Leading accounts of responsibility for structural injustice endorse the idea that all members of an unjust social structure—including those who are oppressed—bear a forward-looking responsibility to help combat structural injustice. Importantly, this idea assumes that all oppressed agents are capable of consciously combating structural injustice. But there exist oppressed agents, which I term 'denialists', who deny the existence of the wrongs that they and other members of their social group(s) experience in virtue of being subject to structural injustice. Initially, it seems doubtful that a denialist can consciously combat structural injustice—what could they possibly do to consciously combat wrongs whose existence they reject? This may lead one to think that a denialist cannot be held responsible for helping combat structural injustice, so that the aforementioned accounts must be revised. In this paper, I show that such revision is not needed. Despite initial appearances, a denialist can be held responsible for helping combat structural injustice. To establish this claim, I first argue that two criteria—feasibleness and plausible effectiveness—jointly generate pro tanto responsibilities to help fix structural injustice for oppressed agents. Then, I argue that these criteria entail that a denialist has a pro tanto responsibility to listen to others' claims of wrongdoing. / Master of Arts / Some oppressed people deny the existence of the wrongs that they and others like them experience in virtue of being oppressed. For instance, a woman might think it is ok for men to objectify women, and thus deny that a woman is wronged when she is sexually harassed. Call such oppressed people 'denialists'. Many philosophers hold that the oppressed are responsible for combating their oppression. One might think that a denialist cannot bear this responsibility. After all, how can a denialist combat wrongs whose existence they deny? I argue, however, that a denialist can be held responsible for combating their oppression. Specifically, I argue that a denialist is responsible for listening to other people when they talk about the wrongs they perceive.

This dissertation adopts a ‘social criticism’ model in order to analyze racism in our contemporary world – particularly the United States. This analysis offers a detailed account of racism as rooted in social structural processes, and prioritizes oppression and domination as the chief wrongs resulting from racism. To do so, said analysis highlights norms, ideals, policies, and actions, that are often assumed to be ‘race neutral’ (e.g., impartiality, merit, ‘natural rights’, and autonomy), and the role they play in the production of racial injustice. More specifically, it exposes how these norms function to undermine human agency by restricting means for self-development and self-determination. As such, the role that inclusive and democratic deliberation can play in combating racial oppression and domination is developed. In light of this analysis, a defense of a ‘concrete morality’ which prioritizes the fight against oppression and domination, is made against an ‘abstract morality’ that adheres to ‘ideally just’ principles regardless of the injustice that results from doing so. Moreover, this project develops a ‘shared responsibility model’ for racial injustice, articulating varying degrees and kinds of responsibility we have for correcting it. It concludes by offering ‘democratic equality of difference’ as a normative ideal for cultivating racial justice. Generally, said ideal aims to: create basic conditions for the self-development and collective self-determination of all; cultivate a universally inclusive and ongoing process of democratic deliberation for solving collective problems; and attend to difference when deliberating about matters of justice. / Philosophy

Thesis advisor: Micah Lott / How do we rectify structural injustice? Iris Marion Young presents a Social Connection Model that states those who participate in social processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice. Within some philosophical discourse, however, there is a general consensus that SCM is not action-guiding and is overly demanding. To supplement Young’s ideas, I explore Robin Zheng’s Role-Ideal Model; Zheng fills some necessary gaps left by Young. My aim in this paper is to use Young's SCM and Zheng's RIM in tandem to create a more action-guiding and ameliorative project for structural injustice. I offer a structurally sensitive account of responsibility for disempowerment that avoids passively repeating domination. I establish a prefatory set of tasks that can be applied to all roles. These tasks are an expansion of the terms mentioned in Zheng Role-Ideal:“raised consciousness” and “boundary pushing.” / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This paper is a project based on a theoretical approach, where my aim is to search for the core elements of a viable feminist cosmopolitan ethics.  To further that purpose I identify, discuss, and compare some of the main components of such an ethics as proposed by political theorists Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young.  In doing so I hope to contribute to the ongoing project of cosmopolitan feminism.  My task in this project is to answer the following questions; what are the main components of Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young´s feminist cosmopolitan ethics? Second; where do Benhabib and Young stand with regards to the relationship between the principle of state sovereignity and the human right to membership? Finally, based on a comparative reading of Benhabib and Young´s theories I ask; what should be some of the core elements of a viable feminist cosmopolitan ethics? I argue that for a feminist cosmopolitan ethics to be considered viable, it must carry within itself an impetus towards increased respect for the basic human rights of the 64.9 million persons that are currently displaced due to conflicts, war, persecutions and human rights violations.  Following a comparative reading of some of the main components of Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young´s cosmopolitan ethics, I promote a vision of feminist cosmopolitan ethics that carries within itself the hope that is inherent in the promise of human rights, while at the same time offering the tools that are necessary to identify and rectify the structural injustices exprssed in the status and real-life situations of the 64.9 million persons that are currently displaced due to conflicts, war, persecutions, and human rights violations.

