This thesis looks at the failure of individual people living in affluent societies to do more to help those living in conditions of extreme poverty at the present moment. Affluent people have the capacity to assist, by contributing additional funds to aid and humanitarian organisations. Given an understanding of what is at stake, the fact that they fail to do so is both morally problematic and difficult to explain. Yet, without an understanding of the causes of inaction, it is difficult to know what measures may be taken to alleviate extreme suffering in the world today. The thesis draws upon different philosophical accounts of practical reason to argue that the conduct of the affluent can only be understood in one of three ways: these people may lack decisive reason to assist, they may be misinformed, or they may be rationally deficient in some regard. Considering each possibility in turn, it advances two central arguments. Firstly, the normative reasons claim is sound: affluent people, who do not incur minor costs by assisting, ought to do more. Secondly, these people tend to have false beliefs about the nature of poverty, to make substantive errors of judgement, and to follow flawed patterns of reasoning when they deliberate about what to do. Taken together, these factors explain their failure to act. Building upon this diagnosis, the thesis then considers how to respond to the problem of inaction, advancing a solution that is institutional in character. It argues for the construction of a division of labour between state and citizen, at the national level, which would see political institutions take on responsibility for poverty eradication, thereby leaving individuals freer to pursue their own personal goals and objectives. In order to perform this function effectively, wealthy nations would have to improve the quantity and quality of assistance that they provide to low-income countries. They would also have to cease partaking in practices that harm the global poor. This approach has a number of advantages over reliance on private philanthropy alone: it forms part of a fair and effective solution to the problem of motivating assistance, the arrangement it proposes is both stable and legitimate, and it is also something that could be achieved in practice. Therefore, it represents part of the best possible way in which to proceed.

Thesis advisor: David Hollenbach / This dissertation looks at the reality of massive and persistent global poverty and underdevelopment in the era of globalization and the attempts to address this reality in both Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and various elements of secular theory and policy. It details that there has been a convergence of human rights and development discourse in both CST and secular thought and global public policy, and seeks a policy framework and ethical agenda for achieving “development as the realization of human rights” from a Catholic perspective. Having delineated the differences between various “Rights Based Approaches to Development” and multiples shortcomings in global public policy, the dissertation argues that the “Right to Development”(RTD) approach best reflects CST’s understanding of human rights as both a chief end and primary means of achieving development. Further, it insists on achievement of development so understood an urgent matter of justice, as itself a human right. It thus makes the case that the RTD can serve as a “carrier” of the tradition, acting as a consensus framework with which to address gaps and failures in responsibility and accountability in global governance, to serve as a guarantor of the indivisibility of all human rights, and to formulate a codification of the multiples obligations on varied global actors to strengthen the indivisibility and universality of rights and the participatory process necessary to secure them. It also argues that the Catholic Church therefore can and must work to see that the RTD approach undergo a re-invigoration in both international law and as an ethical vision in civil society. In short, then, it argues that the RTD and CST should act as allies in the common goal of development understood as the participatory realization of the full spectrum of human rights. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Within and across all societies, some people live longer and healthier lives than others. Although many of us intuitively think of health as a very important good, general theories of justice have hitherto paid little attention to its distribution. This is a thesis about what we owe to one another, as a matter of justice, in view of our unequal levels of health. The first part of the thesis addresses the problem of social justice in health. I argue that the basic institutional framework of society must be arranged so as to ensure an egalitarian distribution of the 'social bases of health,' that is, the socioeconomic conditions that shape our opportunities for a healthy life. Inequalities in health, including those caused by differences in individual lifestyles, are only fair when people have been given fair opportunities. This egalitarian approach to the social bases of health must be complemented by a sufficientarian concern for meeting all basic health needs, regardless of whether these originate in unfair social arrangements. The second part of the thesis takes up the problem of global justice in health. Although I argue against the idea that domestic principles of justice can be simply replicated on a global scale, I emphasise the fact that there are a number of international institutions and practices that shape people's opportunities for health. One of these is the state system - the division of the world into sovereign states - which I argue grounds the idea of the human right to health. I also examine two more specific examples of global practices that contribute to global inequalities in health, namely global trade in tobacco and the global labour market for healthcare workers. Both of these, I suggest, must be restricted in light of their impact on health levels worldwide.

