No description available.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-27T14:41:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-william-tito-schuman-marinho.pdf: 1564748 bytes, checksum: 901cf14e5cdf77cf922cb8a7fc6e229a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-27T15:09:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-william-tito-schuman-marinho.pdf: 1564748 bytes, checksum: 901cf14e5cdf77cf922cb8a7fc6e229a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-27T15:09:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-william-tito-schuman-marinho.pdf: 1564748 bytes, checksum: 901cf14e5cdf77cf922cb8a7fc6e229a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-18 / A ideia central da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, a justiça como equidade, como elaborada desde os seus escritos iniciais até a “edição-tradução revista” de A theory of justice, é apresentar uma concepção de justiça que generalize e eleve a um nível mais alto de abstração a tradicional concepção do contrato social, tal como estabelecida por Locke, Rousseau e Kant. O contrato social, no entanto, é substituído por uma situação inicial que contém certas restrições (sobre a concepção de bem e pelo véu de ignorância) aos argumentos, com o objetivo de conduzir as partes a um consenso justo sobre princípios de justiça. Essa interpretação (mais geral e abstrata da concepção do contrato social) é alcançada por intermédio da ideia, tanto intuitiva, quanto fundamental e de justificação, da posição original. A posição original é apresentada como artifício hipotético e heurístico de representação, verdadeiro experimento do pensamento, e a sua construção é analisada segundo suas categorias próprias. Em linhas gerais, é ela uma situação hipotética de liberdade igual (definição) sobre o justo no status quo que, semelhante ao estado de natureza do contrato social (fundamento filosófico), assegura que pessoas livres e iguais (pressupostos), de forma racional, na condição de representantes dos cidadãos de uma sociedade bem-ordenada, sob um véu de ignorância (característica), escolham certa concepção de justiça, com a finalidade de chegar a um consenso sobre os princípios de justiça para a regulação, na cooperação entre todos, da estrutura básica da sociedade (objetivo). A perspectiva adotada na pesquisa é tanto histórica quanto interpretativa. É sugerida, logo na Introdução, uma reanálise da leitura da obra de John Rawls, considerando-a, na perspectiva histórico-evolutiva, não segundo sua “data de publicação”, mas segundo a “evolução de seus conceitos”. Por isso, a edição-revista de A theory of justice e Justice as fairness: A restatement, sob tal justificativa, são realocadas. No Capítulo 1 é apresentada uma visão geral sobre os pontos de vistas morais adotados, como justificativas, pela justiça como equidade. No Capítulo 2 é iniciada a descrição da “evolução conceitual” da posição original, segundo os escritos iniciais de John Rawls, em consideração aos anos de 1950 até 1971. Neste período são apresentados os elementos estruturais da posição original. No Capítulo 3 é analisada a posição original como estabelecida em A theory of justice, nos aspectos que diferem dos escritos anteriores e no que veio a ser considerado como mais polêmico. A “natureza” da posição original como “experimento do pensamento” é discutida. O Capítulo 4 retoma a descrição da “evolução conceitual” da posição original, mas, agora, a partir dos escritos posteriores a 1971, e institui um diálogo das ideias de John Rawls com outros, a partir de seus esclarecimentos, de suas réplicas e de suas (eventuais) revisões, considerando as críticas que lhe foram dirigidas após a edição original de A theory of justice até 1975, ano de publicação da sua “edição-tradução revista” em alemão. Como Conclusão, sugiro que a posição original, ao menos até 1975, é essencial ao sistema filosófico sobre a justiça de John Rawls; porém, isolada, é insuficiente para, no seu plano, justificar, seja inicialmente, a escolha dos dois princípios de justiça da justiça como equidade, ou, seja posteriormente, estabilizá-los. A justiça como equidade, nestas duas etapas ou graus de justificação, de escolha e de estabilidade – e sem considerar o “giro” do liberalismo político –, além da posição original, necessita, como “complemento”, de outras ideias fundamentais: a de pessoa, a de sociedade bem-ordenada e a de equilíbrio reflexivo. / The central idea of John Rawls’ theory of justice, the justice as fairness, as elaborated from his first writings up to the “translated-edition revised” of A theory of justice, is to present a conception of justice that generalizes and elevates to a higher level of abstraction the traditional concept of social contract, such as established by Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The social contract, however, is replaced by an initial situation that contains certain restrictions (about the conception of good and by the