Thomas Pogge has famously argued that the present arrangement of international institutions that allows for human rights violations to occur on an ongoing basis is unjust, and further, that powerful states that create and maintain these institutions are responsible for the resulting human rights violations. By setting the rules of economic and political interaction in the global forum, the world’s rich and powerful stack the deck against the global poor, making sustainable development difficult and making extreme poverty, malnutrition, and premature death common outcomes. Pogge concludes that this implication of responsibility creates a moral requirement for powerful nations to take immediate steps to reform the global institutional order in such a way as to minimize the number of foreseeable human rights violations that occur within it. I believe that Pogge is only partly correct in his analysis. In this paper, I argue that the global institutional order, which is comprised of a complex web of global and regional organizations with both political and economic aims, is not unjust as Pogge suggests. However, even if the maintenance of these institutions does not constitute an injustice, I believe that there remains an important sense in which powerful states that support the present arrangement of international institutions are responsible for ongoing subsistence rights violations. Establishing this responsibility means that states that continue to support present institutions are then also morally responsible for ensuring these human rights violations are remedied as a matter of justice. In his 2007 book National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller provides the sort of account of responsibility that I believe is lacking in Pogge’s work. Differentiating between moral responsibility, outcome responsibility, and causal responsibility, Miller shows that what we mean when we determine a party is “responsible” for a particular outcome can depend on several factors, viz., the foreseeability and the justification for harm. I argue that the sorts of remedies that are required in cases of moral responsibility, outcome responsibility, and causal responsibility turn out to be quite different from one another. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2008-09-24 23:40:45.915

This dissertation is a philosophical inquiry into the problem of the slums that develop in and around large cities in the Global South, considered in the context of globalization. I argue first that theories of global justice must consider this new human condition engendered by the global slums; second, that the language of alienation and dignity is crucial to conceptions of global poverty; third, that this alienation is in large part predicated on the exploitation of women's labor; and finally, that this dignitarian response to alienation is a critical addition to the Capabilities Approach.

In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue. While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coercive. Second, I develop an account of odious debts from a moral point of view. I argue that a big portion of the debts of the poorest countries are not binding and therefore countries are morally entitled to repudiate them. An implication of this is that lenders have no moral right to demand repayment of odious debts. The reason why some debts are not binding is that citizens should only be held liable for debts incurred in their name when the money that is the basis of that debt is used for legitimate public purposes, not private ones. Whenever ruler acts in accordance to private purposes, states are no longer collectively responsible for the acts incurred in their name. This follows from a proper understanding of social contract theories but also, I argue, from a utilitarian perspective.

In this dissertation, I attempt to clarify the concept of odious debts and its relationship with global justice theory. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by an illegitimate government in their name but were used for private purposes. I approach the problem of odious debts from two different perspectives. First, I explore the possible connections between odious debts and the contemporary debate on global justice. I argue that current debates on global justice have focused on the extremely important question of whether the international order is harmful or coercive, but have sometimes reached wrong conclusions about this issue. While some scholars have argued that the international order is not coercive at all, others have argued that it is, but did not find a persuasive way of making the point. Odious debts become relevant in this context, because they show a different way in which the global order could be said to be coercive. Second, I develop an account of odious debts from a moral point of view. I argue that a big portion of the debts of the poorest countries are not binding and therefore countries are morally entitled to repudiate them. An implication of this is that lenders have no moral right to demand repayment of odious debts. The reason why some debts are not binding is that citizens should only be held liable for debts incurred in their name when the money that is the basis of that debt is used for legitimate public purposes, not private ones. Whenever ruler acts in accordance to private purposes, states are no longer collectively responsible for the acts incurred in their name. This follows from a proper understanding of social contract theories but also, I argue, from a utilitarian perspective.

One of the most active areas of debate in liberal theories of global justice regards the proper application of domestic egalitarian theories of distributive justice, such as that posed by John Rawls, at the scale of global considerations of need, remediation, and ultimately the development of a just order. This paper considers three popularly-referenced theories (that of Michael Blake, Andrea Sangiovanni, and Thomas Nagel) that each advance a variant of a more general thesis, sometimes referred to as ‘anti-cosmpolitan’ or ‘internationalist’ – that liberal egalitarian theories do not presently entail a uniform global principle of distribution that mandates material equality between all individuals, irrespective of their socio-political affiliations. Each theory is described in detail and representatives of major objections are evaluated along with potential responses, concluding with a finding that one interpretation of Blake’s theory appears to be the most promising avenue in developing the internationalist thesis.

