Rousseau notoriously praises ignorance and censures learning for the moral corruption that it has inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in themselves. I consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to answer the following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau? While some interpreters have acknowledged his sensitivity to various groups in society with regard to moral education, none has properly systematized the different types of ignorance that Rousseau praises or identified the benefits of those types of ignorance to various individuals and societies. I distinguish the savage’s ignorance from that of Socrates and identify another important type of ignorance, the benefits of which stem from our natural sentiment and innate curiosity.

This thesis investigates the relationship between our rational capacities and the norms that govern our practice of blame. The conclusion it reaches is rather shocking: it is impossible to satisfy the conditions of blameworthiness. The argument that reaches this conclusion is what I call an internal criticism. Unlike other skeptical arguments about moral responsibility, the one advanced in this thesis does not depend on any metaphysical theses external to the theory of blame. The thesis begins by looking at a position I call rational capacity compatibilism (RCC). My interest in RCC concerns the fact that it has done more than any other theory of responsibility to set out the relationship between our rational capacities and the practice of blame. I use the most well developed RCC view—that of R. Jay Wallace—as the backdrop for the skeptical argument that follows I next defend a recent argument advanced by Gideon Rosen according to which an agent cannot be blameworthy for a given act if akrasia does not occur somewhere in the act's etiology. This serves as the first major premise in my skeptical argument. Next, I turn to the second major premise of my argument, which is comprised of two controversial claims. The first is that akrasia results from a failure in one's rational capacities. The second is that an agent cannot be blameworthy for committing any act that results from a failure in his or her rational capacities. Together, these two claims produce the following premise: when an agent acts akratically she cannot be blameworthy for that act. Now, for any given act, either akrasia occurs in that act's etiology or it does not. If it does not, then the agent in question is not blameworthy (first premise); but if akrasia does occur in the act's etiology, then the agent in question is still not blameworthy (second premise). It follows that for any given act, the agent who performs that act cannot be blameworthy for so acting. I end with a brief discussion of what I call "the moral up-shot" of my skeptical argument: what does a world without blame look like? I suggest, contra the main party line (often associated with P.F. Strawson), that blame is not a requirement for significant and meaningful interpersonal relationships, nor is it a necessary component of morality.

The paper will describe one of David Miller’s arguments for limiting immigration by concluding that immigration is a threat to a successful democratic welfare state. There is a threat to a democratic welfare state when there is lack of trust in a heterogeneous society. Immigration contributes to heterogeneity. The paper will present flaws in Miller’s argument, which include the unacknowledged concepts of ignorance and fear that can lead to mistrust in cultural heterogeneous communities. I will then consider Miller’s response to the critiques. Lastly, I will mention some proposals for increasing trust and addressing the real issues in a multicultural society.

La mise en œuvre de la prescription de l’action publique n’est pas, en principe, subordonnée à la connaissance de l’infraction par les personnes pouvant déclencher les poursuites pénales. Le législateur retient en effet comme point de départ du délai de prescription le jour de la commission des faits et non celui de leur découverte. Cette règle connaît toutefois une exception lorsque l’infraction est dite clandestine. Parce que le ministère public et la victime n’ont pas pu avoir connaissance de l’existence de cette infraction, la prescription ne court pas tant que les faits ne sont pas apparus et n’ont pu être constatés dans des conditions permettant l’exercice de l’action publique. L’exception de clandestinité empêche donc le temps de produire son effet destructeur sur l’action publique. Sa mise en œuvre évite ainsi que certaines infractions restent impunies par le seul jeu de l’écoulement du délai. S’il ne fait aucun doute que la clandestinité d’une infraction constitue un obstacle à la prescription de l’action publique, la notion même de clandestinité reste à circonscrire. Elle recouvre en effet, en droit positif, de multiples réalités qui rendent impossible sa systématisation. Aux termes de la recherche, il apparaît que le critère déterminant de la clandestinité consiste dans l’ignorance légitime de l’existence de l’infraction par les personnes habilitées à mettre en mouvement l’action publique. En application de l’adage contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio, cette ignorance caractérisée devrait autoriser le report du point de départ de la prescription de l’action publique de toute infraction au jour où les faits peuvent être constatés par le ministère public ou par la personne lésée. / In criminal matters, the setting of the time limit for prosecution is theoretically not subject to the knowledge of the offense by the people who can trigger criminal proceedings. Indeed, according to the law, the starting point of the said time limit period is the day the offense was committed, and not the day it was discovered. However, an exception to this rule exists when the offense is said to be clandestine. When both the prosecutor and the victim could not have know of the existence of this offense, the time-limit period does not run until the facts appear and can be noticed in the same conditions. An exception of clandestinity prevents time to produce its destructive effect on the prosecution. It avoids certain offenses to remain unpunished by the single flow of time. Undoubtedly, clandestinity is an obstacle to the prosecution of an offense. Yet, the notion itself remains to be circumscribed. In substantive law, clandestinity refers to a wide variety of realities ; its systematization is thus impossible. In a prospective approach, a criterion is to be found in the justifiable ignorance of the offense by those who can initiate a criminal action. Under the adage “contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio”, this specific ignorance allows postponement of the starting point of the time limit for prosecution of any offence on the day on which the facts have been noticed by the prosecutor or the victim.