S’inscrivant en épistémologie sociale, ce projet souhaite comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène actif dans la production de connaissance et non comme sa simple absence. Se détachant des théories traditionnelles d’épistémologie comprenant l’ignorance comme un état passif, comme antinomie de la connaissance, ce mémoire à l’ambition de comprendre l’ignorance comme un phénomène multifactoriel soit comme une pratique se situant à l’intersection entre le social, le structurel et l’épistémique. Précisément, l’objectif de ce mémoire est de démontrer que, présentes sous plusieurs formes, les pratiques d’ignorances ont des ramifications concrètes sur plusieurs aspects de nos vies telles que nos interactions sociales, notre univers intellectuel et notre partage de connaissances. Se basant sur un cadre critique, sollicitant des écrits issus des études féministes, décoloniales et intersectionnelles, la visée majeure de ce projet est de démontrer la possibilité de considérer l’ignorance comme un élément clef de la production et du maintien d’injustices sociales. Par exemple, le rôle de l’ignorance quant à certaines formes de racisme et de sexisme tels l’incapacité à être considéré comme un individu pouvant produire des connaissances légitimes ou le refus, non fondé, de comprendre certains individus issus des groupes marginalisés comme égaux sur le plan social et épistémique. Accorder un rôle déterminant à l’ignorance permettra d’amener une meilleure compréhension de la persistance de certaines formes d’injustices sociales en rendant compte de leur nature abstraite et parfois difficile à saisir. Nous analyserons l’ignorance en termes sociaux et en relation aux vices épistémiques ce qui rendra compte de la systématicité de certaines actions sexistes ou racistes et permettra de comprendre plus clairement les mécanismes soutenant le maintien de ces inégalités. Avec ceci, nous tenterons de rendre compte du type de vice épistémique que constitue l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le type de traits de caractère, d’attitudes, ou de manières de penser qui nuit à l’accessibilité de la connaissance. Cette approche permet de souligner le fait que l’ignorance n’est pas la même chose que l’erreur et qu’elle peut être durable et activement maintenue. / Framed within social epistemology, this project aims to understand ignorance as an active phenomenon in the production of knowledge rather than simply its absence. Departing from traditional theories of epistemology that view ignorance as a passive state and as the antinomy of knowledge, this paper aspires to comprehend ignorance as a multifactorial phenomenon, situated at the intersection of the social, structural, and epistemic. Specifically, the objective of this paper is to demonstrate that, present in various forms, practices of ignorance have concrete ramifications on various aspects of our lives, such as our social interactions, intellectual universe, and sharing of knowledge. Drawing on a critical framework, and utilizing writings from feminist, decolonial, and intersectional studies, the main goal of this project is to demonstrate the possibility of considering ignorance as a key element in the production and maintenance of social injustices. For example, the role of ignorance in certain forms of racism and sexism, such as the inability to be considered as an individual capable of producing legitimate knowledge or the unfounded refusal to understand certain individuals from marginalized groups as equals on the social and epistemic level. Assigning a determining role to ignorance will lead to a better understanding of the persistence of certain forms of social injustices by accounting for their abstract and sometimes difficult-to-grasp nature. We will analyze ignorance in social terms and in relation to epistemic vices, which will account for the systematicity of certain sexist or racist actions and enable a clearer understanding of the mechanisms that support the maintenance of these inequalities. In doing so, we will attempt to account for the type of epistemic vice that ignorance constitutes, that is, the type of character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that hinder the accessibility of knowledge. This approach highlights the fact that ignorance is not the same as error and that it can be durable and actively maintained.