Cette thèse développe une théorie de nos devoirs globaux de justice en accord avec notre expérience commune du devoir en général comme ayant une origine purement a priori. La base de cette théorie consiste en un nouveau type de constructivisme, que j’appelle « constructivisme téléologique » dans la mesure où il réhabilite la notion kantienne de téléologie pure pratique. Dans l’introduction, je jette les bases du constructivisme téléologique en montrant que toutes les théories déontologiques d’inspiration kantienne sont intérieurement téléologiques, dans la mesure où les principes de justice, bien que premiers par rapport au bien, sont eux-mêmes définis en lien avec les fins prescrites a priori par la raison. Dans le chapitre 1, je m’appuie sur la doctrine Rawlsienne du Droit des Peuples pour développer une théorie de la justice internationale qui reconnaît le rôle normatif joué dans la déduction de nos devoirs de justice par une certaine idée de la société internationale. Dans le chapitre 2, je détermine les conditions auxquelles cette théorie est compatible avec le constructivisme téléologique. Dans les chapitres 3 et 4, je définis le constructivisme téléologique comme une approche qui fait dépendre le choix des premiers principes non seulement du respect pour une procédure de réflexion idéale, mais aussi de la reconnaissance de la fin morale finale prescrite purement a priori par la raison. Finalement, dans le chapitre 5, j’explique comment le constructivisme téléologique différencie entre les devoirs éthiques et les devoirs de justice. En conclusion, je reviens sur la spécificité du constructivisme téléologique en tant qu’approche distincte en théorie politique. / This dissertation provides an account of our global duties of right and justice in line with our common experience of duty in general as having a purely a priori origin. The basis of this account is formed by a new type of constructivism, which I call “teleological constructivism” insofar as it rehabilitates the Kantian notion of pure practical teleology. In the introduction, I prepare the ground for teleological constructivism by showing that all Kantian-inspired deontological theories are internally teleological insofar as the principles of right and justice, though prior to the good, are themselves defined in relation to a final end prescribed purely a priori by reason. In chapter 1, I draw on Rawls’ doctrine of the Law of Peoples to develop an institutionalist account of international justice which recognizes the normative role played by a certain idea of international society in the deduction of our distributive obligations. In chapter 2, I further specify the terms of this account to make it compatible with teleological constructivism. In chapters 3 and 4, I go deeper into the definition of teleological constructivism as an approach that makes the choice of the first principles depend not only on respect for a procedure of ideal reflection, but also on the recognition of a final moral end prescribed purely a priori by reason. Finally, in chapter 5, I explain how teleological constructivism differentiates between ethical and juridical duties and argue for the superiority of the contractualist view over the property-based account of our duties of justice. In conclusion, I discuss the specificity of teleological constructivism as a distinct approach in political theory.

<p>The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions.</p><p>The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.</p>

<p>This thesis explores the possibility of formulating an intermediate approach towards global justice. The desired approach should be intermediate in the sense that it is located in the normative space between the two rather exterme philosophical positions of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism for reasons explained in the thesis. As it turns out in the argumentation within this thesis it is an appropriate identification of the facts that can be thought morally relevant in the context of global justice which is of crucial importance for achieving this task. This is the case since such morally relevant facts, as will be shown, are decisive not only for making definite sense of the ideals at stake with regard to the issues of global inequality and absolute poverty. They furthermore also are essential for determining normatively appropriate and empirically effective obligations for working towards a more just world.</p>