veil of ignorance) to the arguments, with the purpose of conducting the parties to a fair consensus about the principles of justice. This interpretation (more general and abstract of the conception of social contract) is reached through the idea, both intuitive and fundamental, and of justification of the original position. The original position is presented as hypothetical and heuristic artifice of representation, a real thought experiment, and its construction is analyzed according to its own categories. In outline, it is a hypothetical situation of equal liberty (definition) about the just in the status quo that, similar to the state of nature of the social contract (philosophical fundament), assures that free and equal persons (presuppositions), in a rational way, in the condition of representatives of citizens of a well-ordered society, under the veil of ignorance (characteristic), choose certain conception of justice, with the purpose of reaching a consensus about the principles of justice for the regulation, in the cooperation among all, of the basic structure of society (objective). The perspective adopted in the research is both historical and interpretative. It is suggested, soon in the Introduction, a re-analysis of the reading of John Rawls’s work, considering it, in the historicalevolutional perspective, not according to “the date of its publication”, but according to the “evolution of their concepts”. For that reason, the revised-edition of A theory of justice and Justice as fairness: A restatement, under such justification, are relocated. On Chapter 1 is presented a general view about the moral point of views adopted, as justifications, by the justice as fairness. On Chapter 2 is initiated a description of the “conceptual evolution” of the original position, according to John Rawls’s initial writings, in consideration to years 1950 to 1971. In that period, the structural elements of the original position are presented. On Chapter 3 is analyzed the original position as established in the A theory of justice, in the aspects that differ from previous writings and which came to be considered as the most controversial. The “nature” of original position as “thought experiment” is discussed. The Chapter 4 retakes the description of the “conceptual evolution” of the original position, but now beginning from writings after 1971 and establishes a dialogue of John Rawls’s ideas with others, starting from his explanations, his replies and his (eventual) revisions, considering the critiques directed to him after the original edition of A theory of justice, up to 1975, year of the publication of the “translatededition revised” in German. As Conclusion, I suggest that the original position, at least until 1975, it is essential to the John Rawls’s philosophical system about justice; however, isolated, it is not sufficient to, in his plan, justify, be initially, the choice of the two principles of justice of the justice as fairness, or, be later, to stabilize them. The justice as fairness, in these two stages or justifications degrees, of choice and of stability – and without considering the political liberalism’s “turn” – besides the original position, needs, as “complement”, of other fundamental ideas: of person, of well-ordered society and of reflective equilibrium.

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 17 / Milton Valente / Uma distribuição de renda mais justa tem sido debatida como forma de viabilizar as sociedades democráticas com características liberais. O problema a ser examinado nesta investigação é justamente as possibilidades que têm os governos chamados liberais, de promoverem reformas que resultem em tais possibilidades. Neste sentido, nós estaremos dando enfoque à obra Uma teoria da justiça do filósofo norte-americano John Rawls. Inserida na tradição contratualista, elabora uma proposta de justiça como eqüidade, colocando-se como uma alternativa à doutrina utilitarista. Governos democráticos, conforme Rawls, devem ser garantidores de políticas públicas que tenham como conseqüência uma firme justiça distributiva. Esses governos devem ser plurais, e conflitos de ordem filosófica, moral ou religiosa não devem impedir um acordo razoável como forma de viabilizar a estrutura básica da sociedade. Utilizando-se de um artifício racional, em que os acordos celebrados são válidos para todos, Rawls cria o artifício da posição ori / A fairer income distribution has been debated as a way of making viable the democratic societies with liberal characteristics. The problem to be examined in this investigation is exatly the possibilities that the governments called liberal have, promoting reforms that result in such possibilities. In this way, we will be giving focus on the work A theory of justice from the American philosopher Jhon Rawls. Inserted in the contractualist traditions, it elaborates a justice as fairness, placing itself as an alternative to the utilitarian doctrine. The democratic governments, according to Rawls, must ensure that public politics have a consistent distributive justice as a consequence. These governments must be plural, and conflits of philosophical, moral or religious order must not prevent a reasonable agreement as a way of making viable a basic structure of the society. Using a rational artifice in which the agreementes are valid for everyone, Rawls creates the artifice of original position. In this situation th

