The dissertation addresses the impact of the medieval notion of what scholastic theologians termed "invincible ignorance" upon later Spanish attitudes toward and actual treatment of their New World Indian subjects. Once sixteenth-century theologians expanded the range of topics of which "invincible" – and thereby excusable – ignorance could theoretically be had, official Spanish policy towards the pagan and culturally alien Native Americans became noticeably less inhumane and oppressive. This study adds significantly to our knowledge of the interaction between Native Americans and their European conquerors during the first century of Iberian settlement. First, it uncovers the ideological justification for the aforementioned shift in Spain's treatment of its Indian subjects. Second, this study successfully explains why Spanish attitudes towards the American Indians changed at the moment they did. Third, it provides an alternative to the largely discredited but inadequately replaced explanation that Spanish colonial administrators introduced more moderate policies because they increasingly abandoned the position that the Indians were not fully human. This dissertation, moreover, presents a critical contribution to our understanding of the genesis of the concept of individual human rights. As sixteenth-century theologians concluded that insurmountable ignorance constituted valid grounds to excuse some individuals for such "sins" as unbelief, idolatry, and human sacrifice, what became progressively obvious was that no single moral standard could be applied to all human beings, irrespective of upbringing and education. As a result, morality became more subjective and dependent upon the individual circumstances of the actor. Thus, in order to maintain a minimum of justice, what was morally "right" came to be seen in an increasingly direct relation to the individual. Although the connection between moral subjectivity and individual human rights has been well-established in the secondary literature, the underlying issue of invincible ignorance in relation to the problem of colonial conquest has so far not been recognized. Indeed, the very concept of "invincible ignorance" has never been systematically studied. This project reintroduces this critical notion to the center of the conversation.

This thesis explores the topic of decision under conditions of complete uncertainty, advocating an interdisciplinary perspective that benefits from the insights of both economists and philosophers. Thus far, most of the results in the field have been the work of economists who have been responsible for important theorems and axiomatic characterizatoins of a variety of decision rules. While proceeding from a different methodology and focus, tantalizingly similar conjectures have been made by philosophical logicians. While the work of the latter has not (yet) become as advanced in deriving important theorems, I suggest that philosophers have something useful to offer in their method of analysis that would be useful in evaluating the different solutions to standard problems in the field. I attempt to provide a new solution motivated by both disciplines.

archives@tulane.edu / This dissertation examines the relationship between ignorance and responsibility. Ignorance is often treated as an excuse, but there are times when ignorance does not excuse. Ignorance that does not excuse is usually known as culpable ignorance. Since ignorance is largely an epistemological concept, the difference between culpable and exculpating ignorance suggests a connection between epistemology and theories of responsibility that has gone relatively unexplored. The following work explores this connection and argues that incorporating epistemological theories will help provide a robust account of both the ignorance excuse and culpable ignorance. The project begins by pointing out that some highly intuitive accounts of culpable ignorance seem remarkably like theories of epistemic justification. As such, epistemic justification seems like the best candidate for an epistemological concept that might share a connection with the culpable ignorance literature in moral philosophy. I argue that there is a theory of epistemic justification that captures our intuitions regarding culpable ignorance. Its close connection to our practices gives us good reason to think that, if this theory of justification is right, then the following is true: one’s ignorance exculpates only if it is justified, and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it is not justified. I call this the Justification Thesis. Once I establish the Justification Thesis, I defend it against various possible objections. First, the Justification Thesis is a derivative account of culpable ignorance, and it is often thought that derivative accounts are forced into responsibility skepticism. I argue that this is not true. Second, it is often thought derivative accounts like the Justification Thesis are open to a large class of counterexamples. I examine a few common alleged counterexamples and argue that they trade on ambiguities that, I suggest, are shared by every purported counterexample. When disambiguated it turns out they are not counterexamples after all. Third, some question whether ignorance with moral content exculpates. I argue that the Justification Thesis captures our intuitions regarding moral ignorance. Finally, I address a challenge to the initial assumption that culpable ignorance does not excuse and argue that this challenge is mistaken. / 1 / Nathan W. Biebel

Several have reported observations that sometimes ignorance of the domain in a software development project is useful for promoting the elicitation of tacit assumptions and out- of-the-box ideas. This thesis reports work putting the observation to two empirical tests. First, a survey was conducted among software development managers of varying experience to determine what software development activities they thought were at least helped by domain ignorance. Second, transcripts from fourteen interviews of presumably-domain- ignorant immigrants to new software development projects at one large company were examined to determine if the activities performed by those with the smoothest immigrations were activities that are at least helped by domain ignorance. The conclusions are that ignorance plays an important role in software development but there are a lot of other factors that influence immigration smoothness.

