M.A. (Philosophy) / In this essay, I draw attention to the negative political effects of contemporary political theory's flight from particularity, and suggest a way of reducing these problems. My argument is structured as follows. Firstly, I draw attention to the increasing tendency to neglect the intermediary role of political theory, and trace this to the influence of positivist philosophies of science, and more particularly to the ways in which this influence has found expression' in the abstract, systematic structure and disengaged orientation of the conception of theory which predominates in contemporary political theory. I argue further, that two negative political effects are encouraged by these structural features of theory: firstly, the abstraction and system of theory encourages an exaggeration of the systematic character of political situations, which in turn results in a diminution of options for change and critique; secondly, the disengaged stance and privileged cognitive status of theory tends to encourage a manipulative political practice. Thus, where political theory's goal is to inform and inspire transformative action, its form or structure tends to undermine this aim. In the second section of this essay, I qualify and specify the above thesis concerning the alienation of contemporary political theory, by assessing the value of Bruce Ackerman's theory of justice as a guide to political action. In the final section, I propose a deliberate retrieval of the narrative dimension of. political theory as a useful way of reducing the alienation of contemporary political theory, showing firstly, how narrative can be related to theory, and secondly, how it can moderate theory's abstract and systematic tendencies without losing critical force.

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Whether Kant’s account of free will is coherent or not depends upon how we interpret him. On the one hand, if we understand Kant as providing some metaphysical solution to the problem of free will, which secures the reality of free will for agents, then his account seems to be incoherent. One the other hand, if we understand Kant’s account as merely providing a defense of the assumption, or idea of freedom for practical purposes, then his account seems to be useful and coherent. I will argue that the latter account of free will is the one that Kant provides in his works, and will illustrate how this account might shed light on to our epistemic limits and our nature as human beings.

<p>I den här uppsatsen diskuteras begreppet paternalism så som det används av Danny Scoccia och Joel Feinberg. Särskilt fokus ligger vid hur man bör definiera mjuk och hård paternalism. Begreppen är viktiga då de är centrala om man vill diskutera kopplingen mellan moral och politik. I denna uppsats är huvudfokus på de moraliska begränsningarna av vad man bör stifta lagar om men det uppstår oundvikligen paralleller till moraliska överväganden av mer privat karaktär. Även om uppsatsen inte lägger fram några argument som slutgiltigt avgör diskussionen bemöts ett antal argument mot Feinbergs teori och stark kritik framförs mot det av Scoccia föreslagna alternativet till definitioner.</p>

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<p>Den här uppsatsen studerar och analyserar begreppen ”determinism”, ”fri vilja” och ”moraliskt ansvar”, speciellt i Leibniz Theodicy. I uppsatsens första del utreds och preciseras begreppen vilket är nödvändigt för att sedan, i andra delen, kunna analysera Leibniz teori utifrån dem. Leibniz utgår från att Gud som har skapat jorden och i och med detta även bestämt alla dess förlopp (den förutbestämda harmonin), han anser dock att detta är förenligt med människans fria vilja. Enligt Leibniz är frihet att handla i enlighet med sin natur. Trots att Leibniz hävdar att alla förlopp är bestämda av Gud anser han att moraliskt ansvar ändå har en plats i teorin. För att kunna hävda det måste han anse att det räcker med hypotetiska alternativ till den utförda handlingen. Uppsatsen uppfattar Leibniz determinism som teologisk determinism, något som utesluter frihet och fri vilja i det avseende som vi avser då vi talar om begreppen till vardags. Uppsatsen visar på problem i Leibniz teori när det gäller moraliskt ansvar och skuld, dessa blir svåra att förstå och motivera i Leibniz redan förutbestämda harmoni.</p> / <p>This paper studies and analyses the concepts of “determinism”, “free will” and “moral responsibility”, particularly in Leibniz’ Theodicy. In the first part of the paper the concepts are investigated and specified, a necessity in order to use them in the second part. There they are the base of the analysis of Leibniz theory. Leibniz assumes that God has created the world all its and courses of events (the pre-established harmony). He thinks this is possible to combine with human free will. According to Leibniz, people are free when they act as they themselves want to. Even though Leibniz argues that all courses of events are determined by God he still believes that his theory admits of moral responsibility. To say this Leibniz must think that it is enough if there are hypothetical alternatives to the preformed action. This paper understands Leibniz’ determinism as a form of theological determinism, something that rules out the possibility of freedom or free will, at least in the sense that we use the concepts on a daily basis. The paper shows problems in Leibniz’ theory when it comes to moral responsibility and guilt. These concepts are hard to understand and motivate in Leibniz pre-established harmony.</p>

