Dans cette thèse, on examine la manière dont l'œuvre littéraire de David Hume (1711-1776) propose une réflexion sur les notions de subjectivité et d'identité personnelle et collective. On s'interroge sur la cohérence de la réponse de Hume au défi que pose l'enquête sur ces notions et sur la pertinence de sa pensée dans le contexte de l'Écosse des Lumières. On montre également dans quelle mesure sa pensée a influencé des auteurs ultérieurs et ce qu'il reste aujourd'hui des méthodes, des outils et des idées que l'auteur a contribué à développer. On se demande enfin si cette pensée peut nous être utile, à nous, lecteurs du XXIe siècle, pour interroger le monde qui nous est contemporain. Au terme de l'analyse, on est convaincu du bénéfice bien réel qu'il y a à lire les textes humiens au prisme d'un questionnement sur ces notions. Hume a eu l’idée originale que le fond du problème de l’identité est réductible à des principes naturels liés au fonctionnement de l’esprit et que l’idée que l’on en a est l’effet de constructions historiques et de croyances : l'identité est une « fiction ». / This dissertation explores the notions of personal and collective identity as well as subjectivity in the literary works of David Hume (1711-1776). It focuses on the coherence and relevance of Hume's response to the challenge of defining these notions within the context of the Scottish Enlightenment. It looks into the extent to which Hume's thought impacted future generations of thinkers and it demonstrates that some intellectual tools, methods and ideas that the author developed in his time are still relevant today. It finally examines whether his thought may help 21st century readers understand today's society better. Upon completing the inquiry, we may conclude that reading Hume's texts helps us clarify many difficulties related to the aforementioned notions. Hume's conclusions regarding identity and subjectivity are quite remarkable in that the author believed that they emerge from the regular operation of natural principles in the human mind. Our very idea of these notions amounts to a belief that is the result of historical construction : ultimately, identity and subjectivity are 'fictions' of the mind.

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Enactivism builds on the “embodied turn” in cognitive science to firmly establish the close connection between mind and life, exemplified in the work of Evan Thompson. The more recent “interactive turn” emphasizes that individuals’ mental and cognitive processes are shaped by social interactions with other cognitive agents. Regarding personal identity, Miriam Kyselo argues that it remains unclear how and to what extent the self is individuated by these processes, and whether or not social relations are necessary for self-persistence. Further, it remains unclear how the self of simple biological organisms is continuous with the much more complicated personal identity of human beings, who are subject not only to the forces of the natural world, but also to forces that arise only in their uniquely symbolic and sociocultural milieu. I contend that we can come to understand how evaluations dependent on the individual’s needs and desires, what Charles Taylor refers to as “weak evaluations,” are continuous with “strong evaluations,” whose validity are independent of the individual’s needs and desires, by recognizing that some organisms not only create value, but respond to values already present in their environment. The general notion of selfhood that results is one of axiological organization. I argue that what we are really referring to with the term “self” is the organization of evaluations that organisms make in regard to environmental affordances, a system which, over time, comes to take on definitive traits and characteristics. The self, regardless of the particular context in which it is situated, becomes individuated by the evaluations it makes, and is experienced as persistent because evaluative activity is an on-going process, ending only in death. The self is further experienced as persistent because these evaluations are made in accordance with a critical standard which itself rarely, and the overall axiological organization retains a high degree of stability. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / The aim of this thesis is to provide a conception of selfhood and personal identity capable of accounting for the both the “embodied turn” and the “interactive turn” in cognitive science. It seeks to explain the persistence and individuation of selves both biologically, as living systems, and socially, as members that participate in or distinguish themselves from social groups. The first chapter explores selfhood from the perspective of Evan Thompson’s work on the definition of living systems as self-producing and self-organizing. Chapter two introduces Charles Taylor’s work on the necessity of moral frameworks for personal identity, a view which initially appears difficult to reconcile with the approach outlined in the first chapter. The third chapter attempts to combine these approaches by demonstrating that selfhood is best conceived of as axiological organization – the way living beings evaluate and prioritize possible actions in their environment.

Animalismens huvudargument säger att du är det tänkande objektet som sitter i din stol, och enligt animalisterna själva innebär detta att du är identisk med ett mänskligt djur. Argumentet är dock problematiskt då det inte tycks utesluta eventuella tänkande delar hos det mänskliga djuret, som till exempel dess hjärna. Detta beror på att hjärnor också kan beskrivas som tänkande, samt att även de befinner sig inom det spatiella område som upptas av det mänskliga djuret. I den här uppsatsen argumenterar jag för att tänkande hjärnor är ett problem för animalismen och att tesen att vi är identiska med hjärnor är ett verkligt hot mot den animalistiska teorin om personlig identitet. Olika argument som lagts fram mot tesen att vi är hjärnor avhandlas, som till exempel att hjärnor inte existerar och att hjärnor inte tänker. Jag diskuterar även två argument som tidigare använts för att visa att vi är personer snarare än mänskliga djur (the Transplant Intuition och the Remnant Person Problem), men i det här sammanhanget bedöms de utifrån deras förmåga att stödja hjärnteorin.

