<p>This essay is a philosophical investigation of the relation between children and their play. My aim is to see if children are autonomous when it comes to their play. Is there a moral boundary between those who take part in the play and those who do not? This topic is especially important when it comes to the moral status of a child in the Swedish pre-school. How should educationists act when it comes to children’s play?</p><p>  Through an analysis of the notions of play and autonomy I show that play can be understood as something of a moral value to the child and if children should be seen as autonomous when it comes to their play. In my notional investigation I rely on common sense tradition of the philosophy of ordinary language and I also postulate three values which I state constitutes good play, free consent, respected seclusion and meaningfulness. On my results I base an investigation of the policy document of the Swedish pre-school and an argumentation for the strengthening of the respect towards children’s autonomy and play in the policy as a governing document for the pre-school as an institution. </p> / <p>Den här uppsatsen är en filosofisk undersökning av relationen mellan barn och deras lek. Mitt syfte är att se om barn bör betraktas som autonoma när det kommer till deras lek. Finns det en moralisk barriär mellan dem som leker och det som inte deltar i den? Den frågan är i synnerhet viktig när det kommer till barnets etiska ställning i den svenska förskolan. Hur bör pedagoger och förskolepersonal förhålla sig till barn och deras lek?</p><p>  Genom att analysera begreppen lek och autonomi visar jag att lek är något som är moraliskt värdefullt för barnet och att barnet bör beaktas som autonomt när det kommer till dess lek. I min begreppsliga utredning lutar jag mig mot common sense traditionen i vardagsspråksfilosofin och jag postulerar tre värden vilka jag menar utgör god lek, frivillighet, avskildhet och meningsfullhet. Mina resultat blir till grund för en granskning av den svenska förskolans värdegrund och en argumentation för att respekten för barns självbestämmande och fria lek är något som bör förtydligas i värdegrunden som styrande dokument för verksamheten.</p>

This essay is a philosophical investigation of the relation between children and their play. My aim is to see if children are autonomous when it comes to their play. Is there a moral boundary between those who take part in the play and those who do not? This topic is especially important when it comes to the moral status of a child in the Swedish pre-school. How should educationists act when it comes to children’s play?   Through an analysis of the notions of play and autonomy I show that play can be understood as something of a moral value to the child and if children should be seen as autonomous when it comes to their play. In my notional investigation I rely on common sense tradition of the philosophy of ordinary language and I also postulate three values which I state constitutes good play, free consent, respected seclusion and meaningfulness. On my results I base an investigation of the policy document of the Swedish pre-school and an argumentation for the strengthening of the respect towards children’s autonomy and play in the policy as a governing document for the pre-school as an institution. / Den här uppsatsen är en filosofisk undersökning av relationen mellan barn och deras lek. Mitt syfte är att se om barn bör betraktas som autonoma när det kommer till deras lek. Finns det en moralisk barriär mellan dem som leker och det som inte deltar i den? Den frågan är i synnerhet viktig när det kommer till barnets etiska ställning i den svenska förskolan. Hur bör pedagoger och förskolepersonal förhålla sig till barn och deras lek?   Genom att analysera begreppen lek och autonomi visar jag att lek är något som är moraliskt värdefullt för barnet och att barnet bör beaktas som autonomt när det kommer till dess lek. I min begreppsliga utredning lutar jag mig mot common sense traditionen i vardagsspråksfilosofin och jag postulerar tre värden vilka jag menar utgör god lek, frivillighet, avskildhet och meningsfullhet. Mina resultat blir till grund för en granskning av den svenska förskolans värdegrund och en argumentation för att respekten för barns självbestämmande och fria lek är något som bör förtydligas i värdegrunden som styrande dokument för verksamheten.

I den här uppsatsen diskuteras begreppet paternalism så som det används av Danny Scoccia och Joel Feinberg. Särskilt fokus ligger vid hur man bör definiera mjuk och hård paternalism. Begreppen är viktiga då de är centrala om man vill diskutera kopplingen mellan moral och politik. I denna uppsats är huvudfokus på de moraliska begränsningarna av vad man bör stifta lagar om men det uppstår oundvikligen paralleller till moraliska överväganden av mer privat karaktär. Även om uppsatsen inte lägger fram några argument som slutgiltigt avgör diskussionen bemöts ett antal argument mot Feinbergs teori och stark kritik framförs mot det av Scoccia föreslagna alternativet till definitioner.

Min slutsats vilken jag lägger fram i avsnitt 5 är att kollektiv mycket väl kan vara autonoma agenter. Jag kommer även kortfattat att utveckla ett resonemang kring skillnader i kollektivs och människors moral. Skillnaden kan anses vara en förutsättning för att kollektivet ska kunna uppnå fullständig autonomi eftersom antropocentrisk moral i ett kollektiv kräver mänsklig påverkan.

<p>The subject of this thesis is <i>formal axiology</i>, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on <i>intrinsic</i> or <i>final</i> value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes.</p><p>The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or <i>tropes</i>. Essay 4 defends <i>conditionalism</i> about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism. </p>

The subject of this thesis is formal axiology, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on intrinsic or final value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes. The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or tropes. Essay 4 defends conditionalism about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism.

This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Revised work with minor emendations approved by supervisor. / This dissertation considers three broad issues which emerge from the sustainability discourse. First is the nature of the discourse itself, particularly the underlying philosophical positions which are represented. Second, is the nature of the highly complex types of problem which the discourse exposes. And third is whether the engineering profession, as it is practised currently, is adequate to deal with such problems. The sustainability discourse exposes two distinct, fundamentally irreconcilable philosophical positions. The first, “sustainable development”, considers humanity to be privileged in relation to all other species and ecosystems. It is only incumbent upon us to look after the environment to the extent to which it is in our interests to do so. The second, “sustainability”, sees humanity as having no special moral privilege and recognises the moral status of other species, ecosystems, and even wilderness areas. Thus, sustainability imposes upon us a moral obligation to take their status into account and not to degrade or to destroy them. These two conflicting positions give rise to extremely complex problems. An innovative taxonomy of problem complexity has been developed which identifies three broad categories of problem. Of particular interest in this dissertation is the most complex of these, referred to here as the Type 3 problem. The Type 3 problem recognises the systemic complexity of the problem situation but also includes differences of the domain of interests as a fundamental, constituent part of the problem itself. Hence, established systems analysis techniques and reductionist approaches do not work. The domain of interests will typically have disparate ideas and positions, which may be entirely irreconcilable. The dissertation explores the development of philosophy of science, particularly in the last 70 years. It is noted that, unlike the philosophy of science, the philosophy of engineering has not been influenced by developments of critical theory, cultural theory, and postmodernism, which have had significant impact in late 20th-century Western society. This is seen as a constraint on the practice of engineering. Thus, a set of philosophical principles for sustainable engineering practice is developed. Such a change in the philosophy underlying the practice of engineering is seen as necessary if engineers are to engage with and contribute to the resolution of Type 3 problems. Two particular challenges must be overcome, if Type 3 problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. First, issues of belief, values, and morals are central to this problem type and must be included in problem consideration. And second, the problem situation is usually so complex that it challenges the capacity of human cognition to deal with it. Consequently, extensive consideration is given to cognitive and behavioural psychology, in particular to choice, judgement and decision-making in uncertainty. A novel problem-structuring approach is developed on three levels. A set philosophical foundation is established; a theoretical framework, based on general systems theory and established behavioural and cognitive psychological theory, is devised; and a set of tools is proposed to model Type 3 complex problems as a dynamic systems. The approach is different to other systems approaches, in that it enables qualitative exploration of the system to plausible, hypothetical disturbances. The problem-structuring approach is applied in a case study, which relates to the development of a water subsystem for a major metropolis (Sydney, Australia). The technique is also used to critique existing infrastructure planning processes and to propose an alternative approach.

<p>The problems of the world today are global and thus we must act on a global level to solve them. We need to establish a perpetual and global peace and we also need to create global justice. How is this to be done? In 2008 the philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö tried to provide an answer on these questions in the book Global Democracy – The Case for a World Government. In his book Tännsjö argues for an institutional cosmopolitan approach, trying to convince us that a world government would guarantee both a global and perpetual peace, as well as global justice. In this thesis I will present Tännsjö´s main argument and then share my thoughts and give my critique on them.</p>

<p><p>The aim of this thesis is to investigate the critique Richard Shusterman is raising towards Maurice Merleau-Pontys view on consciousness of bodily sensations and habit. Richard Shusterman critique towards Merleau-Ponty is found to have no other basis than Shusterman own subjective view on what the task of philosophy is.</p></p>