Ever since Rawls published The Theory of Justice (1971/2009), the theory itself, along with many of its components, have been subject to intense debate. Both the "original position" and the "veil of ignorance" have been argued to be too unrealistic since the restriction on information makes it impossible to apply in the real world. Furthermore, it is argued that this restriction is too extensive, in that it excludes information that is necessary for making a just decision, and thus, that it contravenes fundamental egalitarian principles, making it less just than it should be. However, there still seems to be something appealing about the concept of the veil of ignorance and results from various experiments that have used it have shown results that indicate it has an effect, which implies that the concept might have some use after all. In this paper, I will argue for a modified version of Rawls' veil of ignorance that, while limited in its available applications, might both serve a practical use in society to increase justice and have a low risk of obtaining inegalitarian results. I will do this by first summarizing Rawls' theory of justice with a focus on his veil of ignorance. Second, I will present and discuss the critiques from various philosophers. Third, I will discuss the implications of several experiments that make use of the veil of ignorance, including the issue that these experiments are 'one-shot', or single iteration, experiments. Finally, I will detail my version of the veil of ignorance and explain why it both meets the critiques of the original veil of ignorance and could potentially serve a practical use in society.

This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.

Telle qu’elle est conçue à l’origine par les jurisconsultes romains, la distinction entre fait etdroit a une fonction méthodologique. Elle oppose, pour l’essentiel, deux types d’enquêtes dont peutdépendre la résolution d’un conflit en justice. L’une a une portée générale, la quaestio iuris ; l’autrene regarde que la seule espèce en cause, la quaestio facti. Les juristes apprécient, suivant chaquesituation envisagée, celle des deux approches qui résoudra le litige de la manière la plusconvaincante.Leurs réflexions sont conditionnées, à cet égard, par les difficultés que suscite l’interpretatiofacti. Le risque de dissoudre l’expression du ius dans l’extraordinaire disparité des faits inciteparfois à privilégier des raisonnements de portée générale. La démarche se caractérise alors par soncaractère artificiel : le fait envisagé est, dans cette hypothèse, le fruit d’une construction. Par uneffort de définition, chaque circonstance est réduite en une notion générique, avant d’êtreconfrontée à la règle de droit. La qualification est alors proprement juridique : elle permet derésoudre le conflit dans le cadre d’une quaestio iuris.Cependant, certaines situations concrètes, par leur singularité, rendent de tels raisonnementsinadaptés. Aussi une autre approche est-elle parfois privilégiée. Elle suppose d’étendre les pouvoirsde l’interprète, en lui permettant d’apprécier chaque circonstance en cause dans le cadre d’unexamen d’espèce. La qualification procède alors d’une quaestio facti. Cette démarche caractérise laprotection prétorienne de la possession ; elle inspire surtout, en substance, la concession des actionsin factum. / As originally conceived by Roman jurists, the distinction between fact and law has amethodological purpose. It confronts, essentially, two types of inquiries used to resolve a dispute incourt. One is general in scope, the quaestio iuris ; the other pertains only to a single case, thequaestio facti. According to each situation, jurists assess the approach that will resolve the disputein the most convincing way.Their thoughts are conditioned, in this respect, by the complexity of interpretatio facti. Therisk of dissolving the ius in the extraordinary disparity of facts may at times lead to a reasoning thatis general in scope. The approach is then artificial : the fact is considered, in this case, as a result ofa construction. A definition allows each circumstance to be reduced to a generic concept, beforebeing confronted to the legal rule. In this case, the evaluation is precisely legal : it resolves theconflict in the frame of a quaestio iuris.However, such appreciation may be inadequate for certain singular situations. Thereforeanother approach is sometimes favored. It involves extending the powers of the interpreter in orderto assess a circumstance through the examination of each concrete case. The evaluation is thencarried out within the quaestio facti framework. This characterizes the Praetorian protection ofpossession, and inspires above all, in essence, the concession of actiones in factum.