This dissertation investigates the relationship between personal identity theory and normative ethics. There are a surprising number of contradictory arguments about the relevance of personal identity criteria for ethics and political philosophy. For example, writers like David Gauthier, Thomas Nagel and John Rawls argue that utilitarianism disregards the separateness, or non-identity, of persons. Derek Parfit claims the opposite. According to him, utilitarians respect the separateness of persons while also respecting the disintegration within lives. Also, Henry Sidgwick was under the impression that the separateness of persons supports egoism and disregard for the other-regarding demands of morality. David Brink claims the opposite. According to him, the resulting form of egoism would be nearly indistinguishable from altruism and therefore not at odds with the other-regarding demands of morality. Finally, both Rawls and Nozick argue that the separateness of persons speaks in favour of their own deontological view—despite the fact that their views are fundamentally opposed. Rawls hopes to gain support for his contractually derived principles of justice, while Nozick believes he can generate support for his deontological side constraints. This situation is rather surprising and in need of an explanation. Finally, there have also been skeptical arguments about the force of such appeals, such as Rawls’s claims that personal identity theory and ethics are independent, and his claim that personal identity criteria are inherently normative. This dissertation looks at these controversies in detail and comes to the conclusion that the force of appeals to personal identity is considerably more fine-grained and more complex than has been presumed.

The main claim of this dissertation is that Hume’s theory of the self can be interpreted in terms of a causal or functional theory of mind. It is a thesis about Hume’s identification of mental particulars―impressions and ideas―in terms of the kind of roles that each plays in the cognitive system that it is a member of. The true Humean idea of the human mind is to understand it as a system of different mental states and processes, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect. Functionalism as such can be construed as both teleo-functionalism and psycho-functionalism. The former is rooted in his teleological characterization of the mind according to which the bundle of perceptions persists over time by maintaining functional continuity, whereas the main source of Hume’s psycho-functionalism lies in his Representational Theory of Mind. Hume, however, Hume expresses his strong dissatisfaction with his earlier treatment of the topic, and confesses that he now finds an inconsistency in his original account. He does not make clear in his recantation what he finds problematic in his earlier account. And although more than a dozen interpretations have been suggested, no consensus as to what Hume’s worry is has emerged. I claim that Hume’s functionalism, as presented in the main body of the Treatise, stores a problem for him and when he arrives at the Appendix he realises the problem and confesses that he is unable to resolve it. The problem that leads to the inconsistency has two main possible sources: First, the principles of constancy and coherence may successfully account for the arising belief in the idea of the continued and distinct existence of external objects and the idea of personal identity, but they fail to explain our belief in other minds (selves). Second, Hume’s functionalism is circular because it presupposes personal identity. The central idea is that if Hume is right to say that something like functional continuity would suffice for persons to persist through time, then he must show that we can have a complete account of how one’s mental states produce the idea of a persisting self without making assumption about the identity condition of their subject or bearer. And of course, psycho-functionalism, including Hume’s, identifies a mental state in terms of its functional relations to other mental states that are the states of the same person. This is straightforwardly circular.

The main claim of this dissertation is that Hume’s theory of the self can be interpreted in terms of a causal or functional theory of mind. It is a thesis about Hume’s identification of mental particulars―impressions and ideas―in terms of the kind of roles that each plays in the cognitive system that it is a member of. The true Humean idea of the human mind is to understand it as a system of different mental states and processes, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect. Functionalism as such can be construed as both teleo-functionalism and psycho-functionalism. The former is rooted in his teleological characterization of the mind according to which the bundle of perceptions persists over time by maintaining functional continuity, whereas the main source of Hume’s psycho-functionalism lies in his Representational Theory of Mind. Hume, however, Hume expresses his strong dissatisfaction with his earlier treatment of the topic, and confesses that he now finds an inconsistency in his original account. He does not make clear in his recantation what he finds problematic in his earlier account. And although more than a dozen interpretations have been suggested, no consensus as to what Hume’s worry is has emerged. I claim that Hume’s functionalism, as presented in the main body of the Treatise, stores a problem for him and when he arrives at the Appendix he realises the problem and confesses that he is unable to resolve it. The problem that leads to the inconsistency has two main possible sources: First, the principles of constancy and coherence may successfully account for the arising belief in the idea of the continued and distinct existence of external objects and the idea of personal identity, but they fail to explain our belief in other minds (selves). Second, Hume’s functionalism is circular because it presupposes personal identity. The central idea is that if Hume is right to say that something like functional continuity would suffice for persons to persist through time, then he must show that we can have a complete account of how one’s mental states produce the idea of a persisting self without making assumption about the identity condition of their subject or bearer. And of course, psycho-functionalism, including Hume’s, identifies a mental state in terms of its functional relations to other mental states that are the states of the same person. This is straightforwardly circular.

This research is documented in three volumes, and is the study of a series of three Doctoral exhibitions. The first of these, Australian moon over Cumbria and the procession of life, evolved from a series of watercolours based on the biblical figures of Eve and the serpent.The volume contains images and a critique from Australian moon over Cumbria. Also included are images that influenced the work, essays, and information on relevant minor exhibitions. The second, Sisters and spinsters, the Misses Swann of Elizabeth Farm, was designed and executed as site-specific.The Misses Swann were nine sisters, and the exhibition focused on the sisters' working lives, their contribution to their local communities, and their personalities.Needlepoint and damask table napkins were used as vehicles for the storytelling.Critical writings and extensive reference material are included. The third in the series, Constructing identity within Catholicism, was based on the hypothesis that images of the culture of Catholicism have the capacity to influence personal identity. All of the work was designed to complement the design and spiritual meaning of the chapel. Included along with the essays are supporting images and documentation. / Doctor of Creative Arts

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