing resources. Through analysis of patterned theory, it becomes evident, Nozick claims, that such frameworks prioritize specific distributions over individual liberty. I find that Nozick made a valid point in his objection to Rawls. However, I consider that the problem of patterned theories represented by Nozick in his critique of Rawls, is rooted in the first principle, not in the second. I assert that there is much more literature on Rawls’s second principle, but much less on his first principle. To address Nozick’s critique, this thesis proposes a modification to Rawls’s first principle, emphasizing self-respect as a foundational value. By reconceptualizing liberty within the Rawlsian framework, this thesis aims to fortify it against objections like the Chamberlain Argument, ultimately enhancing its coherence and theoretical robustness. For this reason, the research question is as follows: How can the Rawlsian theory overcome the Chamberlain argument? The one thesis I will pursue is that Rawls’s two principles can be immune to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument, when the first principle is modified according to the priority of rights over liberty. To do so, the goal is to defend a Rawlsian pattern theory of justice. Firstly, I show that the first principle should be grounded on the priority of the rights instead of the good of the person. By reconceptualizing the concept of self-respect, I show that Rawls’s first principle is mainly focused on a negative concept of liberty, which I modify to a positive concept through what I call reciprocal self-respect. Secondly, I formulate responses to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument and argue that social justice requires a holistic view of the society, not only as individuals, but also as collective and common. This view emphasizes the interdependency of individuals in a society, which presupposes duties of reciprocal self-respect, chosen rationally in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, Chamberlain would never have been able to make profits and succeed without society, infrastructure, opportunities and hotbed for success and self-determination.