Les domaines de la philosophie et de la théorie politique ont connu un certain nombre de changements au cours des quarante dernières années. L'un attire notre attention tout particulièrement ; le basculement d'un point de vue national, cristallisé par le contrat social rawlsien, vers un point de vue non-national. En effet, plusieurs penseurs abordent un ensemble de phénomènes considérés comme nouveaux, tels que les traités de libre commerce et l'économie globale, les entreprises et les institutions supra et transnationales, l'immigration et les contrôles frontaliers etc. Ces changements sont intéressants puisqu'ils obéissent, principalement, à une évolution majeure du terrain politique et social que l'on appelle mondialisation. Les théoriciens travaillant dans le domaine de la justice globale semblent s'adresser à deux questions différentes mais reliées. La première concerne la justice globale : dans quelle mesure et pourquoi l'ordre mondial est-il juste ou injuste ? Qu'est-ce qu'un ordre global juste ? La deuxième est dans un sens corollaire à la première, et concerne la responsabilité : qui devrait être blâmé ou digne d'éloge pour l'ordre mondial ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables de l'ordre mondial ? Qui devrait redresser ses éventuelles conséquences injustes ? Face à l'économie mondialisée et aux institutions politiques et économiques internationales et trans-nationales, cette interrogation devient légitime et nécessaire : suis-je responsable à l'égard des travailleurs des sweat shop lorsque j'achète des habits à Auchan ou bien à l'égard des caféiculteurs très mal payés lorsque je prends un capuccino dans un café Starbucks ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables des traités de libre commerce que leurs gouvernements signent ? Ces questions sur la responsabilité des individus dans le contexte de la mondialisation seront l'enjeu de ce travail de recherche. Nous interrogerons plus exactement la responsabilité d'un agent lorsqu'il fait partie d'un chaîne causale complexe, lorsqu'il participe d'une injustice structurelle. Ainsi, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une chaîne causale, mais de connexions qui sont l'issue d'un changement des modes de productions, de consommation et de la concurrence dans un marché mondialisé. Plus important encore, il ne s'agit pas simplement de la responsabilité individuelle mais plutôt de la responsabilité individuelle en tant que citoyen, et donc d'une responsabilité politique. Elle peut certes être individuelle, mais nous devons tenir compte du fait qu'elle doit être pensée en tant que responsabilité politique, et pas uniquement morale, puisque l'individu et ses actions sont déterminés par des communautés politiques dans lesquelles il participe, ou dans lesquelles il est représenté. Ainsi, la mondialisation nous invite à repenser la responsabilité individuelle pour pouvoir rendre compte des intuitions morales et politiques qui guident une bonne partie du champ de la justice globale. Pour cela, nous verrons dans un premier temps la manière dont les théories de la justice globale essaient de répondre à ce défit. Grâce à cela nous dégagerons l'hypothèse qui nous guidera, l'idée que dans la mondialisation, un agent peut être responsable, avec d'autres, des raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas considéré comme responsable. C'est-à-dire qu'il sera méta-responsable. Dans un second temps, nous essaierons de déterminer un model de responsabilité individuelle, et de comprendre comment la responsabilité est attribuée. Ensuite, nous essaierons de formuler une manière de concevoir la responsabilité politique. Grâce à ces deux éléments, la responsabilité individuelle et la responsabilité politique, nous pourrons parvenir à formuler une conception de la méta-responsabilité comme forme de penser l'agentivité traversée par la mondialisation. / The fields of philosophy and political theory have met major changes in the past 40 years. On of them is quite interesting; there has been a change of the national point of view, which paradigm could be the rawlsian model, to a non-national one. Many thinkers have thought about a set of phenomenons considered as new such as free trade agreements and global economy, supra and transnational institutions and corporations, immigration and border control etc. The thinkers working on global justice seem to adresse two sets of different but related questions. The first ones concern global justice: why and to which extend is global order just or unjust? What is a just global order? The second set is, in a sense a corollary of the first and concerns responsibility: who is to be blamed or praised for the global order? Are citizens responsible for the global order? Who should address