Animalismens huvudargument säger att du är det tänkande objektet som sitter i din stol, och enligt animalisterna själva innebär detta att du är identisk med ett mänskligt djur. Argumentet är dock problematiskt då det inte tycks utesluta eventuella tänkande delar hos det mänskliga djuret, som till exempel dess hjärna. Detta beror på att hjärnor också kan beskrivas som tänkande, samt att även de befinner sig inom det spatiella område som upptas av det mänskliga djuret. I den här uppsatsen argumenterar jag för att tänkande hjärnor är ett problem för animalismen och att tesen att vi är identiska med hjärnor är ett verkligt hot mot den animalistiska teorin om personlig identitet. Olika argument som lagts fram mot tesen att vi är hjärnor avhandlas, som till exempel att hjärnor inte existerar och att hjärnor inte tänker. Jag diskuterar även två argument som tidigare använts för att visa att vi är personer snarare än mänskliga djur (the Transplant Intuition och the Remnant Person Problem), men i det här sammanhanget bedöms de utifrån deras förmåga att stödja hjärnteorin.

The contemporary personal identity debate has divided into two entrenched positions. One supports the supposedly naive and unpopular Bodily Criterion (the view that personal identity requires physical continuity). The other school is the Psychological Criterion (the view that personal identity requires psychological continuity). This has acquired the status of virtual orthodoxy. The British Empiricists, John Locke and David Hume, are both supposed to give historical weight to this orthodoxy. This thesis argues this is a dramatic misrepresentation of history. Locke is supposed to found the personal identity debate in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, arguing that personal identity is sameness of consciousness. It is argued that Locke in fact responds to a prevalent Cartesian View, called here the Compositional Account. The Compositional Account is the belief that a Human Being is composed of a Mind and a Body. Hume, in responding to Locke, is also responding to the Compositional Account. In opposition to widely established readings both philosophers are argued to be highly sympathetic to the Compositional Account. Chapter 1 establishes Descartes' version of the Compositional Account and explains why Descartes needs no philosophical treatment of personal identity. These problems emerge only for the Empiricists, Locke and Hume. Locke's sympathies for the Compositional Account are established in Chapter 2, drawing on material prior to the Essay and normally uncited passages in the Essay. Chapter 3 argues that Hume presumed the Compositional Account in his Treatise Concerning Human Nature. This is argued to explain Hume's famous later recantation of his theory. The thesis concludes by sketching a role for the Compositional Account in contemporary debate. The Compositional Account is argued to give strong support to a recently developed position known as Animalism. This provides the conceptual materials to move beyond the orthodox dichotomy between the Bodily Criterion and the Psychological Criterion.

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A particularly intriguing aspect of personal identity is the staying power of the first arguments. Many of the earliest arguments have remained influential to contemporary theories, even if they sometimes go unacknowledged. One of the most prominent of those long-lived theories comes from Descartes. In this paper I establish the intellectual background, framework, and implications of Cartesian dualism. With this theory in mind I examine Derek Parfit’s We Are Not Human Beings. Despite his denial dualism’s relevance, Parfit’s argument for personal identity contains Cartesian Dualism within it. His examples, definitions, and “intuitions” are compatible, if not more supportive of the Cartesian philosophy. To have the strongest argument that we are not human beings Parfit needs dualism - even if he will not directly acknowledge it.

The debate on personal identity in philosophy is about what makes a person at one point intime the same person as a person at another point in time. Animalism is a point of view whichhas it that being the same human animal is what makes a person at one point in time the sameperson as a person at another point in time. Animalism makes the claim that a person isnumerically identical to a human animal. The two most prominent arguments in favor ofanimalism is the thinking animal argument and the animal ancestry argument. Thinkinganimal argument says that there is a thinking human animal where you are, but you are theonly thinking being where you are. therefore you are a human animal. Animal ancestryargument says that you are a product of evolution and that only living organisms are productsof evolution. Therefore you are a living organism, a human animal. In this thesis these twoarguments, as well as multiple objections against them, were evaluated. It was argued thatarguments about persons being numerically identical to thinking parts and to organs mightpose a threat to the thinking animal argument and the animal ancestry argument, but that thearguments supporting animalism should not be discarded.Abstrakt / Debatten om personlig identitet inom filosofin handlar om vad som gör att en person vid entidpunkt är densamma som en person vid en annan tidpunkt. Animalism är en ståndpunkt somsäger att vad som gör att en person vid en tidpunkt är densamma som en person vid en annantidpunkt, är att de är samma mänskliga djur. Animalism säger alltså att en person är numerisktidentisk med ett mänskligt djur. De två mest framstående argumenten för animalism ärthinking animal argument och animal ancestry argument. Thinking animal argument säger attdet finns ett tänkande mänskligt djur där du är men att du är den enda tänkande varelsen därdu är, alltså är du ett mänskligt djur. Animal ancestry argument säger att du är en produkt avevolutionen och att endast levande organismer är produkter av evolutionen. Alltså är du enlevande organism, ett mänskligt djur. I denna uppsats granskades dessa argument samt ettantal argument mot dessa två argument. Utredningen visade att argument om att personer kanvara numeriskt identiska med tänkande delar och med organ kan vara ett problem för thinkinganimal argument och animal ancestry argument men den slutgiltiga bedömningen är attargumenten för animalism inte bör förkastas.

Through collecting, gathering and transformation I look at themateriality in bodies of human and animal. The asymmetricalrelation rules we have created to approve our behaviour oftoday. I write this paper with the contradicting approach ofbeing scientific yet sentimental to the meanings of physicalmatter.