Cette recherche s'inscrit dans un contexte de fortes pressions foncières en Ile-de-France, de reconversion de friches industrielles et de « revalorisation » du principe de densification urbaine, qui conduisent à l'urbanisation en zones inondables. Cette thèse propose d'examiner le processus d'urbanisation en zones inondables au regard des transformations en cours dans les modes de fabrication urbaine. Aujourd'hui, l'élaboration des grands projets d'aménagement nécessite l'intervention d'une multitude d'acteurs, la production d'une expertise importante, l'intégration des incertitudes inhérentes à des projets qui se conçoivent et se réalisent sur dix, vingt ou trente ans et la nécessaire conception d'un processus de projet évolutif. Chercheurs et acteurs de l'aménagement qualifient ces processus de « projet urbain ».Nous testons l'hypothèse selon laquelle les transformations observées dans les modes d'élaboration des projets urbains peuvent créer une opportunité dans les modes d'intégration du risque inondation. Les acteurs du projet vont-ils se saisir différemment du risque en utilisant une expertise plus riche, en convoquant des acteurs du risque autour de l'élaboration du projet ? Notre recherche s'appuie sur l'analyse de l'élaboration du projet des Ardoines à Vitry-sur-Seine et de Parc-en-Seine à Villeneuve-le-Roi, complétée par l'observation d'autres projets urbains dans la métropole parisienne mais aussi en Allemagne. L'intégration du risque est, bien souvent, dans les cas étudiés en France dans cette recherche, réfléchie au travers du Plan de Prévention du Risque d'Inondation (PPRI). Elle n'engendre qu'à la marge des pratiques et des formes urbaines englobant plusieurs facettes de la gestion du risque (prévention, protection et gestion de crise). L'application de la règle à l'échelle du projet urbain se transforme ainsi en dispositif de construction de l'ignorance (Jouzel, Dedieu, 2013) quant à une gestion du risque globale, intégrant toutes ces actions. Lors de l'application de la règle, les coalitions d'acteurs (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993), au sens de groupe d'acteurs qui vont se retrouver en ce qui concerne l'intégration du risque autour d'une idée commune qui va faire projet, vont être amenées à produire une expertise technique. Cette expertise va être essentiellement centrée sur la mise en sécurité des biens et des personnes et la transparence hydraulique et représente la pierre angulaire pour traduire la règle en formes urbaines (pilotis, rez-de-chaussée surélevés, etc.), gages du bon respect de la règle. La construction de l'ignorance, qui se traduit par une méconnaissance des impacts des aménagements sur le fonctionnement du quartier et de la ville en temps de crise, peut être partiellement comblée par la mise en place d'un Etablissement public d'aménagement. En effet, ce dernier va regrouper en son sein l'Etat, à la fois protecteur et aménageur. Les exemples de projets urbains allemands convoqués dans cette thèse montrent quant à eux une inversion des logiques d'intégration du risque. La suppression de tout principe d'interdiction d'urbanisation en zone inondable conduit à la production de nouvelles règles tant en ce qui concerne les formes urbaines (bâtiments étanches, voiries surélevées…) que les obligations relatives à l'alerte et à la gestion de crise. Une fois le projet urbain réalisé, l'habitant en prenant possession du projet urbain va être l'ultime témoin de la segmentation de la gestion du risque inondation. En effet, en recevant l'information de son exposition, il ne fait pas le lien avec ce qu'implique cette exposition, c'est-à-dire le rôle qu'il aura à jouer en cas de crue. Plus de communication aurait pour conséquence de reposer la question des responsabilités de chacun et de signaler que, malgré les moyens de protection et les aménagements pour réduire l'aléa dans le projet urbain, le risque demeure présent / This study is developed against a background of high estate pressure in the Ile-de-France region, of brownfield conversion and of increased urban densification. All these processes are leading to the land-use in floodrisk areas. The aim of this thesis is to analyse urbanisation process in floodrisk areas, with regard to the current transformations in urban design methods. Large urban development projects require the intervention of several stakeholders and significant expertise. Uncertainties in projects that are designed over ten, twenty or thirty years and the need to develop a progressive process have to be evaluated. Researchers and land-use stakeholders qualify this process of “urban project”. Our primary hypothesis was that the changes observed in urban project designs may challenge flood risk integration methods. Will the urban project stakeholders seize upon the risk integration in a different way using a more significant expertise and make risk management stakeholders play a part? Our analysis focus on two urban projects: les Ardoines in Vitry-sur-Seine and Parc-en-Seine in Villeneuve-le-Roi. Our study also integrates observation of other urban projects in the Greater Paris and in Germany. In our case studies in France, the risk is often analysed through the flood risk prevention plan. However, this will raise only marginally practices and urban forms related to prevention, protection and crisis management. Based on this concept it has been pro-posed that the application of the rule at the urban project scale is transformed into the construction of the ignorance process (Jouzel, Dedieu, 2013) concerning a global risk management, integrating all these actions. During the rule application, the advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, 1993) will find a common idea mainly focusing on ensuring the safety of goods and people and the hydraulic transparency. This expertise will be the most important piece to translate the rule in urban forms (stilts, raised ground floor, etc.) as a guarantee of good compliance with the rule. Construction of ignorance results in a lack of awareness of the impacts of development projects on the district and the city during flood periods. This process is partially filled in by a public development authority, which includes the two figures of the state, both protector and developer. They have for mission to develop and densify an area of three hundred hectares. The examples of German urban projects used in this thesis show a reversal of risk integration methods. The removal of any principle of prohibition of urbanization in flood-risk areas leads to the production of new rules in regard to urban forms (sealed buildings, elevated roads ...) and also the obligations relating to the warning and management crisis. In conclusion, our study has shown that once an urban project is completed, the in-habitants will be the ultimate witnesses to the segmentation of the flood risk management. Indeed, receiving information from risk exposure, does not integrate the implications of this exposure - that is to say the role it will have to play in case of flood. More communication would lead to raise the question of responsibilities of each party and would highlight that the risk remains despite protection tools