<p>The aim of this work is to present and examine the ruling on which the Colombian Constitutional Court declared the blanket criminalization of induced abortion to be unconstitutional: ruling C-355/061; all of this based in the understanding I have achieved of the Courts’ reasoning.</p><p>In the first section I will present the norms that constituted the blanket prohibition of abortion, as well as the likely situation of its practice, both by the time the Constitutional Court took up the analysis of the former. This will provide a good understanding of the importance of the ruling and its starting point. In the second section I will put forth the general nature of the Court and its rulings, inscribed in the Colombian social, political and legal transformation brought by the 1991 constitutional change. I will also bring in the specific decisions the Court made regarding the conditioned constitutionality of induced abortion and the unconstitutionality of the legal expression that equated an abortion performed on a woman less than fourteen years of age to an abortion without consent, thus punishing it harder than a consented one. Such verdict is the starting point of an effort to trace, present and examine the ethical arguments the Court has woven to reach it, all of which will be undertaken in the third section.</p><p>In the fourth section I shall elaborate on two of the common ethical elements that work as corner stones for the Court’s arguments: human dignity and the belief that fundamental rights and constitutional protected goods are not absolute; I will particularly point out how they play a role in the Court’s argumentation. As a conclusion I will offer a final general appraisal of the Court’s work.</p>

The aim of this work is to present and examine the ruling on which the Colombian Constitutional Court declared the blanket criminalization of induced abortion to be unconstitutional: ruling C-355/061; all of this based in the understanding I have achieved of the Courts’ reasoning. In the first section I will present the norms that constituted the blanket prohibition of abortion, as well as the likely situation of its practice, both by the time the Constitutional Court took up the analysis of the former. This will provide a good understanding of the importance of the ruling and its starting point. In the second section I will put forth the general nature of the Court and its rulings, inscribed in the Colombian social, political and legal transformation brought by the 1991 constitutional change. I will also bring in the specific decisions the Court made regarding the conditioned constitutionality of induced abortion and the unconstitutionality of the legal expression that equated an abortion performed on a woman less than fourteen years of age to an abortion without consent, thus punishing it harder than a consented one. Such verdict is the starting point of an effort to trace, present and examine the ethical arguments the Court has woven to reach it, all of which will be undertaken in the third section. In the fourth section I shall elaborate on two of the common ethical elements that work as corner stones for the Court’s arguments: human dignity and the belief that fundamental rights and constitutional protected goods are not absolute; I will particularly point out how they play a role in the Court’s argumentation. As a conclusion I will offer a final general appraisal of the Court’s work.

I denna uppsats granskar jag ett kapitel ur Roger Fjellströms bok Den goda skolan där han behandlar kommunitarismen och för en argumentation kring vad denne teori skulle kunna få för konsekvenser för skolväsendet, främst den fostrande aspekten. För att tydliggöra min granskning av detta har jag delat upp Fjellström argumentation i en tes och tre huvudargument. Tesen testas i första hand genom att jag granskar och bemöter Fjellströms tre huvudargument var för sig i. Fjellström menar att en kommunitaristisk skola löper stor risk att bli en skola som enbart anpassar barn och unga efter den föreliggande gemenskapen vilken denna än är. I min granskning av hans tre huvudargument visar jag dock att de vilar på en för snäv uppfattning om kommunitarismens idéer och därför inte ger stöd åt hans tes.

Den här uppsatsen studerar och analyserar begreppen ”determinism”, ”fri vilja” och ”moraliskt ansvar”, speciellt i Leibniz Theodicy. I uppsatsens första del utreds och preciseras begreppen vilket är nödvändigt för att sedan, i andra delen, kunna analysera Leibniz teori utifrån dem. Leibniz utgår från att Gud som har skapat jorden och i och med detta även bestämt alla dess förlopp (den förutbestämda harmonin), han anser dock att detta är förenligt med människans fria vilja. Enligt Leibniz är frihet att handla i enlighet med sin natur. Trots att Leibniz hävdar att alla förlopp är bestämda av Gud anser han att moraliskt ansvar ändå har en plats i teorin. För att kunna hävda det måste han anse att det räcker med hypotetiska alternativ till den utförda handlingen. Uppsatsen uppfattar Leibniz determinism som teologisk determinism, något som utesluter frihet och fri vilja i det avseende som vi avser då vi talar om begreppen till vardags. Uppsatsen visar på problem i Leibniz teori när det gäller moraliskt ansvar och skuld, dessa blir svåra att förstå och motivera i Leibniz redan förutbestämda harmoni. / This paper studies and analyses the concepts of “determinism”, “free will” and “moral responsibility”, particularly in Leibniz’ Theodicy. In the first part of the paper the concepts are investigated and specified, a necessity in order to use them in the second part. There they are the base of the analysis of Leibniz theory. Leibniz assumes that God has created the world all its and courses of events (the pre-established harmony). He thinks this is possible to combine with human free will. According to Leibniz, people are free when they act as they themselves want to. Even though Leibniz argues that all courses of events are determined by God he still believes that his theory admits of moral responsibility. To say this Leibniz must think that it is enough if there are hypothetical alternatives to the preformed action. This paper understands Leibniz’ determinism as a form of theological determinism, something that rules out the possibility of freedom or free will, at least in the sense that we use the concepts on a daily basis. The paper shows problems in Leibniz’ theory when it comes to moral responsibility and guilt. These concepts are hard to understand and motivate in Leibniz pre-established harmony.