This book is a contribution to the debate of the metaphysics and value of death. The metaphysical problems of death are closely connected with the debate of personal identity. In Chapter Two, I defend the view that human persons are human organisms. This view, often called "Animalism," is apparently incompatible with a standard account of personal identity over time, "the Psychological View." I try to show how the Animalist can accommodate the intuitions that seem to support the Psychological View. In Chapter Three, I discuss the thesis that human persons cease to exist when they die, a thesis that has bearing on several metaphysical and ethical questions. Recently, many materialists have attacked the thesis, arguing that human persons continue to exist after death as corpses. In opposition to this popular view, I argue that human animals, and hence human persons, do go out of existence at death. Epicureans deny that death is an evil for the one who dies. Their arguments are based on what will be called "the missing subject problem." In Chapter Four, I aim to show that Epicureanism survives the objections that have been put forward in current literature. But I also argue that a more convincing case can be made against the Epicurean view. Anti-Epicureans typically base the view that death is sometimes bad for the deceased on the "deprivation approach." This approach seems to have the unsavory consequence that prenatal non-existence, too, is a great evil. Recently, proponents of the deprivation approach have suggested a number of ways of avoiding this implication. In Chapter Five, I argue that all these attempts fail, and that it is preferable to accept the consequence. In Chapter Six I turn to the question of the reasonableness of the special concern that most people have for their own deaths. I claim that this issue should be treated in the light of the more general question of the justifiability of special concern about one's own future. It is often held that such concern is justified if and only if "Non-Reductionism" about personal identity is correct. I argue, on the contrary, that it is unjustified whether or not Non-Reductionism is true.

Advance directives are instructions given by patients – or potential patients – specifying what actions ought to be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer capable to make decisions due to illness or incapacity. Over the last decades, there has been a rising tide in favour of advance directives: not only is the use of such directives recommended by most medical and advisory bodies, they are also gaining increasing legal recognition in many parts of the world. This book, however, takes as its point of departure one of the most commonly discussed medical-ethical arguments against granting advance directives moral force: the Objection from Personal Identity. The adherers of this objection basically asserts that when there is lacking psychological continuity between the person who formulated the advance directive and the later patient to whom it supposedly applies, this seriously threatens the directive’s moral authority. And, further, that this is so because lacking sufficient psychological continuity implies that the author of the advance directive is numerically distinct from the later patient. Although this argument has some initial appeal, most philosophers in the advance directives debate maintain that the Objection from Personal Identity fails, but suggest different reasons as to why. Whereas some argue that the objection has no force because it rests on faulty beliefs about personal identity, others argue that we ought to grant advance directives moral authority even if the author and the later patient are numerically distinct beings. This book investigates some of the most influential of these arguments and reaches the conclusion that the Objection from Personal Identity has more to it than is usually recognized in the medical-ethical debate. Lacking sufficient psychological continuity between author and later patient, it is concluded, does threaten the moral authority of the advance directive.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / De Assinalações a DESTERRO: investigações entre arte e subjetividade é uma reflexão sobre o processo de construção das obras das séries SORTERRO e DESTERRO. Tais trabalhos se utilizam de pelos e cabelos como matéria física e conceitual na sua elaboração e a partir destes elementos dar-se inicio a uma série de investigações que buscam trazer a tona os meandros do processo da criação e produção artística. A investigação inicia com a visita a algumas obras anteriores em que o elemento cabelo aparece. A partir daí uma serie de temas atravessam o caminho. Dentre os quais estão as questões relativas ao corpo, à vida e à morte, ao desejo, ao trauma, à biografia, ao acaso, ao medo, ao erotismo, à animalidade, à perversão, a sublimação e à linguagem. Dentre os autores mais visitados estão: Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida e Gilles Deleuze / From Assinalations to Exile: Investigations between Art and Subjectivity is a reflection about the building process of the artworks from the series SORTERRO and EXILE. These artworks used fur and hair as physical and conceptual matter, and, after these elements, started a process of investigations that would seek to bring to light the intricacies of the creation process. The has investigation initiated with the contact with some previous artworks that the element hair could have been found. After that, a series of themes crossed the pathway taken. Among them, issues related to body, to life and death, to desires, to trauma, to biography, to fortuity, to fear, to eroticism, to animalism, to perversion, to sublimation and to the language appeared. Among the most visited authors, there are: Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / De Assinalações a DESTERRO: investigações entre arte e subjetividade é uma reflexão sobre o processo de construção das obras das séries SORTERRO e DESTERRO. Tais trabalhos se utilizam de pelos e cabelos como matéria física e conceitual na sua elaboração e a partir destes elementos dar-se inicio a uma série de investigações que buscam trazer a tona os meandros do processo da criação e produção artística. A investigação inicia com a visita a algumas obras anteriores em que o elemento cabelo aparece. A partir daí uma serie de temas atravessam o caminho. Dentre os quais estão as questões relativas ao corpo, à vida e à morte, ao desejo, ao trauma, à biografia, ao acaso, ao medo, ao erotismo, à animalidade, à perversão, a sublimação e à linguagem. Dentre os autores mais visitados estão: Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida e Gilles Deleuze / From Assinalations to Exile: Investigations between Art and Subjectivity is a reflection about the building process of the artworks from the series SORTERRO and EXILE. These artworks used fur and hair as physical and conceptual matter, and, after these elements, started a process of investigations that would seek to bring to light the intricacies of the creation process. The has investigation initiated with the contact with some previous artworks that the element hair could have been found. After that, a series of themes crossed the pathway taken. Among them, issues related to body, to life and death, to desires, to trauma, to biography, to fortuity, to fear, to eroticism, to animalism, to perversion, to sublimation and to the language appeared. Among the most visited authors, there are: Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze