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Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

In this dissertation I examine the link between status and perceptions of just rewards. Specifically I focus on how an individual's status-valued attributes shape their perceptions of just rewards, or the amount of a good that they deem fair. According to equity theorists, status-valued attributes constitute one 'input' that shapes perceptions of just rewards, but the precise nature of this relationship has been heretofore unspecified. Drawing from reward expectations theory, which is one of the equity theories, I develop a set of equations to estimate point predictions of just rewards based on individual's status-valued attributes. The model quantifies the commonly held belief that individuals with the more positively evaluated states of status-valued attributes expect to receive relatively more rewards from a distribution of valued goods. The model borrows the quantification of reward expectations states from reward expectations theory, which requires reducing all status differences to two states of relatively high and relatively low. This is an unnecessary simplifying assumption that requires throwing away the relative magnitude of status-valued attributes. In the interest of increasing the precision and realism of the formal model of just rewards, I also extend the mathematics of reward expectations theory to account for status-valued attributes with more than two states (e.g., occupational prestige or education). This extension not only increases the precision of the formal model of just rewards, but is also applicable to all of the expectation states theories, which account for a large body of scholarship and have a broad domain of applicability. To evaluate these ideas I use a variety of quantitative methodologies, including an experiment, a vignette study and the analysis of secondary data from thirteen countries. Across these methods, I find support for both the formal model of just rewards and the procedure for modeling status-valued attributes with more than two states. I conclude the dissertation with the implications of this research and future directions of the project.

Wong Fan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-106). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstracts --- p.i / Preface --- p.iii / Acknowledgements --- p.viii / Chapter 1. --- Walzer's Theory of Distributive Justice --- p.1 / Walzer's philosophical Approach --- p.1 / Distribution and Social Meanings of Goods --- p.2 / "Monopoly, Domination, and Complex Equality" --- p.9 / Relativist Theory of Justice and Democratic Socialism --- p.19 / Chapter 2. --- On Equality --- p.23 / Arneson on Walzer's Criticism of Simple Equality --- p.23 / "Cohen's ""Voluntary Equality"" 一 A Defense Of Literal Equality" --- p.26 / Arneson's Criticism on Walzer's Complex Equality --- p.33 / Further Problems on Walzer's Complex Equality --- p.41 / Chapter 3. --- Social Meanings of Goods --- p.45 / Is Walzer's Theory Unnecessarily Restrictive? --- p.45 / Social Meanings of Goods and Moral Considerations --- p.51 / The Conflicting Social Meanings of A Good --- p.54 / Other Problems --- p.61 / Chapter 4. --- Shared Understandings And Moral Relativism --- p.65 / Is Walzer A Conventionalist? --- p.65 / Equal Citizenship And Democracy --- p.72 / Walzer's Benign Relativism --- p.76 / Chapter 5. --- Interpretation --- p.86 / Walzer's Thesis of Interpretation --- p.86 / Walzer and Marx --- p.93 / Conclusion --- p.98 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.102

Thesis (D. Jur.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Law. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ67940.

One of the most active areas of debate in liberal theories of global justice regards the proper application of domestic egalitarian theories of distributive justice, such as that posed by John Rawls, at the scale of global considerations of need, remediation, and ultimately the development of a just order. This paper considers three popularly-referenced theories (that of Michael Blake, Andrea Sangiovanni, and Thomas Nagel) that each advance a variant of a more general thesis, sometimes referred to as ‘anti-cosmpolitan’ or ‘internationalist’ – that liberal egalitarian theories do not presently entail a uniform global principle of distribution that mandates material equality between all individuals, irrespective of their socio-political affiliations. Each theory is described in detail and representatives of major objections are evaluated along with potential responses, concluding with a finding that one interpretation of Blake’s theory appears to be the most promising avenue in developing the internationalist thesis.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1987. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-144).