<p>Traditionally, the promotion of socio-economic justice has been seen as an exclusive concern for the state and its citizens. Many contemporary political thinkers criticize this view and argue that the principles of justice which apply within a state also apply to the global level. Further, they often argue that this conclusion is strengthened by the increased level of interconnectedness between people and states created by globalization. It is said that even if principles of justice are constrained by institutional boundaries, these boundaries no longer coincide with state borders but rather extend transnationally, or even globally. In this thesis it is argued that the impacts on justice inferred from globalization are often seriously overstated. The demand for socio-economic justice is created exclusively by a special relationship between citizens. This relationship is constituted by a common membership in the kind of coercive institutional structure epitomized by the state. Under current state of affairs, state coercion has no counterpart in the global arena. The conclusion is that concerns of socio-economic justice should be reserved for the domestic arena. Yet, it is also argued that justice is pluralistic and other kinds of concern are applicable on a global scale. Issues of fairness in international trade are discussed as examples of such concerns, and it is concluded that the international trade regime should institutionalize a number of safeguards that reduce the vulnerability of developing states.</p>

Traditionally, the promotion of socio-economic justice has been seen as an exclusive concern for the state and its citizens. Many contemporary political thinkers criticize this view and argue that the principles of justice which apply within a state also apply to the global level. Further, they often argue that this conclusion is strengthened by the increased level of interconnectedness between people and states created by globalization. It is said that even if principles of justice are constrained by institutional boundaries, these boundaries no longer coincide with state borders but rather extend transnationally, or even globally. In this thesis it is argued that the impacts on justice inferred from globalization are often seriously overstated. The demand for socio-economic justice is created exclusively by a special relationship between citizens. This relationship is constituted by a common membership in the kind of coercive institutional structure epitomized by the state. Under current state of affairs, state coercion has no counterpart in the global arena. The conclusion is that concerns of socio-economic justice should be reserved for the domestic arena. Yet, it is also argued that justice is pluralistic and other kinds of concern are applicable on a global scale. Issues of fairness in international trade are discussed as examples of such concerns, and it is concluded that the international trade regime should institutionalize a number of safeguards that reduce the vulnerability of developing states.

This thesis explores the possibility of formulating an intermediate approach towards global justice. The desired approach should be intermediate in the sense that it is located in the normative space between the two rather exterme philosophical positions of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism for reasons explained in the thesis. As it turns out in the argumentation within this thesis it is an appropriate identification of the facts that can be thought morally relevant in the context of global justice which is of crucial importance for achieving this task. This is the case since such morally relevant facts, as will be shown, are decisive not only for making definite sense of the ideals at stake with regard to the issues of global inequality and absolute poverty. They furthermore also are essential for determining normatively appropriate and empirically effective obligations for working towards a more just world.

Global poverty is a pressing moral issue that necessitates serious moral reflection. It is inextricably connected with the issue of global justice. In today’s world where there are obvious extreme economic inequalities that impoverishes millions of people in many poor countries, the need for a sound principle of global justice is morally necessary. This thesis proposes Thomas Pogge’s idea of cosmopolitan justice as a feasible and relevant theory which can help and guide in alleviating severe worldwide poverty. Pogge emphasizes the stringent negative duty not to impose, sustain and profit from a global order that deprives the poor of their basic necessities necessary for them to lead a worthwhile human life. Many people are not aware that in participating in an unjust global order, they seriously harm the global poor more than their failure to provide assistance for the poor’s basic needs. So the greater responsibility of restructuring global order in order to meet the demands of global justice lies mainly in the hands of developed nations and their citizens who have profited from the present global arrangement and who have more than adequate means to help those who are deeply affected by extreme global economic inequalities. The stronger obligation not to harm the global poor must be performed by those who make decisions and policies at the global institutional level. They are the ones who decide the fate of the global poor and they are the ones who can easily change the rules underlying the present global order. The first step to poverty eradication and the overseeing that continuous efforts are exerted to realize this aim of helping the global poor are theirs to perform immediately. This task is not optional. It is urgent and a moral necessity.