John Rawls was a political philosopher who proposed a theory centered around the idea of justice as fairness. His primary concern was social justice, so more specifically, he proposed a basic structure for society that ensures major social institutions like the government fairly distribute fundamental rights and duties and optimally divide advantages brought about by social cooperation. His theory is based on the idea that the correct principles to use for the basic structure of society are those that free and rational people would agree to in attempt to advance their own self-interest from a fair and equal starting position. Rawls proposes three principles that he believes people would agree to in this situation and describes what a society based on these principles would look like. Throughout this paper, I will attempt to explain Rawls’s “Theory of Justice” and defend various aspect of the theory against common objections.

This thesis explores the topic of decision under conditions of complete uncertainty, advocating an interdisciplinary perspective that benefits from the insights of both economists and philosophers. Thus far, most of the results in the field have been the work of economists who have been responsible for important theorems and axiomatic characterizatoins of a variety of decision rules. While proceeding from a different methodology and focus, tantalizingly similar conjectures have been made by philosophical logicians. While the work of the latter has not (yet) become as advanced in deriving important theorems, I suggest that philosophers have something useful to offer in their method of analysis that would be useful in evaluating the different solutions to standard problems in the field. I attempt to provide a new solution motivated by both disciplines.

Ever since Rawls published The Theory of Justice (1971/2009), the theory itself, along with many of its components, have been subject to intense debate. Both the "original position" and the "veil of ignorance" have been argued to be too unrealistic since the restriction on information makes it impossible to apply in the real world. Furthermore, it is argued that this restriction is too extensive, in that it excludes information that is necessary for making a just decision, and thus, that it contravenes fundamental egalitarian principles, making it less just than it should be. However, there still seems to be something appealing about the concept of the veil of ignorance and results from various experiments that have used it have shown results that indicate it has an effect, which implies that the concept might have some use after all. In this paper, I will argue for a modified version of Rawls' veil of ignorance that, while limited in its available applications, might both serve a practical use in society to increase justice and have a low risk of obtaining inegalitarian results. I will do this by first summarizing Rawls' theory of justice with a focus on his veil of ignorance. Second, I will present and discuss the critiques from various philosophers. Third, I will discuss the implications of several experiments that make use of the veil of ignorance, including the issue that these experiments are 'one-shot', or single iteration, experiments. Finally, I will detail my version of the veil of ignorance and explain why it both meets the critiques of the original veil of ignorance and could potentially serve a practical use in society.

This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first provides a novel analysis of dynamic optimal taxation under the assumption that individuals in an economy have ‘hidden’ idiosyncratic productivity levels. Specifically, it shows how to derive a complete set of optimality conditions characterising the solution to a problem of this kind. The method relies on constructing perturbations to the consumption-output allocations of agents in a manner that preserves all relevant incentive compatibility restrictions. We are able to use it to generalise the ‘inverse Euler condition’ to cases in which preferences are non-separable between consumption and labour supply, and to prove a number of novel results about optimal income and savings tax wedges. The second main part investigates a more general problem. When policymakers are constrained in their present choices by expectations of future outcomes a well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making: the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time are not in agreement with one another, because of differences in the constraints faced by each. We present a new approach to determining policy in this setting, based on asking: What policy would be chosen by a decisionmaker who did not know the time period in which their choice was to be implemented? This is akin to designing institutions from behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’. The theory is used to obtain qualitative policy prescriptions across a number of environments; these policies have several appealing properties that we outline.

Aging-friendliness work uses a model of eight core domains to assess and achieve communities in which people are more equipped to age well, and remain in their community as they age. These domains are broken into the built environment (i.e., Housing, Transportation) and the social environment (i.e., Communication, Social Inclusion, Employment). This dissertation is centered on the efforts to make communities more aging-friendly, and focuses specifically on the Livable Lexington initiative. This dissertation utilized an exploratory study of a pre- and posttest evaluative design to pilot intergenerational discussion groups as a potential intervention. Intergenerational discussion groups were developed with the goal of changing community members’ perceptions of how aging-friendly their community is, and were a way of operationalizing Rawlsian concepts such as the Veil of Ignorance and Wide Reflective Equilibrium, with the end goal of Intergenerational Equity. The three outcome variables in the study were perceptions of 1) ability to age in place, with regard to domains, 2) overall aging-friendliness, and 3) ability to engage and participate in community activities (such as decision making). Recruited from an initial aging-friendly needs assessment developed by AARP, the intergenerational discussion groups (n = 40) exposed participants to an environment that allowed them to lead discussion around what would make their assigned core domains (i.e, housing, transportation, social inclusion, communication, employment, etc.) more aging-friendly. Participants in the discussion groups perceived a greater ability to age in place, with respect to the social environment (p < .001), as well as a greater ability to engage and participate in community activities (p < .001). Additionally, participants perceived their community as more aging-friendly after the intervention (p < .001). The participants, however, did not perceive a greater ability to age in place, with regard to the built environment (p < .001). Throughout the discussion, the results are tied back into the literature and theory, and reasons for the adverse result in the built environment are also discussed (while more time is often necessary to notice changes in the built environment). Implications for this research, as well as future recommendations are discussed, as well.

This thesis consists of several independent papers in population ethics. I begin in Chapter 1 by critiquing some well-known 'impossibility theorems', which purport to show there can be no intuitively satisfactory population axiology. I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to escape or at least mitigate the effects of these theorems. In particular, in Chapter 2, I argue that certain of the impossibility theorems have little more dialectical force than sorites arguments do. From these negative arguments I move to positive ones. In Chapter 3, I justify the use of a 'veil of ignorance', starting from three more basic normative principles. This leads to positive arguments for various kinds of utilitarianism - the best such arguments I know. But in general the implications of the veil depend on how one answers what I call 'the risky existential question': what is the value to an individual of a chance of non-existence? I chart out the main options, and raise some puzzles for non-comparativism, the view that life is incomparable to non-existence. Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the consequences for population ethics of the idea that what is normatively relevant is not personal identity, but a degreed relation of psychological connectedness. In particular, I pursue a strategy based in population ethics for understanding the controversial 'time-relative interests' account of the badness of death.

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Everyone will probably be given healthcare at some point in life, and might ask themselves how and why the healthcare is distributed the way it is in Swedish society. I also believe this is a matter where one would like the distribution of healthcare to be just. When I have read about different distribution theories, I have noticed similarities between the healthcare in Sweden and Rawls theory of justice, and the aim of this paper is to compare the Swedish ethical consideration on healthcare distribution with Rawls’s ideas. I find the three ethical principles stated by the Swedish Health Care and Medical Priorities Commission conform quite well with Rawls’s two principles of justice. They agree on equal healthcare distribution of resources on a population scale and that the ones in most need should be prioritised. Although, Rawls and Norman Daniels believe that only the equal opportunity to healthcare in order to strive for one’s life plans is valued, while the ethical principle of Swedish healthcare also adds an egalitarian adjustment of resources to people not living healthy. Normans’ interpretation of Rawls ideas argues to elevate individuals’ health to what is thought of as normal biological functioning, while my interpretation of Swedish ethical principles do not forbid elevating beyond the normal functioning. It might be impossible to make an ideal distribution of healthcare completely just, but I believe the Swedish healthcare distribution would be more just if it adheres more to Rawls’s principle of justice.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.