A capitalist society has two defining features. The first is well-known. A capitalist economy leaves coordination of exchange and production largely to private authority. The dissertation investigates a second feature. In a capitalist economy, individuals and firms coordinate exchange through contracts that involve obligations to pay money. Financial contracts allow individuals to defer payment and save money for expenditures at a later point in time. My dissertation assigns a crucial role to the structure of institutions and to the rules that create and define the authority over money. I refer to such a structure as a monetary constitution. In existing capitalist societies, money is not entirely under public control, as proponents of socialism or full reserve banking require. Nor is it entirely in private hands as libertarian free bankers would ideally have it. Instead, the supply of money to the economy takes place through a hierarchical order of money creation. Money issued by the central bank stands at the top of the hierarchy. Below it, private financial institutions issue different forms of credit money. In this sense, the monetary constitution is a hybrid of both public and private authority over money. Political philosophy has said virtually nothing about the authority over money. I aim to persuade the reader that this is a grave neglect. The three main claims of the dissertation are: 1. Money and finance are central to any account of distributive justice that is adequate for a capitalist society. 2. There are five objections to unregulated private money creation. 3. Existing monetary constitutions need fundamental reform. In support of the first claim, I argue that money is a crucial metric for any theory of distributive justice that is adequate for a capitalist society. I also put forward a new account of the crucial role of credit and saving in realising a fair intertemporal distribution. Finally, the second and third claims support the first claim where it concerns the authority over money. In support of the second claim, I argue that unregulated private money creation leads to (1) financial instability, (2) macroeconomic instability, (3) unsustainable use of natural resources, (4) an unfair distribution of economic means, and (5) an undemocratic concentration of political power. I also put forward a new account of why financial instability matters from the perspective of distributive justice. In support of the third claim, I argue for the incremental abolition of private money creation. Although the delegation of public money creation to an independent central bank is not objectionable in principle, I go on to argue that existing mandates are insufficiently democratic and need reform.

Research on justice has produced two literatures, procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice research has focused on the psychology of procedural preference, establishing reliable preferences for adjudication over other dispute resolution procedures. Procedural justice theories suggest these preferences are based on the concern of participants with decision and process control. Distributive justice theories have examined the justice rules that decision-makers use to determine the appropriate distribution of resources, emphasizing the interpersonal relationships among participants in determination of the “fair” rule for that dispute. Research distinguishing these two justice literatures has concluded that procedural justice concerns are the more robust: that procedural manipulations are more determinative of fairness perceptions than are the rules used for allocation outcomes. This research re-examines that conclusion, using M. J. Lerner’s justice motive theories (1977, 1981) as the bases of analysis for distributive justice while assessing the importance of interpersonal relationship characteristics on procedural justice phenomena. Three studies tested fairness perceptions of conflict scenarios constructed to describe the relational characteristics of Lerner’s theories. Study 1 examines procedural preferences among adjudication, negotiations and joint problem-solving under different interpersonal relationships outlined in Lerner’s original forms of justice (1977), and assesses the distribution rule preferences associated with those relationships. Study 2 tests the evaluations of fairness of those justice procedures and distribution rules across Lerner’s interpersonal relationship characteristics. Study 3 investigates the impact of Lerner’s revised forms of justice (1981) on fairness of distribution rules and on participant concern for process and decision control. Few consistent results for procedural justice emerged across the first 2 studies: Psychological relations of identity/unit/nonunit influenced procedural preference, with joint problem-solving most robust. Adjudication was not the preferred justice procedure. Distributive justice rule preference and fairness ratings in studies 1 and 2 offered only inconsistent and partial support for Lerner’s original forms of justice. Studies 1 and 2 suggested that people preferred a cooperative justice procedure (joint problem-solving) but a competitive distribution rule (justified self-interest). Results from Study 3 similarly presented only partial support for Lerner’s revised justice theory: Only two of six justice rules tested matched a relationship characteristic theorized as determinative of perceived fairness, those being utilitarian decisions and legal contest. Study 3 results showed process and decision control influenced by relationship characteristics: Nonunit relationships were associated with both third-party process control and third-party decision control. Results of the three studies are discussed in terms of their implications for Lerner’s theories and the interaction of distributive and procedural justice literatures. It is apparent that while interpersonal relationships influence both procedural fairness and distribution rule fairness, the power of procedural and distributive justice theories in predicting fairness is weak. / Graduate