Ce mémoire examine le rôle de la diversité dans une conception de la justice. Je débute en considérant l’abstraction de la différence impliquée dans le raisonnement utilisé pour arriver à une conception de la justice. Par la suite j’évalue le rôle des différences des groupes sociaux dans l’application des principes de justice, en considérant si la justice exige des droits individuels ou si les groupes peuvent revendiquer des droits différenciés. Ce mémoire utilise la position originale de John Rawls pour évaluer la première question, et sa conception de la personne et des groupes sociaux pour examiner la deuxième. Je soutiens que nous pouvons et devrions utiliser l’abstraction de la position originale, tant que nous sommes conscients de ses limites. Bien que sa conception politique de la personne soit également utile pour la défense des droits individuels, sa conception du groupe social n’est pas appropriée pour les groupes culturels ou historiquement opprimés, car il repose trop lourdement sur la notion d’association volontaire. J’analyse l’argument de Will Kymlicka concernant les droits minoritaires et j’enrichis la théorie de Rawls en ajoutant l’inégalité entre groupes. Je termine en examinant les problèmes concernant les minorités à l’intérieur des groupes minoritaires et conclue que les droits minoritaires ne sont justifiées que lorsqu’ils sont compatibles avec les droits individuels, et non pas quand ils renforcent une autre inégalité. Par conséquent, même si l’abstraction au niveau théorique est justifiée, les droits des groupes minoritaires exigeront qu’on porte une attention aux différences entres groupes, ainsi qu’à l’intérieur de ceux-ci. / This thesis examines the role of diversity in a conception of justice. I begin by considering the abstraction from difference involved in the reasoning used to arrive at a conception of justice. I then evaluate the role of social group difference in the application of principles of justice, considering whether justice demands principles that are the same for all in the form of individual rights or whether groups can claim differentiated rights. This thesis uses John Rawls’s original position to evaluate the first question, and his account of the self and social group to discuss the second. I argue that we can and should use the abstraction of the original position, so long as we are aware of its limits. While Rawls’s political conception of the self is also useful for defending individual rights, his account of the social group is inappropriate for cultural or historically oppressed groups, as it relies too heavily on the notion of voluntary association. I follow Will Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights and extend Rawls's theory to consider inequality between groups. I close by considering concerns regarding minorities within minorities, and conclude that minority rights are only justified when they are consistent with individual rights, not when they reinforce a different inequality. Therefore, even though the abstraction at the theoretical level is justified, minority rights for groups will require attention to the differences between groups, as well as within them.

There is circumstantial and scientific evidence of nepotism in Europe and USA, and among politicians, judges and other elites. Despite this, an access to positions of power in a liberal democracy is restricted in the sense that occupational following in the offices is subject to public scrutiny. There is a conflict between a personal obligation to promote one's kin and a public obligation to promote liberty. This public duty emerges from a duty to allow access to offices of power to those who have the misfortune of not being born as dynastic followers. It is based on John Rawls's original position which is a thought experiment establishing an impartial environment to detect chief principles adjudicating conflicts of moral doctrines, fairly. In it, the condition of impartiality is achieved by means which are found in this dissertation to be excessive. Its blanked ban on biases immolates even those biases which contribute to fairness, despite their partiality. When nepotism is partly considered an expression of altruism, it shows a capacity to increase cohesion, impede free-driving and improve economy. In order to preserve these virtues, an improved condition of impartiality is offered to enhance Rawls's theory and to classify instances of nepotism according to their effects on improving or hampering...

