Telle qu’elle est conçue à l’origine par les jurisconsultes romains, la distinction entre fait etdroit a une fonction méthodologique. Elle oppose, pour l’essentiel, deux types d’enquêtes dont peutdépendre la résolution d’un conflit en justice. L’une a une portée générale, la quaestio iuris ; l’autrene regarde que la seule espèce en cause, la quaestio facti. Les juristes apprécient, suivant chaquesituation envisagée, celle des deux approches qui résoudra le litige de la manière la plusconvaincante.Leurs réflexions sont conditionnées, à cet égard, par les difficultés que suscite l’interpretatiofacti. Le risque de dissoudre l’expression du ius dans l’extraordinaire disparité des faits inciteparfois à privilégier des raisonnements de portée générale. La démarche se caractérise alors par soncaractère artificiel : le fait envisagé est, dans cette hypothèse, le fruit d’une construction. Par uneffort de définition, chaque circonstance est réduite en une notion générique, avant d’êtreconfrontée à la règle de droit. La qualification est alors proprement juridique : elle permet derésoudre le conflit dans le cadre d’une quaestio iuris.Cependant, certaines situations concrètes, par leur singularité, rendent de tels raisonnementsinadaptés. Aussi une autre approche est-elle parfois privilégiée. Elle suppose d’étendre les pouvoirsde l’interprète, en lui permettant d’apprécier chaque circonstance en cause dans le cadre d’unexamen d’espèce. La qualification procède alors d’une quaestio facti. Cette démarche caractérise laprotection prétorienne de la possession ; elle inspire surtout, en substance, la concession des actionsin factum. / As originally conceived by Roman jurists, the distinction between fact and law has amethodological purpose. It confronts, essentially, two types of inquiries used to resolve a dispute incourt. One is general in scope, the quaestio iuris ; the other pertains only to a single case, thequaestio facti. According to each situation, jurists assess the approach that will resolve the disputein the most convincing way.Their thoughts are conditioned, in this respect, by the complexity of interpretatio facti. Therisk of dissolving the ius in the extraordinary disparity of facts may at times lead to a reasoning thatis general in scope. The approach is then artificial : the fact is considered, in this case, as a result ofa construction. A definition allows each circumstance to be reduced to a generic concept, beforebeing confronted to the legal rule. In this case, the evaluation is precisely legal : it resolves theconflict in the frame of a quaestio iuris.However, such appreciation may be inadequate for certain singular situations. Thereforeanother approach is sometimes favored. It involves extending the powers of the interpreter in orderto assess a circumstance through the examination of each concrete case. The evaluation is thencarried out within the quaestio facti framework. This characterizes the Praetorian protection ofpossession, and inspires above all, in essence, the concession of actiones in factum.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vitor Martins Flores.pdf: 1799128 bytes, checksum: 693a95ff3a84a83754c0575e6c22d846 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-06 / The purpose of this study is to investigate and demonstrate scientific a method for assessing the legitimacy of the modification of the legal concept of profits , as defined by corporate law, for corporate income tax purposes. By proposing objective parameters for assessing the limits which the tax legislation may modify the concept of profits, we construct a useful tool for endorse or refuse such modifications. For achieving this goal, the study investigates how the interpretation of tax law interacts with the legal presumptions and legal fictions / O objetivo deste trabalho é o de investigar e demonstrar cientificamente um método para avaliar a legitimidade jurídica da atribuição de efeitos quantitativos ao lucro contábil-societário pela legislação do Imposto sobre a Renda, para fins de apuração do novo lucro para efeitos tributários, o lucro real . Com a definição de parâmetros objetivos para avaliar os limites em que a legislação fiscal pode partir de um conceito ou um instituto de direito privado para atribuir-lhe efeitos que lhes altere a substância, espera-se criar um instrumento de justificação dessas modificações quando legítimas ou para a sua oposição quando contrárias à Constituição e a outros princípios legais positivados. Para atingir esse objetivo, o estudo adota como método a investigação sobre como se relacionam a interpretação do direito tributário com as presunções e ficções jurídicas, de modo a verificar os limites desses efeitos. Ao final, como resultado, propõe-se um método para avaliar a justificação ou refutação dessas tais modificações

Inspiré par une démarche de droit politique, le présent travail se propose d’envisager la fiction en droit à travers le prisme inédit de la légitimité, afin d’étudier sous un angle théorique son utilité dans la constitution de la réalité juridique, c’est-à-dire dans les fondations du droit en vigueur. Caractérisée en référence à la réalité politique, la fiction constituante est une technique justificative dont la fonction relève soit de la connaissance, soit du gouvernement. En tant qu’instrument de connaissance, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’épistémologie du positivisme juridique, et sert à reléguer la légitimité en son sens le plus profondément politique à une simple affaire de "Sein", c’est-à-dire « extra-juridique » ; tel est notamment l’objet de la "Grundnorm" de Kelsen. Le propos de la première partie de ce travail est de montrer que cet isolement de la chose juridique empêche d’approfondir la connaissance de ses fondations ; ce faisant, il s’agira de poser les bases de ce que pourrait être une épistémologie de droit politique. En tant qu’instrument de gouvernement, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’État, et sert à légitimer l’exercice du pouvoir politique par le biais de la représentation. En s’appuyant sur des auteurs classiques tels que Hobbes, Locke et Rousseau, le propos de la seconde partie de ce travail est de montrer que ce sont les caractéristiques de ce système d’organisation politique, quelle que soit au demeurant la forme de gouvernement retenue, qui rendent nécessaire le recours au registre fictionnel "lato sensu" ; celui-ci étant en effet susceptible de s’inscrire dans trois catégories discursives distinctes : la fiction "stricto sensu", le mensonge ou le mythe. / Following an approach inspired by "droit politique", this work aims at considering legal fiction through the unexplored prism of legitimacy in order to study from a theoretical perspective its utility in creating legal reality, i.e. in founding the law in force. Defined through its relation to political reality, constituent fiction is a technique of justification and its function is either a matter of knowledge or of government. As an instrument of knowledge, constituent fiction is at the core of the epistemology of legal positivism. It is used to relegate legitimacy, in its most political sense, to a simple matter of "Sein, i.e". to an “extra legal” matter, as it is notably the case of Kelsen’s "Grundnorm". The first part of this work aims at showing that this isolation of law prevents a deeper understanding of its foundations. In doing so, we will try to lay the grounds for what could be an epistemology of "droit politique". As an instrument of government, constituent fiction is at the core of the State. It is used to legitimize the exercise of political power by the means of representation. Relying on the classical works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the second part of this study aims at identifying the characteristics of this system of political organization that makes recourse to fiction a necessity; whatever the form of government chosen. This recourse to fiction, considered here in its broadest sense, can relate to three distinct discursive models: fiction in its strictest sense, falsehood, or myth.

This thesis deals with one of the modern topics of international law - diplomatic protection. It provides for its comprehensive assessment from a wider and deeper perspective on the background of the codification process, which culminated in 2006, when the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted 19 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. In the current state of international law, diplomatic protection is based on customary international law. It is an instrument to protect nationals (be it a natural or legal person) by their state of nationality, if they injured by another (host) state in violation of international law. Under the current definition, diplomatic protection means the invocation (through peaceful means) by a state of the responsibility of another state for an injury caused to a national by an internationally wrongful act of that another state. The aim of diplomatic protection is to implement this responsibility. The application and exercise of diplomatic protection is considered to be a sovereign, discretional right of the state, although the thesis points out the some recent developments in international law towards the need to recognize the rights and interests of the individual, as well as the constitutional practice of some states guaranteeing its citizens a (domestic) right to...