Managing organisational knowledge is crucial to increase business performance and competitiveness. However, given the complexity and dynamic nature of knowledge management practices, multinational organisations experience difficulties in identifying business opportunities and often fail to make necessary investments. This thesis develops an alternative perspective on knowledge management through the creation of a model based on socio-technical characteristics and organisational ignorance, and argues that managing nescience, i.e. knowing what needs to be known and also acknowledging the power of understanding the unknown, could facilitate employees' knowledge sharing behaviour and could improve both short-term opportunistic value capture and longer term business sustainability. It also creates a novel technique for managing dysfunctional knowledge management scenarios and improving knowledge management practices in the workplace by definition of the concept of KM anti-patterns, while discussing practices that reduce the risk of making the wrong decision when using uncertain information. The philosophy of this study is based on an interpretative approach with inductive reasoning. Both qualitative and quantitative methods, based mainly on workshop style discussions, questionnaires and semi-structured interview data, were implemented using various departments of one multinational organisation within the Aerospace and Defence industry as units of the analysis. Managing organisational ignorance is seldom and insufficiently discussed by the current KM literature and no previous attempt has been made to detect, analyse and categorise KM dysfunctional situations using a systematic KM anti-pattern template. It is argued that the issues addressed in this study could lead to inefficient or otherwise inappropriate KM practices; therefore it is important, particularly for managers and senior executives, to acknowledge, verify and act upon such matters in order to increase performance within their business, and optimise the level of knowledge for an individual employee or group in knowledge intensive settings.

Patients who self-harm reported negative staff attitudes towards them on presentation to an Emergency Department (ED). The present research aims to explore staff attitudes and behaviours (own and perception of others’) and the impact of this on behaviour, barriers and facilitators of effective treatment, and team identification and norms. Ten staff members from one ED were interviewed, representing all major professional groups working non-therapeutically in the ED. A thematic framework analysis was applied and cross-referenced with another researcher and participants for validation. Analysis identified the following themes: Beliefs about self-harm, attitudes and behaviours, influences on behaviour, and identity, culture and role; related through an overarching theme of balancing difference and diversity. Evidence of PI was found, although interviewees were able to accurately recognise a mixture of beliefs and attitudes in both themselves and others. Influences on behaviour and identity were important in gaining a contextual perspective, and the concept of a ‘fluid team’, relating to patient needs, was highlighted. Results suggest that exposure of the phenomenon of PI may be useful, in conjunction with training to minimise feelings of failure/frustration. This could increase understanding and improve patient care; however, further research is required prior to this. Team stability must, however, be considered. Limitations included restricted participation across one ED and a powerful advocate for mental health patients. Although this is positive for the department, it may set it apart from others.