This thesis attempts to provide a coherent view of the idea of ‘justice as fairness’ and, in particular, the ‘difference principle’ expressed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The main focus of the thesis is the difference principle and its limits. Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ is based on the thought experiment of the ‘original position’ in which people, considered as free and equal, deliberate under an imagined ‘veil of ignorance,’ i.e. not knowing which social roles or status they would occupy in their society. Rawls then argues that in the original position people come up with two major principles of justice, understood as principles that would be acceptable to people treated as free and equal. The second principle entails the so-called ‘difference principle,’ according to which the inequalities of, say, wealth and authority are just and fair only if they lead to compensating benefits for everybody and particularly the least advantaged. The thesis proceeds, then, by probing whether compared with other theories, , including a discussion of Dahl’s theory of democracy, Rawls’s difference principle could be a proper answer to one of the main questions of social justice. The questions is: how the economic fortune in a society should be distributed among citizens. However, despite Rawls’s aim to develop the difference principle as a practical normative theory, it fails to give us a pragmatic answer. The reason is: the statement of the difference principle fails to take into account one crucial point: to wit, the matter of time. The thesis develops two empirical economic scenarios to illustrate that there is a trade-off between the interests of the poor in short and long period of time. However, this important issue is not considered and discussed by Rawls which makes the theory inapplicable.

O presente trabalho busca elidir o verdadeiro significa do ideal de justiça distributiva com vistas à criação de um paradigma ético apto a orientar a adoção de políticas públicas e, ao mesmo tempo, ser o vetor interpretativo da sua eficácia e resultados práticos. Com bases nas premissas teóricas assentadas na basilar obra Uma Teoria da Justiça de John Rawls, busca-se discutir qual é o verdadeiro significado da equidade onde os bens primários sociais são divididos de uma forma tão desigual e como a adoção de políticas públicas orientadas por uma vertente substantiva da justiça pode ser um novo paradigma apto a orientar esta dinâmica. Ultrapassada esta linha de argumentação inicial, o trabalho desdobra-se na busca pelo verdadeiro significado de meritocracia, assentada, ainda uma vez, na distribuição desigual de bens primários sociais ou, simplesmente, na divisão desigual de oportunidades. Nesta ordem de convicções, busca-se afirmar que para haver de fato- a meritocracia é necessário haver um ambiente que propicie igualdade de oportunidades para que cada indivíduo singular possa buscar desenvolver seus projetos de vida de acordo com seu esforço e talento individuais. Por fim, as políticas públicas distributivas podem ser o instrumento que materialize este ideal, desde que sejam orientadas por premissas que privilegiem a vertente substantiva da Justiça e que a partir de uma perspectiva crítica da desigualdade possam buscar a distribuição justa dos bens primários sociais. / The present work intends to clarify the true meaning of the ideal of distributive justice with the aim of creating an ethical paradigm able to orient the implementation of public policies, in addition to serve as an interpretation guideline of its effectiveness and practical results. Based on the theoretical premises set forth on the fundamental work A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls we seek to discuss the true meaning of equity where the primary social goods are distributed in an very unequal way and how the adoption of public policies oriented by a substantive perspective of justice may become a new paradigm to orient this dynamics. Succeeding this initial line of argument, this work develops into the search of the true meaning of meritocracy, founded, once again, on the unequal distribution of primary social goods or, simply, on the uneven division of opportunities. In the context of these beliefs, we seek to assert that in order to exist in fact meritocracy, it is necessary to have an environment which promotes equal opportunities so that each singular person may seek to develop their life project in accordance with their efforts and individual talents. Finally, distributive public policies may be the instrument to materialize this ideal as long as it is oriented by premises which favor the substantive perspective of Justice and that from a critical view of inequality may pursue a just distribution of primary social.

