<p>This thesis was successfully defended on December 16th, 2013 at McMaster University.</p> / <p>In response to humanitarian crises within sovereign nation-states, many voices in global politics have begun to frame their arguments in terms of a responsibility to uphold basic human rights. The most prominent example of this theme is found in the idea of the responsibility to protect, an international framework for crisis response developed by an international commission and consolidated at the United Nations. A major challenge to this frame of thinking is the traditional disjuncture between the concept of ethico-political responsibility, on the one hand, and nation-state sovereignty on the other. A critical investigation of the ethical and political impulses articulated within the doctrine of the responsibility to protect demonstrates that much of the emergent consensus surrounding the responsibility to protect framework is premised on ideational and normative ambiguity. Part of the reason for this is the complexity of the idea of ‘responsibility’. This project seeks to explain some of the contestation of the responsibility to protect by first developing, and then applying, a conceptual framework that differentiates between monological impulses of ‘being responsible’ and more socially embedded practices situated within relational regimes of accountability and answerability.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005). My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.

Theories of global justice are often criticised for being ineffective or unrealisable. The aim of this interdisciplinary thesis is to examine whether this motivational criticism holds regarding Singer’s Principle and Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice. First, I will show that the effectiveness argument is unconvincing: the underlying effectiveness criterion is either incoherent or not defined, and existing effectiveness predictions are empirically unsatisfactory. Second, I will analyse whether Singer’s interactional Principle satisfies the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) criterion, which holds that obligations must be within the capacities of individuals. Having discussed the rationale and standard of the OIC criterion, I will show that the philosophical literature does not offer a convincing empirical justification of possibility evaluations. Drawing on psychological explanations of moral heroism, I will conclude that compliance with Singer’s Principle is possible for ordinary persons, i.e. that ‘every person is a hero in waiting’. Third, turning to the feasibility of Pogge’s theory of global egalitarian justice, I will discuss how the standard, time-frame, weight and rationale of the feasibility criterion should be defined. Based on psychological and sociological explanations about moral behaviour, social norms and identity, I will evaluate the empirical arguments advanced in the philosophical literature. In addition, I will consider how the long-term trends of globalisation are likely to influence the role of nationality, identity and global institutions. I will conclude that Pogge’s theory of egalitarian global justice is conditionally feasible, i.e. if we assume that domestic egalitarian justice is feasible. This implies that nationalism will not necessarily play a dominant role during the centuries to come. Overall, possibility and feasibility evaluations remain uncertain and partly subjective. I will thus argue that a burden of proof should be established to limit the negative effects of false evaluations.

This paper is a project based on a theoretical approach, where my aim is to search for the core elements of a viable feminist cosmopolitan ethics.  To further that purpose I identify, discuss, and compare some of the main components of such an ethics as proposed by political theorists Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young.  In doing so I hope to contribute to the ongoing project of cosmopolitan feminism.  My task in this project is to answer the following questions; what are the main components of Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young´s feminist cosmopolitan ethics? Second; where do Benhabib and Young stand with regards to the relationship between the principle of state sovereignity and the human right to membership? Finally, based on a comparative reading of Benhabib and Young´s theories I ask; what should be some of the core elements of a viable feminist cosmopolitan ethics? I argue that for a feminist cosmopolitan ethics to be considered viable, it must carry within itself an impetus towards increased respect for the basic human rights of the 64.9 million persons that are currently displaced due to conflicts, war, persecutions and human rights violations.  Following a comparative reading of some of the main components of Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young´s cosmopolitan ethics, I promote a vision of feminist cosmopolitan ethics that carries within itself the hope that is inherent in the promise of human rights, while at the same time offering the tools that are necessary to identify and rectify the structural injustices exprssed in the status and real-life situations of the 64.9 million persons that are currently displaced due to conflicts, war, persecutions, and human rights violations.

Pouvons-nous maintenir la justice sociale à l'intérieur des frontières étatiques, malgré l'intensification des flux transnationaux? La thèse part des théories cosmopolitiques de la justice mondiale, qui entendent transposer les principes de justice rawlsiens à l'échelle du monde sur la base de deux arguments: l'universalisation de la position originelle et l'observation des rapports d'interdépendance tissés par la mondialisation. Cependant, en découplant les garanties sociales de la reconnaissance de l'égalité politique entre les citoyens -dont elles sont les corollaires au sein des institutions démocratiques -ces théories sortent la justice sociale de son cadre de justification normatif. Nous tentons au contraire de prendre en compte les injustices singulières produites par le commerce transnational, sans pour autant renoncer à l'ancrage politique de la justice. À ce titre, l'Union européenne offre un exemple fécond: bien que les citoyens européens bénéficient de protections sociales lorsqu'ils circulent dans un autre État membre, la politique sociale demeure essentiellement de la compétence des États. En revanche, c'est la Cour de justice de l'Union qui veille au respect des quatre libertés de circulation. Le décalage entre ces deux niveaux de protection nous permet de définir des contextes où les injustices sont de second ordre, car la concurrence entre les normes nationales dans un marché ouvert affecte le sens et l'application de la justice sociale à l'intérieur des États. Les raisons de vouloir harmoniser les politiques sociales et fiscales des États sont ainsi solides et néanmoins indépendantes du cosmopolitisme. / Should social justice be contained within state borders when, in the global context, borders themselves have become increasingly fluid? This research takes as its starting point the theories of global justice that apply Rawlsian principles at the global scale. They are based on the idea that the original position can be universalised, and that globalisation has given rise to the increased interdependence of peoples. However, the domain in which social guarantees apply is hereby conceived separately from the domain in which democratic institutions instantiate political equality. Social justice is thus made separate from its political context of justification. As an attempt to overcome this problem, this project examines the particular injustices caused by cross-border trade. The European Union (EU) provides a particularly fruitful example. On the one hand, although EU citizens are entitled to social benefits while circulating in another Member State, social policies still fall within the competence of the Member States. On the other, the "Four Freedoms" of movement are subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice. The gap between these two layers of protection allows us to define what this project calls a "second-order injustice," whereby competition between the social norms of each state in the single market affects the meaning and application of social justice within the states themselves. This dissertation concludes that while there is a serious justification to expect harmonization between the social and fiscal policies of Member States, it does not have necessarily to depend on cosmopolitan grounds.

