Rectificatory justice for colonialism has been, in recent years, included in the discussion of global justice. The idea is that former colonial powers acknowledge, apologise and make reparations for the harms caused during colonialism. However, there are some objections to rectificatory justice for colonialism. This paper examines one of the main objections, the counterfactual argument. This objection has been found to have some plausibility due to the difficulty in estimating the effect of past injustice on present conditions, as well as the claim that African countries did indeed benefit from colonialism. However, due to the exploitative nature of colonialism, it is reasonable to argue for rectificatory justice based solely on the harm caused, without having to conceptualise a world without the occurrence of colonialism. The aim of this paper is to claim that the harms of colonialism are partly to blame for the current global inequality and that rectificatory justice will go a long way in decreasing this inequality.

<p>The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions.</p><p>The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.</p>

The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions. The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.

This thesis scrutinises the state plans for future mining operations in two specific areas in northern Sweden, namely Rönnbäck/Rönnbäcken and Gállok/Kallak, and how these plans have become issues of intense dialogues and debates nationwide during the previous years. This is partly because of environmental reasons but the primary matter is because these two areas have traditionally belonged to the indigenous Saami people where they are pursuing reindeer husbandry. Despite the many voices of the Swedish society as well as the Saami people that have been raised against the mining plans in these two specific areas, the Swedish government still approved the mining companies to start pursing their activities in both cases. Because of this, several human rights issues have been invoked against the Swedish state in terms of the directly affected Saami’s rights as an indigenous people. Some of these invocations have been made by referring to the ICERD and UNDRIP. Therefore, on the basis of the Saami’s right to fair rectification as an indigenous people, the aim of this work is to further examine how state actions for rectification, because of previous state conducted human rights violations, are being perceived by different actors; in this case the Swedish state and the Saami people. By applying the theoretical framework of rectificatory justice, and conducting the method of analysing the arguments and perceptions of the Saami people as well as the Swedish state, the main focus of the thesis is to further examine the two cases of Rönnbäck/Rönnbäcken and Gállok/Kallak. The thesis’ main finding is that there are many discrepancies between the Saami people and the Swedish state in terms of their views on fair rectificatory arrangements as well as the rights of the Saami as an indigenous people.