O presente trabalho busca elidir o verdadeiro significa do ideal de justiça distributiva com vistas à criação de um paradigma ético apto a orientar a adoção de políticas públicas e, ao mesmo tempo, ser o vetor interpretativo da sua eficácia e resultados práticos. Com bases nas premissas teóricas assentadas na basilar obra Uma Teoria da Justiça de John Rawls, busca-se discutir qual é o verdadeiro significado da equidade onde os bens primários sociais são divididos de uma forma tão desigual e como a adoção de políticas públicas orientadas por uma vertente substantiva da justiça pode ser um novo paradigma apto a orientar esta dinâmica. Ultrapassada esta linha de argumentação inicial, o trabalho desdobra-se na busca pelo verdadeiro significado de meritocracia, assentada, ainda uma vez, na distribuição desigual de bens primários sociais ou, simplesmente, na divisão desigual de oportunidades. Nesta ordem de convicções, busca-se afirmar que para haver de fato- a meritocracia é necessário haver um ambiente que propicie igualdade de oportunidades para que cada indivíduo singular possa buscar desenvolver seus projetos de vida de acordo com seu esforço e talento individuais. Por fim, as políticas públicas distributivas podem ser o instrumento que materialize este ideal, desde que sejam orientadas por premissas que privilegiem a vertente substantiva da Justiça e que a partir de uma perspectiva crítica da desigualdade possam buscar a distribuição justa dos bens primários sociais. / The present work intends to clarify the true meaning of the ideal of distributive justice with the aim of creating an ethical paradigm able to orient the implementation of public policies, in addition to serve as an interpretation guideline of its effectiveness and practical results. Based on the theoretical premises set forth on the fundamental work A Theory of Justice, by John Rawls we seek to discuss the true meaning of equity where the primary social goods are distributed in an very unequal way and how the adoption of public policies oriented by a substantive perspective of justice may become a new paradigm to orient this dynamics. Succeeding this initial line of argument, this work develops into the search of the true meaning of meritocracy, founded, once again, on the unequal distribution of primary social goods or, simply, on the uneven division of opportunities. In the context of these beliefs, we seek to assert that in order to exist in fact meritocracy, it is necessary to have an environment which promotes equal opportunities so that each singular person may seek to develop their life project in accordance with their efforts and individual talents. Finally, distributive public policies may be the instrument to materialize this ideal as long as it is oriented by premises which favor the substantive perspective of Justice and that from a critical view of inequality may pursue a just distribution of primary social.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rosane Terezinha Felipe.pdf: 343926 bytes, checksum: 224c503dc3bfd9bea2ea039acc896491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The objective of the present work consists in the investigation and exhibition of the conception of the original position in the theory of justice as fairness, drawn by John Rawls. For that, it is highlighted the way the author exhibits the agreement made in this initial situation of the choice, in other words, the parts symmetrically situated in the original position and covered by the veil of ignorance, that has the function to impede the passage of arbitrary information that can influence in the choice of the principles. Besides, the agreement made in the original position is characterized as hipothetical and non-historical. Rawls, in the subsequent works of A Theory of Justice, emphasizes that the misunderstanding about the hypothetical aspect of this position is due to the fact it isn´t seen as a representation artifice. By this way , in order to understand the argumentation about the original position, it treats the doctrines, in which the theory of justice as fairness, is presented as an alternative, with the intent to contextualize the theory of Rawls. From the works of the own author, it looks for presenting the fundamental ideas and the way how they are linked in this theory. Besides, they are object of study the role and the characteristics of this initial situation of the choice and the principles of justice, as the result of the agreement made between the parts in the original position, are objects of the study. This position is understood as an initial situation of the suitable equality for the choice of the principles, that must specify the fair terms of the society understood as a system of social cooperation. / O objetivo do presente trabalho consiste na investigação e exposição da concepção de posição original na teoria da justiça como eqüidade, elaborada por John Rawls. Para isso, destaca a maneira como o autor expõe o acordo realizado nesta situação inicial de escolha, ou seja, as partes simetricamente situadas na posição original e encobertas pelo véu de ignorância, que tem como função impedir a passagem de informações arbitrárias que possam influenciar na escolha dos princípios. Além disso, o acordo realizado na posição original é caracterizado como hipotético e a-histórico. Rawls, nas obras posteriores a Uma Teoria da Justiça, destaca que o mal-entendido quanto ao aspecto hipotético desta posição está no fato dela não ser vista como um artifício de representação. Desta forma, a fim de compreender a argumentação acerca da posição original, trata-se das doutrinas nas quais a teoria da justiça como eqüidade é apresentada como uma alternativa, com o intuito de contextualizar a teoria de Rawls. A partir das obras do próprio autor, procura apresentar as idéias fundamentais e a forma como estão interligadas nesta teoria. Além disso, são objetos de estudo o papel e as características dessa situação inicial de escolha e os princípios de justiça, como o resultado do acordo realizado entre as partes na posição original. Esta posição é compreendida como uma situação inicial de igualdade adequada para a escolha dos princípios, que devem especificar os termos eqüitativos da sociedade compreendida como um sistema de cooperação social.