its possible unjust consequences? Facing globalization and international and transnational political and economical institutions those questions become legitimate and necessary: am I responsible for the sweat shop workers that produced the clothes I bought at Auchan or for badly payed coffee-grower when I buy a capuccino at Starbucks? Are citizens responsible for the free-trade agreements that are signed by there governments? These questions concerning the individual responsibility in the age of globalization will be the object of these research. We will question the responsibility of an agent when he is part of a complex causal chain, when contributes to structural injustice. Thus, it is not only about a causal chain but about connexions that are the result of changes in the modes of production and consumption, or the competition on a global market. Moreover, individual responsibility, in this context, cannot be thought solely as individual but the responsibility of individuals qua citizen, this is political responsibility. It is certainly individual but since agents and their actions are also determined by the political communities to which they belong or that represent them, this responsibility must be thought as political and not only as moral. Thus, globalization invite us to rethink individual responsibility in order to make sense of the the moral and political intuitions the guide the field of global justice. In order to do so, we will see, first, the way in which some theories of global justice try to tackle this challenge. Thanks to this we will determine thy hypothesis that will guide us; the idea that in the context of globalization an agent can be responsible, with others, for the reasons that make him non-responsible, that is, meta-responsible. On a second moment we will try to formulate a model of individual responsibility and to understand its conditions of attributability. Subsequently we will try to formulate a way to conceive political responsibility. Thanks to this two elements, individual responsibility and political responsibility we will be finally able to formulate a conception of meta-responsibility as a way to think agency when it is entwined by globalization.

Ce mémoire court a comme objectif d’appliquer le concept de responsabilité politique développé par Iris Marion Young dans Responsibility for Justice, ainsi que son modèle de connexion sociale, au contexte du recyclage des déchets électriques et électroniques. Au premier chapitre, il sera question en un premier temps d’explorer comment Young définit ses concepts et comment ils diffèrent des conceptions plus traditionnelles de la responsabilité. Au chapitre suivant, il s’agira de comprendre à quels problèmes philosophiques Young tente de répondre. Il sera intéressant ici de voir comment Young se distingue de J. Rawls, de comment elle s’inspire d’H. Arendt et comment elle se distance de l’approche nationaliste de D. Miller. Enfin, au dernier chapitre, ce travail termine par une application du modèle de Young au contexte du recyclage des déchets électriques et électroniques. Bien qu’il y ait des similitudes avec l’étude de cas présenté par Young dans Responsibility for Justice, des différences marquées dans les types d’interactions sociales à la source des injustices structurelles illustrent la pertinence d’utiliser le modèle de Young afin d’entamer une réflexion sur les solutions possibles. Ce mémoire court se veut donc être une sorte d’hommage à la pensée de Young qui est toujours d’actualité. / The objective of this short-form master thesis is to put in application the concept of political responsibility and its social connexion model developed by Iris Marion Young in Responsibility for Justice to the context of e-waste. In the first chapter, we will start by exploring how Young define her concepts and how they differ from traditional conceptions of responsibility. In the second chapter, we will see which philosophical questions Young wanted to address with her model. It will be interesting to see how she distinguishes her theory to the one of J. Rawls, how she seeks inspiration in the thoughts of H. Arendt, and how she distances herself from the national conception of responsibility developed by D. Miller. Finally, in the last chapter, this work ends with an application of Young’s social connection model to the context of e-waste. While there are some similarities with the case study presented by Young in Responsibility for Justice, the context of e-waste provides a different insight on the many types of social interactions at the source of structural injustices, and how Young’s theory is useful for a reflection about the possible solutions. This work is a kind of tribute to the thoughts of Young which are still relevant today.