<p>This essay discusses and criticizes Richard Swinburne's inductive argument for the existence of God. In his The Existence of God, Swinburne aims at showing that the existence of God is more probable than not. This is an argument taking into consideration the premises of all traditional arguments for the existence of God. Swinburne uses the phenomena and events that constitute the premises of these arguments as evidence in an attempt to show that his hypothesis is more probably true than nor. Swinburne pursues this task by way of applying Bayes' theorem. The aim of this essay is normative - to judge the strength of Swinburne's argument for the existence of God. My primary objections towards Swinburne is that he professes a subjective concept of probability, that he relies too heavily on simplicity as a virtue of plausible and probable hypotheses and that his concept of God involves an incoherent picture of God's nature. I question not only the actual success of Swinburne's project but what his argument, if it had been successful, would have been able to establish.</p> / <p>Denna uppsats diskuterar och kritiserar Richard Swinburne's induktiva argument för Guds existens. I sin The Existence of God, försöker Swinburne visa att Guds existens är mer trolig än inte. Detta argument tar alla traditionella argument för Guds existens i beräknande.. Swinburne  använder de fenomen och händelser som utgör premisser för dessa argument som bevis i ett försök att visa att hans hypotes är mer trolig än inte.  Han genomför detta genom att använda sig av Bayes teorem. Syftet med denna uppsats är normativt - att bedöma styrkan I Swinburnes argument för Guds existens.  Mina primära invändningar mot Swinburne är att han  använder sig av ett subjektivt sannolikhetsbegrepp, att han förlitar sig allt för starkt på enkelhet som en förklaringsmässig dygd och att hans Gudsbegrepp inbegriper en inkoherent bild av Guds natur. Jag ifrågasätter den faktiska framgången i Swinburnes  projekt, och även vad Swinburne hade kunnat fastställa om hans projekt hade varit framgångsrikt.</p>

<p>Denna uppsats är en granskning av Robert Kanes libertarianska teori om viljeansträngningar, hur dessa kan lösa det problem som det så kallade turargumentet utgör för en libertariansk händelse-kausal teori och om hans teori ger en bra redogörelse för fri vilja, framför allt i samband med moraliska konflikter. Jag undersöker också Randolphs Clarkes kritik mot Kanes teori, som bland annat går ut på att de dubbla viljeansträngningarna är irrationella, att de inte behövs för att bemöta turargumentet och att Kanes teori inte tillför tillräckligt mycket för att ge en typ av fri vilja som vi inte redan skulle kunna ha i en deterministisk värld. Jag kommer fram till att Kanes teori kan bemöta turargumentet på ett ganska bra sätt, men att den inte tillför något som skulle kunna ge fri vilja även om fri vilja skulle vara omöjlig i en deterministisk värld. Som libertariansk teori misslyckas den alltså.</p>

<p> </p><p>The central objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how the concept—or <em>concepts</em>—of the public/private divide actively shapes the conditions of migrant domestic work in Europe. In doing so, I aim to show how European states’ current treatment of migrant domestic work is ethically problematic, and that a sufficient moral response to this dilemma entails a re-evaluation of any operative notions of the public/private distinction.</p><p>The premise of my thesis is that migrants working as domestics suffer human rights abuses due to two distinct but inseparable factors: their gender-based mode of employment and their legal status. I will make the claim that states fail to prevent these abuses, and secure the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of migrants’ human rights, because they assume a morally problematic understanding of the public/private distinction. </p><p>In arguing for a re-evaluation of the public/private sphere, I will likewise propose that certain revisions be accordingly made in several levels and domains of legislation—regional and national, as well as labor and immigration. Less concrete, though no less important, is my contention that receiving and sending countries alike need to undertake a more profound re-examination of the moral status of domestic work, and, more fundamentally, care work itself. </p><p> </p>

<p>I denna uppsats diskuterar författaren dels om det är möjligt för kollektiv att klassificeras som autonoma entiteter, och dels huruvida det är möjligt för en kollektiv entitet att ha vissa moraliska egenskaper som kollektivets ingående individer saknar. Enligt David Copps kollektiva moraliska autonomites så är detta möjligt. I framställningen presenteras det ett antal invändningar mot Copp riktade av Seumas Miller, som författaren delvis vänder sig mot.</p>