As a founding member of the Via Campesina (1993) and active participant in the Global Justice Movement (the altermondialiste movement in France), the Confederation paysanne (CP) - which literally stands for 'peasant confederation' - has been presented in academic and activist circles as a key player in the struggle against neoliberal globalisation, and as a contributor to the emergence of new transnational activist networks and a 'global civil society'. As a trade union representing the interests of 'peasants', the CP has been praised as an innovative form of professional organisation whose originality lies in its ability to defend farmers' interests while at the same time responding to a broader set of challenges for the planet and those who populate it (environmental degradation, cultural homogeneity, social injustice). As a result, the CP - and in particular its emblematic leader Jose Bove - was rapidly propelled to the forefront of a new progressive avant-garde whose discourse on the cultural and economic threats of neoliberalism found a positive echo in farming and non-farming circles alike. -- Yet, as I shall argue throughout the following pages, the CP's success was not only related to its successful response to the new challenges for the 'peasantry' and society but also to its re-appropriation of popular and essentialist representations of 'peasantness' as a timeless and intrinsically egalitarian condition. From the moment that we recognise this, our understanding of the union's evolving popularity changes. Many observers and activists, for example, explained the CP's disappointing result in the 2007 professional elections by arguing that the CP was ahead of its time.

In "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Peter Singer urges citizens of wealthy countries to make immense personal sacrifices in order to assist the poor overseas. Though Singer has moderated his view in recent years and now supports widespread tithing, the motivation remains the same. By contrast, Immanuel Kant contends that the first right of humanity is freedom and that the purpose of a political order is to unite people into a rightful condition. As part of this, taxes should be imposed in order to support the domestic poor - an obligation that does not extend across borders. Although their underlying assumptions are quite different, Singer and Kant’s concerns can both be addressed by a common solution: the creation of a global tax to support the poor, implemented by a global state. Such an arrangement would permit substantial coordinated flows of aid to the needy (meeting Singer’s utilitarian concerns) while also ensuring that all people of the world are in a rightful condition with each other, thereby providing the justification for global social assistance (respecting Kantian deontology.) This solution requires expanding Singer’s proposals and a revisionist reading of Kant that dismisses his arguments against the creation of a global state. (Rawls’ support for a world of distinct states that support each other can also be dismissed, as his approach does not sufficiently connect political structures with personal duty, as Singer and Kant both do.) Though the final form of the solution is largely the same, Kant’s framework is superior: while Singer cannot eliminate the danger of becoming overwhelmed by duty, Kant’s focus on individual autonomy can guard against this. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-01 12:30:15.657

More than 2.7 billion people have less than US$2 a day on which to live. The world's 358 richest people have more money than the combined annual incomes of countries with 45% of the world's population. Traditionally social and political philosophy has focused on intra-national issues and institutions. But the fact that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected raises an important philosophical question: To what, if anything, are the global poor entitled? This book does two things. First, it argues that to be legitimate, the global institutional system must do what it can to enable people to meet some of their basic needs. Second, it considers which ways of altering the global institutional system might make it more legitimate.

Public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. One person enjoying the benefits of a public good will not reduce the value of the good for others. And nobody within a particular population can be excluded from enjoying those benefits. While we often think of the relevant population being co-citizens of a state - national defence is taken to be the archetypal public good - in recent years the importance of public goods that benefit individuals across different countries has increasingly been recognised. We can refer to these as "global public goods". When global public goods are supplied, various costs and benefits are generated, and these costs and benefits can be shared among countries in different ways. This thesis explores how justice requires us to share them; I develop a theory of distributive justice for global public goods. I begin by developing two principles for assigning the costs and benefits of supplying public goods within a state, and then argue that these should, for the most part, also govern the distribution of costs and benefits arising from global public good production. Finally, I assess how certain private goods that the supply of public goods make possible should be shared among states. The fact that these goods rely for their production on the supply of global public goods, I argue, will affect the principles of distributive justice that should govern these.

<p> </p><p>In exploring how to decisively address global poverty the question of what should be the content of nations’ global justice duties has been debatable. Nationalism has usually been regarded as incompatible with cosmopolitanism. It is against extending principles of social justice to the entire globe as cosmopolitanism demands on the grounds that the global context lacks the special attachments that generate national solidarity which is regarded as what ensures distributive justice realizable. For nationalism there cannot be motivation for global distributive justice since this solidarity is only national. As such the nationalist perspective holds that only humanitarian obligations constitute global justice duties. Nationalists also restrict global justice duties to humanitarian assistance due to the fact that nations have a moral obligation to respect another nation’s political culture’s values manifested in the type of national policies they pursue. For nationalists fulfilling the moral requirement of mutual respect of nations’ political cultures would entail letting nations face the consequences of their preferred choices which in some cases lead to poverty. Only when a humanitarian crisis looms do other nations have moral obligations of helping out. Cosmopolitanism agrees with the idea of respecting nations’ right to self-determination and letting nations face consequences of their choices. However it demands the precondition that the background context in which the self-determination is exercised should be just and fair. This demands that before nations respect poor nations’ political cultures the global cooperation which interferes with the exercise of self-determination should be rid of its interference tendencies that negatively restrict nations’ choices. It further demands that nations’ political cultures that are harmful to individuals by subjecting them to poverty ought to be reformed. What cosmopolitanism demands is that there should be a new understanding of nationalism with respect to the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern. It also regards the lack of solidarity on the globe context as a resolvable challenge that would be faced in the implementation of global justice in the non-ideal real life. It does not in any way invalidate the moral worth of cosmopolitan principles of justice.</p><p> </p>