<p>This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification.</p> / <p>Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.</p>

This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification. / Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.

John Rawls developed principles of justice to guide the fair allocation of resources in a society. However, his principles did not take into consideration a society’s differing health needs. Norman Daniels attempted to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to apply to the allocation of health resources. In Just Health, Daniels argued that, under certain circumstances, an age-based allocation of health resources can be prudent. He proposed the Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) to defend age-rationing against claims that it would lead to favoring one age-group over another. In this paper, I analyze Daniels’s PLA and argue that societal aging poses a significant threat to its effectiveness. I then examine and critique alternate theories to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to account for health, specifically those proposed by Dennis McKerlie and Hugh Lazenby.

In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.

I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis looks at fundamental disagreements about the role of society in the delivery of health care services. In particular, it develops an argument for viewing health care as a human right, and in doing so, argues that society is at least partially responsible for the health of its members. In the first section of the thesis, I argue that health is a human need, and that the institutional goal of health care is to restore to an individual their health. As an institution, health care is a primary social good and, as such, it ought to be afforded the same institutional protections as other primary social goods, and encoded as a “human right.” In the second section, I tackle the “Difficult Costs” objection, noting that while there is high financial cost associated with the provision of health care services, the moral and social cost of not providing health care and viewing it as a human right far outweighs the financial costs. With another appeal to Rawlsian principles, by way of reflective equilibrium, I argue that the design of an institution is paramount to the cost-effective distribution of health care resources in accordance with the view that health care is a human right. In the final section, I acknowledge that the objections to health care as a human right should be taken seriously, and that they form the basis of the limits to this right. I argue that any right to health care cannot be extended beyond the restoration of basic, species-typical normal human function. I acknowledge that the Rawlsian ideal has difficulty rendering decisions where priority is a central concern. Finally, I suggest that these limitations can be overcome when the right to health care is viewed as progressively realizable, in conjunction with other basic human rights.

This thesis aims to contribute to Norman Daniels&#039 / expansion of Rawls&#039 / theory of Justice as Fairness to health care by considering individual responsibility in maintaining and restoring health. The thesis also considers transplantation as a special case and develops a Rawlsian model for transplantation.

Everyone will probably be given healthcare at some point in life, and might ask themselves how and why the healthcare is distributed the way it is in Swedish society. I also believe this is a matter where one would like the distribution of healthcare to be just. When I have read about different distribution theories, I have noticed similarities between the healthcare in Sweden and Rawls theory of justice, and the aim of this paper is to compare the Swedish ethical consideration on healthcare distribution with Rawls’s ideas. I find the three ethical principles stated by the Swedish Health Care and Medical Priorities Commission conform quite well with Rawls’s two principles of justice. They agree on equal healthcare distribution of resources on a population scale and that the ones in most need should be prioritised. Although, Rawls and Norman Daniels believe that only the equal opportunity to healthcare in order to strive for one’s life plans is valued, while the ethical principle of Swedish healthcare also adds an egalitarian adjustment of resources to people not living healthy. Normans’ interpretation of Rawls ideas argues to elevate individuals’ health to what is thought of as normal biological functioning, while my interpretation of Swedish ethical principles do not forbid elevating beyond the normal functioning. It might be impossible to make an ideal distribution of healthcare completely just, but I believe the Swedish healthcare distribution would be more just if it adheres more to Rawls’s principle of justice.