<p>This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.</p>

This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.

This thesis seeks to examine the Concept of Right Action in Karl Popper's social and moral philosophy. This is attempted through the study of his theory of rationality. Through the examination of his theory of 'critical rationalism', it has been established that a right action is a rational action, that is, an action based on a critical assessment of its possible consequences. His theory of falsifiability, which is fundamental to his theory of critical rationalization and which advocates that falsification as opposed to verification, is a true test of a theory, is also examined, in order to see whether and how it can be applied to social and moral problems. In this context it has been established that in social and political realms also, one works through theories, ideas and hypotheses which can be tested. This method is considered to be a rational and scientific method and is advocated as an alternative to authoritarian and totalitarian methods. In order to determine the viability of K. Popper's proposals, his critique of historicism is also examined. Through the study of these critiques, it has been established that historicist modes of thought and action tend to lead to totalitarian and authoritarian political and social systems, and the consequent violence. A system based on critical rationalism is considered to be the only alternative. In examining these critiques we also raised the question whether religion and tradition have any place in Popper's system. It has been shown that the critical understanding and use of tradition is fundamental and necessary. We have also shown that Popper is not anti-religion and that religion and rationality are not incompatible, when we consider that religion is not merely a metaphysical system but also a social system, i.e., a body of ethics and a way of life. A rational and a secular attitude and a religious attitude are not mutually exclusive. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Der Begriff von Orthos Logos ist zentral für die ethische Lehre Aristoteles’. In der Literatur ist jedoch umstritten, was der Inhalt von OL ist. Das genaue Wesen von OL liegt immer noch im Dunkel. Ziel meiner Dissertation ist es, den Beitrag von OL für Aristoteles’ Ethik zu erforschen. Dabei soll vor allem erläutert werden, was OL ist bzw. was OL leisten kann. Auf dieser Untersuchung basierend versuche ich, eine ausführliche bzw. in sich konsistente Interpretation der wichtigen Bestandteile der Nicomachischen Ethik zu liefern. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass OL als der praktische Syllogismus selbst aufzufassen ist, der die moralischen Subjekte darüber informiert, was sie tun sollen bzw. weswegen sie gerade dies und nicht etwas anderes tun sollen. Sofern ein hinsichtlich der Moralität noch lernender Mensch den Syllogismus nicht vollständig begreift, ist es allerdings möglich, dass OL diesem Menschen etwas anderes zu sein scheint. / The notion of the orthos logos (abbr. OL) is vital and decisive for Aristotle’s ethical project. The question of what OL really means is a vigorously debated issue. But what the OL exactly is still remains ambiguous and obscure. The purpose of my dissertation is to inquire into the philosophical contribution of the OL in Aristotle’s Ethics. To fulfil this goal, it is essentially to determine what the OL is and what the OL can do. Through this inquiry I seek to present a comprehensive and consistent reading of important parts of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I will argue that the OL is the practical syllogism per se, which could tell moral people what should they do and why should they do this or that. But it could also appear to be something else for moral learners, since they are not capable of fully understanding the syllogism yet.