<p>This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.</p>

<p>The objective for this study is to examine whether it is possible to use the method of reflective equilibrium in order to enhance the usefulness of public debates as a support for political decision-making. Since public debates from political quarters are seen as an important tool for policy-making, the need for a rational assessment of the views put forward in such debates are important. And since reflective equilibrium aims for coherence between judgments on different levels – intuitions, principles and theories, which all are put forward in public debates – the point of departure for this theses is that this method could be useful for the matter of bringing some kind of structure to public debates.</p><p>The analysis in this study shows that there actually are similarities between the method of reflective equilibrium and the course of public debates, since they both are characterized by the fact that viewpoints are mutually scrutinized in the light of one another. Further, it is argued that a more systematic applying of the method of reflective equilibrium would further the justification force of the outcome of public debates, since the method stresses the need of rationality and the importance of taking all relevant opinions into consideration. Therefore, the conclusion is that applying reflective equilibrium to public debates could make the political decision-making more democratic.</p>

<p>Denna uppsats är, precis som titeln anger, en analys av sambandet mellan motsägelser och ångest. De nutida vardagsuttrycken för begreppen utreds och granskas med hjälp av känslo- och rationalitetsfilosofiska teorier och distinktioner ifrån Arne Næss och Jean-Paul Sartre. Författaren föreslår en egen definition av ångest och jämför denna med andra filosofers och tankeskolors definitioner av begreppet. Författarens syn på ångest skiljer sig från Sartres, då han menar att ångest kan lösas upp och att den ofta är väldigt specifik och konkret till sin karaktär, medan Sartre menar att ångesten är omöjlig att lösgöra sig ifrån och att den är av ett mycket mer generellt slag. Detta konkreta och specifika element i den ångestdefinition, som författaren vill lägga fram, består i att ångesten uppstår i vissa valsituationer där valalternativen, i någon form, är sinsemellan motsägande och där ett val är tvunget att göras.</p> / <p>This paper is, as the title states, an analysis of the connection between contradictionsand anxiety. The present everyday expressions of these concepts are investigated with the help of philosophical theories from Arne Næss and Jean-Paul Sartre concerning emotions and rationality. The author presents his own definition of anxiety and compares it to other philosophers and thinkers’ definitions of the same concepts, and this way he reaches a conclusion. For example this conclusion diverge with Sartre’s view of anxiety, because the author states that it is possible to get free from anxiety and that it is often something very particular and precice, while Sartre says it is impossible to free yourself from it and that it is very general by nature. This specific element in the author’s definition of anxiety lies in the fact that he thinks of it as something that often occurs in situations with two or more options, and where these options are, amongst themself, contradictory in one form or an other, and where a choice has to be made.</p>

<p>This paper treats George Dickies institutional theory of how to define art. Some alternative theories and their originators are also introduced. According to Dickie something is art because it has been created against a background of an already existing artworld. Dickie has formulated his theory in two different versions, ”the earlier” and ”the later”, which differ somewhat in their design. Both versions is presented and discussed in this paper.</p>

<p>The thesis <em>„Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy with regard to its feministic orientation” </em>represents Martha Nussbaum’s theory of the good life, demonstrates it as a feminist philosophy and locates it in the context of feminist theory. It is shown that Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach in connection with her reflections about the political liberalism and communitarianism is an important contribution for a feministic ethic of equality. Martha Nussbaum combines questions of justice with a theory of the good life. In her demand for the ethicing of the political, lies the relevance of her philosophy for feminism.</p><p> </p>

This book is a contribution to the debate of the metaphysics and value of death. The metaphysical problems of death are closely connected with the debate of personal identity. In Chapter Two, I defend the view that human persons are human organisms. This view, often called "Animalism," is apparently incompatible with a standard account of personal identity over time, "the Psychological View." I try to show how the Animalist can accommodate the intuitions that seem to support the Psychological View. In Chapter Three, I discuss the thesis that human persons cease to exist when they die, a thesis that has bearing on several metaphysical and ethical questions. Recently, many materialists have attacked the thesis, arguing that human persons continue to exist after death as corpses. In opposition to this popular view, I argue that human animals, and hence human persons, do go out of existence at death. Epicureans deny that death is an evil for the one who dies. Their arguments are based on what will be called "the missing subject problem." In Chapter Four, I aim to show that Epicureanism survives the objections that have been put forward in current literature. But I also argue that a more convincing case can be made against the Epicurean view. Anti-Epicureans typically base the view that death is sometimes bad for the deceased on the "deprivation approach." This approach seems to have the unsavory consequence that prenatal non-existence, too, is a great evil. Recently, proponents of the deprivation approach have suggested a number of ways of avoiding this implication. In Chapter Five, I argue that all these attempts fail, and that it is preferable to accept the consequence. In Chapter Six I turn to the question of the reasonableness of the special concern that most people have for their own deaths. I claim that this issue should be treated in the light of the more general question of the justifiability of special concern about one's own future. It is often held that such concern is justified if and only if "Non-Reductionism" about personal identity is correct. I argue, on the contrary, that it is unjustified whether or not Non-Reductionism is true.