Several have reported observations that sometimes ignorance of the domain in a software development project is useful for promoting the elicitation of tacit assumptions and out- of-the-box ideas. This thesis reports work putting the observation to two empirical tests. First, a survey was conducted among software development managers of varying experience to determine what software development activities they thought were at least helped by domain ignorance. Second, transcripts from fourteen interviews of presumably-domain- ignorant immigrants to new software development projects at one large company were examined to determine if the activities performed by those with the smoothest immigrations were activities that are at least helped by domain ignorance. The conclusions are that ignorance plays an important role in software development but there are a lot of other factors that influence immigration smoothness.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1983 / Bibliography: leaves [185]-188. / Microfiche. / vii, 188 leaves, bound 29 cm

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How do people cope when they feel uninformed or unable to understand important social issues, such as the environment, energy concerns, or the economy? One would intuitively expect that a lack of knowledge would motivate an increased, unbiased search for information, thereby facilitating participation and engagement in these issues – especially when they are consequential, pressing, and self-relevant. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between the importance/self-relevance of social issues and people’s willingness to engage with and learn about them. Drawing from the literature on System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), I hypothesized that, rather than motivating an increased search for information, a lack of knowledge about a specific socio-political issue will (a) foster feelings of dependence on the government, which will (b) increase system justification and government trust, which will (c) increase desires to avoid learning about the relevant issue when information is negative or when information valence is unknown. In other words, I suggest that ignorance – as a function of the system justifying tendencies it may activate – may, ironically, breed more ignorance. The rational for these predictions is discussed in Chapter 1. Then, in the contexts of energy, environmental, and economic issues, I present seven studies that: (a) provide evidence for this specific psychological chain (i.e., ignorance about an issue → dependence → government trust → avoidance of information about that issue); (b) shed light on the role of threat and motivation in driving the second and third links in this chain; and (c) illustrate the unfortunate consequences of this process for individual action in those contexts that may need it most.

A narrative of denial and ignorance of colonial history is pervasive in Canadian school curriculum. Generations of Canadians children learn about history without adequate understanding of Indigenous peoples and of the negative impact of colonialism. Drawing on Indigenous and critical race theories, this research study applied a critical discourse analysis to explore how historical narratives are (re)circulated in school history curriculum. Using the Ontario Grade 7 history curriculum and two history textbooks, the information that is currently being presented to Grade 7 students in Ontario history classes was analyzed. The study found that themes of denial, ignorance, Euro-centrism, racialized sexism and White settler colonial hegemony are pervasive in the history curriculum and textbooks, while information regarding distinct Indigenous peoples and their nations, their histories, and their contributions to Canadian history, are largely absent. These findings highlight implications for curriculum reform and the need for anti- racist, decolonizing pedagogical and curricular approaches. / Graduate / hclausin@uvic.ca

How do people cope when they feel uninformed or unable to understand important social issues, such as the environment, energy concerns, or the economy? One would intuitively expect that a lack of knowledge would motivate an increased, unbiased search for information, thereby facilitating participation and engagement in these issues – especially when they are consequential, pressing, and self-relevant. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between the importance/self-relevance of social issues and people’s willingness to engage with and learn about them. Drawing from the literature on System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), I hypothesized that, rather than motivating an increased search for information, a lack of knowledge about a specific socio-political issue will (a) foster feelings of dependence on the government, which will (b) increase system justification and government trust, which will (c) increase desires to avoid learning about the relevant issue when information is negative or when information valence is unknown. In other words, I suggest that ignorance – as a function of the system justifying tendencies it may activate – may, ironically, breed more ignorance. The rational for these predictions is discussed in Chapter 1. Then, in the contexts of energy, environmental, and economic issues, I present seven studies that: (a) provide evidence for this specific psychological chain (i.e., ignorance about an issue → dependence → government trust → avoidance of information about that issue); (b) shed light on the role of threat and motivation in driving the second and third links in this chain; and (c) illustrate the unfortunate consequences of this process for individual action in those contexts that may need it most.