<p>The globalization of political and economic processes is a growing moral concern for theologians and political philosophers alike. My thesis aims to outline, analyze, and compare church studies of globalization with global theories of justice.</p><p>To do this, I draw upon recent studies of globalization made by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). The WCC and LWF are two global reaching church organizations. They have a common aim of uniting churches for ecumenical dialogue and are involved in social, economic, political, and ecological questions. The WCC and LWF analyze globalization by applying biblical and theological principles from the Christian tradition. Out of this analysis comes an invitation to resist globalization and seek economic alternatives. Their work forms a moral discourse about globalization from a theological ethical perspective.</p><p>In comparison, I consider theories of global justice by political philosophers in the liberal tradition (i.e., John Rawls). The two philosophers I draw upon are Thomas Pogge and Kok-Chor Tan. Their recent work forms a moral discourse that attempts to globalize Rawls’s liberal principles of political and economic justice. These principles challenge globalization and build an argument for greater global justice. This argument calls for a restructuring of today’s global political and financial institutions. In my thesis, this work also acts as lens for which to critically analyze the church studies.</p><p>Finally, I consider a potential and positive relationship between these two kinds of global moral discourses, between theological ethics and political philosophy. This relationship helps the church develop ethics for a realistic global citizenship. More importantly, this relationship creates a reasonable and broad based consensus for global justice. Such a consensus is demanded in a global context of plurality and secularity.</p>

<p>The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory.</p><p>Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy.</p><p>The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances.</p><p>Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.</p>

The globalization of political and economic processes is a growing moral concern for theologians and political philosophers alike. My thesis aims to outline, analyze, and compare church studies of globalization with global theories of justice. To do this, I draw upon recent studies of globalization made by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). The WCC and LWF are two global reaching church organizations. They have a common aim of uniting churches for ecumenical dialogue and are involved in social, economic, political, and ecological questions. The WCC and LWF analyze globalization by applying biblical and theological principles from the Christian tradition. Out of this analysis comes an invitation to resist globalization and seek economic alternatives. Their work forms a moral discourse about globalization from a theological ethical perspective. In comparison, I consider theories of global justice by political philosophers in the liberal tradition (i.e., John Rawls). The two philosophers I draw upon are Thomas Pogge and Kok-Chor Tan. Their recent work forms a moral discourse that attempts to globalize Rawls’s liberal principles of political and economic justice. These principles challenge globalization and build an argument for greater global justice. This argument calls for a restructuring of today’s global political and financial institutions. In my thesis, this work also acts as lens for which to critically analyze the church studies. Finally, I consider a potential and positive relationship between these two kinds of global moral discourses, between theological ethics and political philosophy. This relationship helps the church develop ethics for a realistic global citizenship. More importantly, this relationship creates a reasonable and broad based consensus for global justice. Such a consensus is demanded in a global context of plurality and secularity.

The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory. Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy. The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances. Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O trabalho tem por objetivo articular uma defesa da teoria de justiça distributiva de John Rawls, considerando-se, para tal, as mudanças que o autor efetuou em sua teoria de justiça como equidade. Assim, a pesquisa tomará como base não somente o critério de justiça distributiva que se consolidou em Uma Teoria de Justiça, através do princípio da diferença, mas também avaliará de que forma este ideal continua presente nos textos posteriores do autor: O Liberalismo Político e O Direito dos Povos. Para tal, o estudo retomará as críticas cosmopolitas à proposta de internacionalização da teoria de justiça como equidade e, à luz destas, apresentará uma defesa do projeto de Rawls, evidenciando elementos do mesmo que estão alinhados ao projeto de justiça distributiva e sugerindo que sua proposta teórica é coerente com as premissas de Uma Teoria de Justiça, apesar de o princípio da diferença não estar presente entre os princípios fundamentais que devem ser estabelecidos entre os povos. Logo, trata-se também de uma proposta interpretativa que se vincula à compreensão (minoritária) de que as mudanças teóricas efetuadas por Rawls em sua teoria não a tornaram incompatível com seu projeto originário estabelecido em Uma Teoria de Justiça. / This study aims to defend John Rawlss theoretical approach to distributive justice based on the changes that he made to his theory of justice as fairness. Therefore the research considers not only Rawlss criterion of distributive justice as it was laid out on A Theory of Justice by the difference principle but also proposes to consider how the criterion can be understood in his later work, mainly The Law of Peoples. Contrary to what is commonly held by the cosmopolitan criticism of Rawlss later work, this study argues that Rawls proposes a feasible theoretical framework to deal with problems of justice on the international sphere and will justify within Rawlss theory his motivation for not employing the difference principle as one of the principles that should hold between peoples. To do so, it will be necessary to review the main changes that Rawls made to his theory as well as consider the cosmopolitan challenges that argue for a radically egalitarian criterion of distributive justice on an international sphere, such as the difference principle. Accordingly, this study will side with an understanding of Rawlss theory as a project that kept its main ideas notwithstanding the many changes Rawls made to his theory in the effort of trying to solve some of the inconsistencies that he recognized in A Theory of Justice.